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Abstract
Information Quality (IQ) has been always a growing concern for most organizations,
since they depend on information for managing their daily tasks, delivering their services
to their costumers, making important decisions, etc., and relying on low-quality informa-
tion may negatively influence their overall performance, or even disasters in the case of
critical systems (e.g., air traffic management systems, healthcare systems, etc.). Although
there exist several techniques for dealing with IQ related problems in the literature (e.g.,
checksum, integrity constraints, etc.), but most of them propose solutions that are able to
address the technical aspects of IQ, and seem to be limited in addressing social and or-
ganizational aspects. In other words, these techniques do not satisfy the needs of current
complex systems, such as socio-technical systems, where humans and their interactions
are considered as an integral part of the system along with the technical elements (e.g.,
healthcare systems, smart cities, etc.). This introduces the need of analyzing the social and
organizational context where the system will eventually operates, since IQ related problems
might manifest themselves in the actors’ interactions and dependencies. Moreover, consid-
ering IQ requirements since the early phase of the system development (the requirements
phase) can prevent revising the system to accommodate such needs after the system de-
ployment, which might be too costly. Despite this, most of the Requirements Engineering
(RE) frameworks and approaches either loosely define, or simply ignore IQ requirements.
To this end, we propose a goal-oriented framework for modeling and reasoning about IQ
requirements since the early phases of the system development. The proposed framework
consists of (i) a modeling language that provides concepts and constructs for modeling IQ
requirements; (ii) a set of analysis techniques that support system designers while perform-
ing the required analysis to verify the correctness and consistency of the IQ requirements
model; (iii) an engineering methodology to assist designers in using the framework for
capturing IQ requirements; and (iv) an automated tool-support, namely ST-IQ Tool. In
addition, we empirically evaluated the framework to demonstrate its applicability, useful-
ness, and the scalability of its reasoning techniques by successfully applying it to a case
study concerning a stock market system.
Keywords[Requirements Engineering, Information Quality Requirements, Critical sys-
tems, Socio-technical Systems]
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Whether you think that you can, or that you can’t, you are
usually right.
Henry Ford
Most organizations depend on information to perform their everyday tasks, e.g., deliver
their services to customers, support their business processes, assist their decision making,
etc. In this context, the efficient performance of these tasks is highly influenced by the
quality of information they depend on. More specifically, Information Quality (IQ) is
a key success factor for organizations, since depending on low-quality information may
result in undesirable outcome [Red95], or even disasters in the case of critical systems
[GG13b] (e.g., Air Traffic Management, health care systems, etc.).
Generally speaking, quality can be defined as “fitness for use” [JGB79], or as in [RB94]
the conformance to specifications, i.e., meeting or exceeding consumer expectations. Sim-
ilarly, IQ can be defined based on the “fitness for use”, i.e., determining whether IQ is
high or low depends on its “fitness for use”. In other words, the same information might
be considered as high quality for one user and low quality for another one. For example, a
stock market investor who uses his laptop to trade some securities, the level of IQ required
by him concerning his trades is not the same as the IQ level required by a main stock
market (e.g., NYSE, NASDAQ) that is responsible of managing thousands of trades in
milliseconds simultaneously. In the first case, low-quality information can be accepted to
a certain level, while in the second case it may result in a financial disaster (e.g., stock
market mini crash, full crash, loses of millions of dollars, etc.).
In addition, IQ is a hierarchical multi-dimensional concept that can be characterized by
different dimensions, including: accessibility, accuracy, completeness, timeliness, consis-
tency, trustworthiness, etc. [Red95; PLW02; BSM03; Jia10]. Thus, determining whether
IQ “fitness for use” or not depends on analyzing its different dimensions. That is why
2 Introduction
deciding whether IQ is high or low is not a trivial task. For instance, a stock investor can
evaluate the quality of its trading order (information) at the intended trading market by
analyzing the order accuracy, completeness, timeliness (validity), etc.
Although there exist several models for analyzing IQ based on its different dimensions
[LC02; PLW02; WRK95; BSM03], yet most of them share several common limitations,
including: (1) ambiguity [Jia10], (2) subjectivity: there is no clear theoretical bases to
justify why a certain IQ dimension is considered or not for analyzing IQ [LC02]; (3) in-
consistency among the dimensions they consider (e.g., completeness is a sub-dimension of
believability in [WRK95], while it is a sub-dimension of integrity in [BSM03]). Moreover,
most of them propose holistic methods for analyzing IQ (one size fits all), i.e., they con-
sider a user-centric view [WS96] without taking into consideration the different relations
between information and its purposes of use. In particular, they do not explicitly capture
the “fitness for use” for “what” and the “fitness for use” of “who”, which is very important
when information has several stakeholders, who may require different (might be conflict-
ing) quality needs. More specifically, existing approaches miss the clear semantics that
enables for capturing IQ needs. Without having such semantics, it is hard to determine
whether IQ “fits for use” or not.
Consider for example, a stock investor who wants to send a trading order to a stock
market through a stock trader. This simple scenario raises several questions: How can we
define the IQ about the order? Does its quality have the same meaning for the different
stakeholders (e.g., investor, trader, market)? Do all stakeholders have the same purpose
of information usage? How we can define the quality of the order based on the different
purposes of use? Finally, do these stakeholders have the same IQ needs? If not, how
do they differ? Actually, the previous questions cannot be properly answered without
defining a clear semantics between information, its quality, and the stakeholders’ intended
purposes of information usage.
Moreover, not only how IQ can be analyzed based on its different dimensions is prob-
lematic, but also how each of these dimensions can be measured is problematic as well. In
particular, IQ requirements used to be represented as generic non-functional properties of
the system-to-be, without specific methods for their analysis [CdPL09]. However, it is not
possible to properly deal with IQ requirements without providing a clear-cut criteria for
their satisfaction, i.e., removing any ambiguity related to their verification among the dif-
ferent stakeholders of the system by providing a general consensus among the stakeholders
on how IQ dimensions can be represented and measured.
At the other hand, several approaches and techniques for dealing with IQ related con-
cerns have been proposed in the literature (e.g., checksum [Coh87], integrity constraints
[Mot89], etc.), but most of them focus on the technical aspects of IQ, and do not con-
3sider the social or organizational aspects. More specifically, they do not satisfy the needs
of current complex systems, such as socio-technical systems [ET60], where humans and
their interactions are considered as an integral part of the system along with the technical
elements (e.g., healthcare systems, smart cities, etc.). Fisher and Kingma [FK01] high-
lighted the limitation of existing approaches for addressing IQ concerns that might arise
at the social and organizational levels. They showed how different kinds of vulnerabilities
might manifest themselves in the actors’ interactions and dependencies, and how such
approaches are not able to address such vulnerabilities.
For instance, the Flash Crash (a main stock market crash) is an example where the
problem was not caused by a mere technical failure, but it was due to several socio-
technical related vulnerabilities of the system [Cli11; SCC+12]. In particular, several
reasons contributed to the Flash Crash were caused by social and organizational issues.
For example, some traders exploit vulnerabilities in the system design, and intention-
ally provide fraud/ falsified information in order to destabilized the trading environment
and influence the prices of the securities they aim to buy/ sell before their real trades
[KKST11]. Others continue trading during the crash by forwarding their orders to the
markets that did not halt their trading activities due to lack of coordination among the
markets[GHLZ12; Sub13], where the lack of coordination resulted also from IQ vulnera-
bilities. This introduces the need of analyzing IQ needs in their social and organizational
context where the system will eventually operates.
In addition, most of these approaches provide ad-hoc techniques to deal with IQ related
vulnerabilities, instead of solving the main reason for such vulnerabilities by considering
them during the early phase of the system development (e.g., requirements level). This
is particularly important since considering IQ during the early development phase of
the system can prevent revising the entire system to accommodate such needs after the
system deployment, which might be too costly. Despite this, most of the Requirements
Engineering (RE) frameworks and approaches either loosely define, or simply ignore IQ
requirements (e.g., UMLsec [Ju¨r05], i* [Yu95], etc.).
In summary, a RE framework for capturing IQ requirements is still missing. To this
end, we propose a novel RE framework for modeling and reasoning about IQ requirements
from the early phases of the system development. The framework offers: (i) a modeling
language that provides concepts and constructs for modeling IQ requirements; (ii) a set
of analysis techniques that help in verifying the correctness and consistency of the IQ
requirements model; (iii) an engineering methodology to assist system designers during
the different phases of the system design; and (iv) an automated tool-support (ST-IQ
Tool).
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1.1 Objectives of our research
This thesis aims to propose a RE framework that is able to model and analyze IQ re-
quirements since the early phases of the system development. In order to achieve that,
we need to answer the following questions:
RQ1: How can we analyze IQ in socio-technical systems? in other words, which
IQ dimensions should be considered for analyzing IQ, and how each of the consid-
ered dimensions can be analyzed taking into consideration the intentional, social
and organizational aspects that might underlie some of them. We address this ques-
tion by proposing a multi-dimensional model for analyzing IQ from socio-technical
perspectives in Section 3.
RQ2: How can we deal with IQ requirements? most RE approaches deal with
IQ requirements as generic non-functional requirements, without specific methods
for their analysis [CdPL09]. Usually, non-functional requirements (e.g., IQ require-
ments) are more difficult to be expressed in a measurable way [NE00], since they do
not always have a clear-cut criteria for their satisfaction [MCN92; CdPL09]. How-
ever, it is not possible to properly deal with IQ requirements without removing any
ambiguity related to their verification, i.e., providing a clear-cut criteria for their
satisfaction. We address this question in Section 3 by proposing a systematic pro-
cess that starts by identifying top-level IQ requirements as softgoals (informal), and
then gradually refining them until reaching their formal operational specification.
RQ3: How can we model the IQ requirements? it is generally accepted in the RE
community that system development requires models that represent the system-to-be
[NE00]. One main benefit of such model is representing the system requirements in a
simple way, which enables the system designer along with the different stakeholders of
the system to communicate and understand each other perfectly. However, existing
RE frameworks and approaches (e.g., i* [Yu95], Secure Tropos [MG07], SI* [Zan06],
etc.) do not propose concepts or constructs for modeling IQ needs. We address
this question in Section 3 by proposing the required concepts and constructs for
modeling the IQ requirements of the system-to-be.
RQ4: How can we verify the IQ requirements model? in other words, how can
we verify that the requirements model is correct and consistent, i.e., it meets the
stakeholders’ requirements, and there is no inconsistencies among such requirements.
We address this question in Section 4 by proposing: (i) a formalization of the
concepts that our framework offers; (ii) a set of reasoning axioms; and (iii) a set of
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properties of the design that enables for detecting incorrectness and/or inconsistency
in the requirements model, which helps in resolving them.
RQ5: How the final specifications of the IQ requirements can be defined? as
highlighted in [CCRC13], specifying IQ requirements is not a trivial task, since we
need to guarantee that the defined specifications are consistent with one another,
and they are also consistent with the social and organizational aspects, where the
system will eventually operates. We address this question in Section 5 by proposing
a mechanism to support the automatic derivation of IQ specifications from the IQ
requirements model, and represent them in clearly defined IQ specification language.
RQ6: How can we support system designers in constructing the system-to-
be? we address this question in Section 6 by suggesting a detailed methodological
process to be followed by designers during the different phases of the system design,
i.e., starting from IQ requirements modeling until deriving the final operational
specification from such requirements.
RQ7: How well does the framework performs when applied to realistic set-
tings? validating the proposed framework provide an evidence about its usefulness
in terms of its applicability and performance. We address this question in Section
7 by performing a set of experiments to verify whether the framework can efficiently
perform the tasks it has been developed to perform. In particular, we need to an-
swer questions like: RQ7.1: do the modeling concepts and constructs cover all the
required aspects of the system?; RQ7.2: is the methodological process easy to be
understood and used by designers?; RQ7.3: do the proposed analysis techniques
provide all the required reasoning we need?; and RQ7.4: how well the CASE tool
(ST-IQ Tool) performs, can it deal with large models?.
1.2 Contributions of the Thesis
This thesis provides the following contributions:
A modeling language for capturing IQ requirements: we propose a modeling lan-
guage that introduces concepts and constructs for modeling the stakeholders of the
system along with their objectives, entitlements, capabilities, and their social inter-
actions (e.g., information provision, goals and permissions delegation). In addition,
it proposes more refined constructs for modeling trust relations among actors, and
it introduces specialized concepts and constructs for modeling IQ related aspects.
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A modeling language for capturing IQ requirements in Business Processes:
we propose Workflow net with Actors (WFA-net) that is a modeling extension
of our framework, which enables for modeling and analyzing IQ requirements in
Business Processes.
IQ policy specification language: that is used to represent IQ specifications in terms
of IQ policies that clearly define the permitted, forbidden and obligated actors’
activities toward information.
A formal framework: that supports the automated reasoning about the IQ require-
ments model. In particular, the framework introduces formalization for all the con-
cepts that or framework supports, and it proposes the required reasoning axioms
along with a set of properties of the design that enables for verifying the correctness
and consistency of the IQ requirements model.
A RE methodology specialized for capturing IQ requirements: the proposed
methodology assist system designers during the different phases of the system
design. In Particular, it supports designers during the requirements modeling phase,
and it helps them during the analysis phase to perform the required analysis to
verify the correctness and consistency of the IQ requirements model against some
properties of the design. Finally, it supports designers while deriving the final
operational specification from the IQ requirements model.
A CASE tool (ST-IQ Tool): the prototype tool has been developed to assist system
designers and analysts during the system design process. ST-IQ Tool enables for
modeling the IQ requirements model, and transforming it into formal specification
that allows for performing the required analysis to verify the correctness and consis-
tency of the model. Moreover, it supports deriving the final operational specification
from the IQ requirements model in terms of IQ policies.
1.3 Structure of the Thesis
This thesis is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 presents an overview of the state-of-the-art related to our work. We start by
reviewing the main works in Organization and Enterprise Engineering, and then we
discuss several related work in trust management. Finally, we overview how different
communities have dealt with IQ related issues.
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Chapter 3 propose our modeling language. The chapter starts by introducing the ob-
jectives that underlie our modeling language, and then we discuss several principles
that have been taken into account while developing the language. Finally, we intro-
duce our modeling language that proposes concepts and constructs for modeling IQ
requirements in their social and organizational context. The work partially appeared
in [GG13a; GG15d; GG15a; GG15e].
Chapter 4 discusses the formal framework that underlies our approach, which enables
for performing the required analysis to verify the correctness and consistency of the
IQ requirements model The work partially appeared in [GG15d; GG15a; GG15e].
Chapter 5 introduces our proposed IQ specification language that clearly defines the
permitted, forbidden and obligated actors’ activities toward information. Moreover,
it discusses the mechanisms that we rely on for the automatic derivation of IQ policies
from the IQ requirements model. The work partially appeared in [GG15c].
Chapter 6 describes our proposed methodology that supports system designers/ an-
alysts during the different phases of the system design. In addition, it presents
our CASE tool (ST-IQ Tool) that support our framework. The tool provides a
GUI for drawing IQ requirements models, supports translating the graphical models
into disjunctive Datalog formal specifications, and helps in verifying the correct-
ness and consistency of the requirements models. The work partially appeared in
[GG15b; GG15d; GG15a; GG15e].
Chapter 7 illustrates the efficiency of our proposed framework for modeling and ana-
lyzing IQ requirements of a case study concerning a stock market crash (the Flash
Crash). In this section, we empirically evaluate the usefulness of the proposed frame-
work. The work partially appeared in [GG14; GG15d; GG15a; GG15e].
Chapter 8 concludes the thesis with a summary of our contributions, its limitations and
a brief discussion of future work.
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• Mohamad Gharib and Paolo Giorgini. “Modeling and analyzing Information Qual-
ity Requirements for Socio-technical Systems: Experience Report”, 1st International
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in Information Science (RCIS), 2015 IEEE Ninth International Conference, pages
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quirements Engineering”. In Proceedings of REFSQ-2015 Workshops, Research
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pages 218-219.
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in safety critical systems”. In Proceedings of the 6th International i star Workshop
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in safety critical systems”. In Proceedings of the 3rd International Workshop on
Information Systems Security Engineering WISSE’13, pages 524–529.
Chapter 2
State of the art
This chapter aims to review the most relevant research efforts on capturing IQ require-
ments in their social and organizational context. As previously mentioned, socio-technical
systems are not pure technical systems, but they are also composed of humans who op-
erate these systems along with their interrelations and dependencies. Thus, considering
only the technical aspects of the socio-technical system leaves the social and organiza-
tional aspects outside the system’s boundary, which leaves the system open to different
kinds of vulnerabilities that may arise at business, social and organizational levels. This
introduces the need of analyzing the social and organizational environment where the
system will operates. In particular, the development of such system requires adopting
different ideas and techniques from several research areas, such as (1) Organization and
Enterprise Engineering areas 2.1, which propose concepts enable for modeling the social
and organizational context where the system will eventually operates; (2) Trust Manage-
ment area in 2.2 that proposes concepts enable for modeling the social interactions and
dependencies among the actors of the system. Finally, (3) IQ area in 2.3 that discusses
concepts related to information, IQ along with its dimensions, metrics and measurements,
and then we review how different communities have dealt with IQ needs.
2.1 Organizational Engineering
Organizational Engineering aggregates multi-disciplinary concepts, methods and technol-
ogy to model, develop and analyze various aspects of organizations [BWHW05]. Different
research communities have considered the problem of modeling and analyzing organiza-
tional setting (e.g., Enterprise Engineering, Agent Oriented Software Engineering (AOSE),
Multi-agent Systems (MAS), etc.). In this section, we review several proposals for mod-
eling organizational aspects in Enterprise Engineering area 2.1.1, and then we present
several organizational concepts that have been introduced in organization and enterprise
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ontologies 2.1.2. Moreover, we discuss organizational concepts that have been proposed
by Agent Oriented Software Engineering (AOSE) and Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) com-
munities 2.1.3. Finally, we introduce the main organizational concepts that have been
proposed by the RE community 2.1.4.
2.1.1 Enterprise Engineering
Organizations are becoming increasingly complex and competitive, since they need to
adapt to the rapidly changing markets [Sta96]. Usually, the organizational modeling
of an enterprise is often dealt with by Enterprise Engineering methodologies [Zan06],
where Enterprise Engineering is a sub-discipline of Systems Engineering. In particular,
Enterprise Engineering is defined as the body of knowledge, principles, and practices
related to analyzing, designing, and implementing of an enterprise [LJMU95]. In other
word, it focuses on the design of the enterprise as a whole, which enables the enterprise
to more effectively achieve its goals and objectives. In what follows, we discuss the most
influential frameworks for enterprise and organizations modeling.
Computer-Integrated Manufacturing Open-System Architecture (CIMOSA) [Kos95]
is an enterprise modeling framework, which aims to support the enterprise integration
of machines, computers, and people. CIMOSA supports complete life cycle of enterprise
modeling (e.g., requirements definition, design specification and implementation descrip-
tion). The sequence of modeling is optional, and modeling may start at any of the
enterprise system life cycle phases, and it might be iterative as well. CIMOSA defines
four different modeling views, namely: function, information, resource and organization.
The functional view describes the functionality and behavior of the enterprise operations,
and it can be described by processes, events and enterprise activities. The information
view describes the inputs and outputs of enterprise, and information that is required by
each function. The resource view describes all the resources needed by functions. Finally,
the organization view describes the enterprise organizational structure.
The Open Group Architecture Framework (TOGAF) [HV07] is a framework for enter-
prise architecture modeling, which can be used for designing, planning, implementing, and
governing enterprise information architecture. TOGAF provides a detailed, step-by-step
method on how to build, maintain, and implement enterprise architecture. The core com-
ponents of TOGAF are (1) Architecture Development Method (ADM); and (2) TOGAF
Foundation Architecture, where the first defines a process for developing and maintaining
the organization’s enterprise architecture, and for implementing the architecture through
a planned program of work. While the last describes an enterprise continuum through
which the development of architecture progresses from the general (foundation) to the
organization-specific ones.
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Generic Enterprise Reference Architecture and Methodology (GERAM) [BN96] is an
enterprise architecture framework that can be used for designing and maintaining enter-
prises during their entire life-cycle. GERAM introduces the required concepts for describ-
ing the structure, content, and behavior of enterprises. GERAM can be described as a
generic architecture framework because it applies to all types of enterprises.
2.1.2 Enterprise and Organization Ontologies
In computer science area, an ontology is a formal specification of shared conceptualization
of a common area of interest among a community of people [Die06]. In this section, we
investigate most influential ontologies in both enterprise and organizational areas.
Enterprise Ontology
The ENTERPRISE ontology introduced by the University of Edinburgh [UKMZ98] pro-
poses five top-level classes for integrating the various aspects of an enterprise: (1) meta-
ontology: entity, relationship, role, actor, and state of affairs; (2) activities and processes:
activity, resource, plan, and capability; (3) organization: organizational unit, legal en-
tity, management, and ownership; (4) strategy: purpose, strategy, help to achieve, and
assumption; and (5) marketing: sale, product, vendor, customer, and market.
Organization Ontology
Fox et al. [FBGL98] propose an organizational ontology for enterprise modeling. In
their ontology, an organization consists of a set of divisions, a set of subdivisions, a set
of organization-agents, a set of roles that the agents play in the organization, and an
organization-goal tree that specifies the goals (and their decomposition into subgoals)
that agents try to achieve. Moreover, an organization-agent plays one or more roles,
where each role is defined along with a set of goals that the role is created to fulfill, and
it is allocated with proper authority for fulfilling such goals. Moreover, roles might be
generalized or specialized from one another.
Agents perform activities in the organization, and they may consume resources (e.g.
materials, labors, tools, etc.). An agent can be a member of a team that have been set
up in response to a special task. Moreover, agents have skills, and they have a set of
communication-links that define their communications with other agents in the organiza-
tion. Communication-with-Authority links can be used when communication is intended
to create obligations, specifies the two agents, one in the authority position (called super-
visor) and the other is the controlled position (called supervisee), among which commu-
nication takes place. While authority relationship is a control relationship between two
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organizational agents, and it can be defined among agents in given organization roles.
2.1.3 Organizational Aspects in AOSE and MAS
Driven by organizations need, software agents and multi-agent systems received greater
attentions lately. This attention was, mainly, because of the “autonomous agent” concept
that both AOSE and MAS adopt. Jennings [Jen00] argued that agent-oriented approaches
can significantly enhance our ability to model, design and build complex software systems.
In this section, we review how organizational aspects were considered by AOSE and MAS
communities.
Organizational Aspects in Agent-Oriented Software Engineering
In GAIA [ZJW03], organizations are composed of a set of roles, which are defined by four
attributes: (1) responsibilities: define the functionality of the role; (2) permissions: are
the rights which allow the role to perform its responsibilities. i.e., permissions identify
the resources that can be used legitimately by a role; (3) activities: are computations
that can be executed by the role; and (4) protocols: define the interaction between roles.
However, GAIA does not make a separation between responsibilities and capabilities, in
general a role might be responsible of some activity, but it does not have the capabilities
to perform it. In such case, it depends or delegates the activities to another role. The
notion of a role in GAIA gives an agent a well-defined position in the organization, with
an associated set of expected behavior.
The main aim of the design process in GAIA is to transform the abstract models
derived during the analysis stage into models at a sufficiently low level of abstraction that
can be easily implemented. In particular, the design process in GAIA involves generating
three models: (1) the agent model that identifies the agent types and the agent instances
that will be instantiated from these types; (2) the services model that identifies the main
services that are required to realize the agent’s role; and (3) the acquaintance model that
documents the lines of communication between the different agents.
MESSAGE [CCG+02] is an agent-oriented software engineering methodology that ex-
tends UML with agent knowledge level concepts, and diagrams with notations for repre-
senting them. Most of the MESSAGE knowledge level entity concepts fall into 3 main
categories: (1) ConcreteEntity (e.g., agent, organization, role and resource); (2) Activity
(e.g., task, Interaction and InteractionProtocol); and (3) MentalStateEntity (e.g., Goal,
InformationEntity, Message). MESSAGE can be used for the analysis and design of
multi-agent systems (MAS). Moreover, MESSAGE distinguishes between high-level de-
sign phase and detailed design phase. In the high-level design phase, agent architecture is
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defined, and roles are assigned to agents. Detailed design deals with computational repre-
sentations of the entities modeled in high-level design. During this phase, the refinement
process continues to determine how entities can be implemented.
Organizational Aspects in Multi-Agent Systems
Multi-agent Systems Engineering (MaSE) [DWS01] is a general purpose methodology for
designing, analyzing, and developing heterogeneous multi-agent systems. In MaSE, each
role is defined in terms of its interactions [Ken98], and it is responsible of achieving, or
help in achieving specific system goals or sub-goals, and roles can be played by actors.
Moreover, a single role may have multiple executing tasks that define the required role
behavior. However, MaSE suffers from a main drawback that is the permission concept is
missing, the authors consider that permissions are implicitly included along with the role’s
functionality, i.e., a role has the required permissions to perform the activities assigned
to them, which is not true in general.
MOISE+ [HSB02] is an organizational model for Multi-Agent Systems that is based
on three main concepts roles, role relations, and groups. MOISE+ organizational model
follow the organizational centered point of view, which can be composed by two core
notions: an Organizational Specification (OS) and an Organizational Entity (OE). An
Organizational Specification (OS) is formed by, (1) a Structural Specification (SS): that
is defined at a three levels 1- individual level; 2- social level; and 3- collective level. Based
on those definitions, the SS of a MAS organization is formed by a set of roles, a set of
root group specifications, and inheritance relation; (2) a Functional Specification (FS):
that is based on the missions and global plans concepts; and (3) a Deontic Specification
(DS): that links the structural specification to functional specification. While an OE is a
population of agents functioning under an OS, i.e., agents play roles defined in the OS,
aggregated in groups instantiated from the OS groups, and behaving as normalized in the
OS.
2.1.4 Organizational aspects in Requirements Engineering community
Three decades ago, the traditional view of RE focuses mainly on the target system. A
different view start to emerge by the early 80’s, which pays more attention to the en-
vironment of the system as to the system itself [GMB82; DHL+86], i.e., modeling the
environment where the system operates has been recognized as an important part of the
system design process. For example, RML [GMB82] was able to model the organizational
environment where the system will eventually operates.
Since then, several RE researchers have proposed languages that are able to capture
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the organizational aspects of the system-to-be. For example, in [YM94] an organization
is viewed as being made up of social actors who are intentional entities, and they have
motivations and beliefs, etc. Moreover, i* [Yu95] and Tropos [BPG+01] offer concepts
such as actors, roles, agents, positions, goals, tasks, resources, and social dependencies,
which enables to capture several social and organizational aspects of the system-to-be.
2.2 Trust Management
The importance of trust in human societies is out of discussion [SS05], so it is in Socio-
Technical Systems (STS) [ET60], where organizations and humans are an integral part of
the system. Vulnerabilities of a STS are not only originated by technical issues, but they
can be directly related to the social interactions of its components (both social and techni-
cal actors). Trust is complex and multidimensional concept that has been studied within
many disciplines, including philosophy, psychology, sociology, transaction economics, and
organization theory [CW03]. In particular, trust is a relation that is frequently defined in
terms of the trustor’s attitude toward the trustee, such as confidence [Luh88], credibility
[DC97; Bai86], competence [Blo97], goodwill [Blo97; RSB+98], expectation [Blo97], belief
[Blo97], positive intentions [LMB98], or future actions [Gam00; ZMP98].
There is a very rich literature concerning trust, in which we can find a wide variety
of trust definitions. For example, Jøsang [Jøs97] defines trust in agents community as
the belief that the agent will behave without malicious intent. Rousseau et al. [RSB+98]
define trust as the psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability
based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another. Tseng and
Fogg [TF99] define trust as a property of the recipient, such as dependability or reliability.
Blomqvist and Stahle [BS00] define trust as an actor’s expectation of another actor’s
competence, goodwill and behavior. While, Chopra and Wallace [CW03] define trust as
the willingness to rely on a specific other actor, based on confidence that this trust will
lead to positive outcomes. Finally, Jonker and Treur [JT99] define trust as the attitude
an agent has, with respect to the dependability/capabilities of some other agent. In
summary, an integrated definition of trust recognizes it as the union of three elements:
the trustor that is the source of trust relation, where trust represents its expectations
about the trustee’s behavior and willingness to act on that expectation to fulfill the
trustum that is the object of the trust relationship.
At the other hand, distrust has been characterized as a psychological state in which
perceivers actively entertain multiple, possibly rival, hypotheses about the motives or
genuineness of a person’s behavior [FH94]. Lewicki et al. [LMB98] assert that both trust
and distrust involve movements toward certainty, i.e., trust concerning expectations of
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things hoped for and distrust concerning expectations of things feared of. Traditionally,
scholars use to see trust and distrust as mutually exclusive concepts. However, this is not
true, since trust and distrust are not totally separated concepts [LMB98]. In other words,
you may have reasons to trust a trustee for a trustum, and you may have other reasons
to distrust the same trustee for the same trustum. Lewicki et al. [LMB98] identify four
different interrelations between trust and distrust: 1- low trust/low distrust, in which
an individual or actor has neither reasons to be confident nor reasons to be wary and
watchful, 2- high trust/low distrust, an actor has reason to be confident in another and
no reason to suspect the other, 3- low trust/high distrust, in which an actor has no reason
for confidence in another and ample reason for wariness and watchfulness, and 4- high
trust/high distrust, in which an actor has reason to be highly confident in another in
certain respects, but also has reason to be strongly wary and suspicious in other respects.
Considerable effort has been spend for identifying the bases of trust/ distrusts, i.e.,
how trust/ distrusts can be constructed. For example, Kramer [Kra99] stated that the
bases of trust/ distrusts can be classified under: 1-dispositional trust; 2- history-based
trust; 3- category-based trust; 4- role-based trust; and 5- rule-based trust. Moreover,
Jones and George [JG98] stated that positive moods; emotions; and positive experience
can enhance trust/ distrusts building. While Blomqvist and Stahle [BS00] propose a
model for trust/ distrusts building, in which trust can be built based on 3 dimensions:
competence; goodwill; and behavior. Finally, several researchers focused at building trust
based on some related belief and assumptions. For example, Castelfranchi and Falcone
[CF98] define seven kinds of beliefs for building trust: 1- competence; 2-disposition; 3-
dependence; 4- fulfillment; 5- willingness; 6- persistence and 7- self-confidence belief.
Furthermore, a large body of literature has focused on computational trust. For in-
stance, Marsh [Ste94] proposes one of the earliest trust models that consider direct inter-
action as a main source of trust related beliefs. Schillo et al. [SFR00] introduce a trust
model based on probability theory, which can be used when trust among agents has a
Boolean value (good or bad). While in Abdul-Rahman and Hailes [ARH00], trust can
be build based on agents’ belief in one another concerning their experience and reputa-
tional, and the degrees of trust range from complete distrust to complete trust. Esfandiari
and Chandrasekharan [EC01] propose a cognitive based trust and reputation model. In
which, trust can be built based on observation and interaction. Finally, Castelfranchi et
al [CFP03] propose a cognitive trust model, in which different types of belief can be used
to build trust.
At the other hand, trust is still a new research thread within the RE community.
However, several RE approaches suggested concepts for capturing trust. For instance, in
Giorgini et al. [GMMZ04] they focus on capturing trust at the level of roles. While in
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Giorgini et al. [GMMZ05], they capture trust at two different levels (roles and agents),
and they highlighted the problem that may arise when a trusted role is played by an
untrusted individual (agent). In [Zan06] trust was introduced as a fundamental aspect
for making decisions on security. While Asnar et al. [AGMZ07] refine the Goal-Risk
framework by introducing the notion of trust for assessing risk. Finally, Chopra et al.
[CPG11] introduce architectural trust that can be used to assist the trustworthiness of
the overall STS.
2.3 Information and Information Quality
The first section starts by discussing information 2.3.1, clarifying its related concept, and
then discussing information sources and information provenance. While in the second
section 2.3.2, we start by discussing IQ along with its different dimensions. Moreover, we
introduce IQ metrics and measurements that have been proposed in the literature, and
we list and discuss several principles to be followed while developing IQ measurements.
Finally, in section 2.3.3, we review how different communities have dealt with IQ needs. In
particular, we review several proposals for improving IQ by design, and how different RE
approaches have dealt with IQ requirements, and then we review the several technologies
and mechanisms that have been proposed for dealing with IQ related issues.
2.3.1 Information
Information Quality (IQ) is a key success factor for organizations, since depending on
low-quality information may cause severe consequences [Red95], or even disasters in the
case of critical systems. However, to get better understanding of IQ, first we need to
clarify what information is, and how it is related to other concepts such as “data” and
“knowledge”, and then we briefly discuss information sources and information provenance.
Data, Information and Knowledge
The literature is rich with different attempts to define data, information, and knowledge
along with their inter-relationships. Despite the lack of an agreed upon definitions of
these terms, a general consensus exists that data, information, and knowledge are not the
same thing [AN95; Ste01; DP01; CEH+09]. According to [Ack89] data can be defined as
raw entity; and information is data that has been given a meaning. While knowledge is
an appropriate collection of information to be used when needed. Aamodt and Nygard
[AN95] define data as entities with no meaning, and they define information as interpreted
data, i.e., information is data with meaning. Moreover, they define knowledge as learned
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information, i.e., information existing in an agent’s reasoning resources (it is the output
of a learning process).
Not only the definitions of data, information and knowledge are arguable, but their
interrelations are not always clear as well. Yet several researchers (e.g., [AN95; Ack89;
DP01; BCM04]) have described this relationships as a hierarchical relation consisting of
data at the bottom, followed by information, and knowledge on top, which implies that
data can be transformed (interpreted) into information, which in turn can be transformed
into knowledge (learning). However, Stenmark [Ste01] argued that the relation between
data, information and knowledge is not linear in one direction, since we all on several occa-
sions have used our knowledge to derive information, and created data out of information
we have.
Information Sources
Generally speaking, information is produced by information sources. Buckland [Buc91]
classify information based on its source under: (1) created internally: actors are able to
produce information based on their knowledge, or they can elaborate it from information
they have (e.g., a doctor set his daily schedule (created information) based on the ac-
tivities he supposed to perform); (2) acquired from an objects: actors are able to obtain
information that describes an object or one of its properties. (e.g., a doctor is able to
acquire the patient temperature by different means); and (3) acquired by communications:
information provided from one actor to another one (e.g., a doctor provides the patient
with his date and time appointment).
At the other hand, humans (social actors) can serve as information sources, i.e., they
are able to produce information based on information they have (elaboration), or derive it
from their knowledge. Davenport and Prusak [DP01] stated that knowledge is embedded
in our minds. Thus, we can instantiate some of this knowledge as explicit information
[Ste01], i.e., such knowledge can be made tangible and represented as objects outside
of the human mind [Ste01]. More specifically, Ackoff [Ack89] stated that the content of
human mind can include: (1) data: symbols; (2) information that provides answers to
“who”, “what”, “where”, and “when” questions; and (3) knowledge: that is used to answers
“how” questions.
Information Provenance (Lineage)
Information might not be used where it has been produced, i.e., it might be transferred,
stored, etc., which might affect its quality. Thus, estimating its quality requires under-
standing the information chain (from origin to destination), and the rules that have been
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Table 2.1: IQ dimensions in literature
Accuracy Completeness Timeliness Consistency Believability Accessibility Trustworthiness
Ballou and Pazer [BP85] X X X X
DeLone and McLean [DM92] X X X
Wand and Wang [WW96] X X X X
Wang and Strong [WS96] X X X X X
Bovee et al. [BSM03] X X X
Kovac et al. [KLP97] X X X
Cykana et al. [CPS96] X X X X
Liu and Chi [LC02] X X X X X
applied to it as it moves along the chain, since different rules might have different effects
over the quality of information [SC12]. In particular, to get better understanding of IQ,
we should rely on what is called information provenance (also called “lineage”), which
can be defined as any information that helps in determining the history of information
product, starting from its original sources and the process by which it has been delivered
to its destination [BKWC01; SPG05; SC12]. More specifically, information provenances
is particularly important for analyzing IQ [dSDMM03], since the level of details included
in the provenance enables to estimate IQ, and it has been studied in both database and
data warehouse systems (e.g., Buneman et al. [BKWC01], Simmhan et al. [SPG05]).
2.3.2 Information Quality
In this section, we start by discussing IQ along with its different dimensions. Moreover, we
introduce several IQ metrics and measurements that have been proposed in the literature,
and then we list and discuss several principles to be followed while developing IQ metrics
and measurements.
Information Quality Dimensions
Generally speaking, quality has been defined as “fitness for use” [JGB79], or as in
[RB94] the conformance to specifications, i.e., meeting or exceeding consumer expec-
tations. There is a general consensus that IQ is a hierarchical multi-dimensional con-
cept [BP85; Red95; WW96] that can be characterized by different dimensions/ sub-
dimensions including: accessibility, accuracy, completeness, timeliness, consistency, etc.
[PLW02; BSM03; Jia10]). Table 2.1 lists different IQ dimensions that have been considered
in the literature; in what follows we define each of these dimensions.
Accuracy: means that information should be true or error free with respect to some
known or measured value [BSM03]. Some researchers use the term correctness in-
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stead of accuracy. However, according to [WW96] these two terms seems to be
equivalent;
Completeness: means that all parts of information should be available, and information
should be complete for performing a task at hand [BSM03; WW96];
Timeliness: means to which extent information is valid in term of time (e.g., sufficiently
up-to-date) [WW96; PLW02];
Consistency: means that multiple records of the same information should be the same
across time and space [BSM03];
Believability: the extent to which information is accepted or regarded as true [WKM93;
PLW02; BSM03];
Accessibility: means to which extent information is available, or easily and quickly
retrieved [PLW02];
Trustworthiness: means to which extent information is credible [LC02].
Information Quality Metrics and Measurements
IQ dimensions enable to capture the quality of information with respect to stakeholders’
requirements. Yet such dimensions must be associated with specific measures to eval-
uate IQ with respect to user requirements [FP04]. In what follows, we discuss several
proposed measurements for IQ dimensions including: accuracy, correctness, complete-
ness, timeliness and consistency. For instance, Redman [Red05] measure accuracy in a
databases at two different levels: at the “field” (attribute) level accuracy is measured as:
field level accuracy = number of fields judged “correct” / number of fields tested; while
the “record” level accuracy = number of records judged “completely correct” / number of
records tested. At the other hand, Parssian et al. [PSJ04] measure information accuracy
in databases by considering a relation S that contains tuples captured for a predefined
real world entity type. Each tuple in S is either accurate, inaccurate, or a mismember,
which can be formally defined as:
• A tuple is accurate if all of its attribute values are accurate;
• A tuple is inaccurate if it has one or more inaccurate values for its non-identifier
attributes, and no inaccurate values for its identifier attribute(s);
• A tuple is a mismember if it should not have been captured into S, i.e., a mismem-
bership could be a tuple mistakenly included in the relation.
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To understand the relationship between tuples in S and the underlying entity instances
in the real world, they use the notion of a conceptual relation T , where T consists of tuples
as they should have been captured in S if there were no errors of any kind (i.e., in an
ideal world). Moreover, tuples in T belong to three categories that can be defined s as
follows: TA, a set of instances in T that are correctly captured into S and thus remain
accurate; TI , a set of instances in T that are captured into S, and one or more of their
non-identifying attribute values are inaccurate or null; and TC , a set of instances in T
that have not been captured into S and therefore form the incomplete dataset for S.
Each instance in TA corresponds to an instance in SA. Similarly, instances in TI and TC
correspond to instances in SI and SC , respectively. Based on the above definitions, they
define the following quality metrics for a relation S.
• Accuracy of S, measured as αS = | SA | / | S |, is the probability that a tuple in S
accurately represents an entity in the real world.
• Inaccuracy of S, measured βS = | SI | / | S |, is the probability that a tuple in S is
inaccurate.
• Mismembership of S, measured as µS = | SM | / | S | , is the probability that a
tuple in S is a mismember.
At the other hand, Heinrich et al. [HKK07] measure the correctness of information
by comparing the values of an information item in the Information System (IS) with
its corresponding value in the real world. More specifically, consider wL be a value of an
information item within a database (IS), and wR as the corresponding value of information
in the real world. Moreover, they define d(wL, wR) as a domain-specific distance function
quantify the difference between wL and wR, which has two forms d1 for character based
values and d2 for numerical values, both of them are defined as follows:
d1(wl, wr) :=


0 if w1 = wr
∞ otherwise
d2(wl, wr) :=| wl − wr |
And information correctness can be defined as follows:
Qcorr.(wl, wr) :=
1
d(wl, wr) + 1
Several measurements for information completeness have been proposed in the liter-
ature. For example, Pipino et al. [PWKR05] measure the degree of completeness of an
Information and Information Quality 21
information item based on information items exists / information items that should exist.
Moreover, Ballou and Pazer [BP03] measure both the structural and content completeness
of information as follows: (1) Structural Completeness = values that are recorded / values
that could have been recorded; (2) Content Completeness = content that is conveyed /
content that could have been conveyed.
Considering the measurements of IQ time-related dimensions, Ballou et al. [BWPT98]
propose an equation to measure information currency in information system (database),
where currency is the time interval between information creation (or updated) to its
usage time [WS96; PLW02]. They consider: (1) information delivery time: the time that
an information item needs to be delivered to the customer; (2) information input time:
represent the time when information was obtained in the system; and (3) age: how old
information item was when it was received:
Currency = (Delivery T ime− Input T ime) + Age
At the other hand, information timeliness can be defined as the extent to which infor-
mation is sufficiently up-to-date for a task at hand [PLW02; WW96]. According to Ballou
et al. [BWPT98], the timeliness of information can be measured depending on both its
currency and volatility (how long the item remains valid):
T imeliness = {max[(1−
currency
volatility
), 0]}s
Where s is a parameter allows to control the sensitivity of timeliness to the currency
/volatility ratio. Moreover, Heinrich and Helfert [HH03] measure information timeliness
by considering both information mean update time along with information age:
T imeliness = 1/(meanupdate time).(age) + 1
Information Quality Measurement Requirements
To ensure consistency and usefulness assessment of IQ dimensions, Even and Shankara-
narayanan [ES05; ES07] propose several principles to be followed while developing IQ
dimensions measurements:
Representation Consistency : the measurement outcome should be easy to interpret
by business users;
Interpretation Consistency : the measurement should have consistent semantic inter-
pretation;
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Aggregation Consistency : the calculation should be subject to some rules that guar-
antee its consistency, i.e., the aggregation cannot be higher than the highest quality
level nor lower than the lowest;
Impartial-Contextual Consistency : the measurement should consider the contextual
perception of the metrics (if any).
Moreover, Heinrich et al. [HKK07] refine the quality metrics requirements proposed in
Even and Shankaranarayanan [ES05; ES07] by refining the representation consistency to
requirements (R1) - (R3), while (R4) integrates the consistency principles (interpretation
consistency and aggregation consistency). (R5) refers to the adaptively requirement metric
that represent impartial-contextual consistency [ES07]. Finally, they propose one more
property to capture the measurement procedure (R6). Each of these requirements is
defined as follows:
R1. Normalization : an adequate normalization is necessary to assure that the values
of the metrics are comparable;
R2. Interval scale : the difference between two levels of IQ values must be meaningful;
R3. Interpretability : demand the measurement being “easy to interpret by business
users”, i.e., the IQ metric has to be easily understandable;
R4. Aggregation : stated that the aggregation consistency can be guaranteed only, if
both of the interpretation consistency and aggregation consistency are guaranteed;
R5. Adaptivity : it is necessary that the metrics can be adapted to the context of a
particular application;
R6. Feasibility : the metrics should be based on input parameters that are deter-
minable.
2.3.3 Information Quality in the Literature
In this section, we review several proposals for improving IQ by design, we discuss how
different RE approaches have dealt with IQ requirements, and then we review the relevant
technologies and mechanisms for improving IQ that have been proposed in literature.
Improving Information Quality by Design
Several approaches for maintaining high quality information have been proposed in the
literature, Jiang [Jia10] classify these approaches under two main types: (1) Curative
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approaches : focus on detecting and correcting existing errors in information that might
affect its quality [BS06]; and (2) Preventive approaches focus at preventing errors from
occurring in the first place, or at least reducing the chance of their occurrence (e.g., infor-
mation quality by design [Wan98]). Even no pure curative or preventive approach is able
to address all IQ related problems [BS06], but preventing or reducing errors occurrence is
more desirable, since the consequences of depending on low quality information might be
too costly or their effects might be non-reversible (e.g., human causalities).
Improving IQ by design is not new; several researchers have proposed approaches that
can be used for improving IQ by design. For example, Wang [Wan98] propose the Total
Data Quality Management (TDQM) methodology, where the main purpose of TDQM
is to deliver high quality information products (IP) to information consumers. TDQM
was build based on the same idea of Wang proposed in his previous work [WSF95]. In
their work, the concept of Information Product (IP) is introduced to emphasize the fact
that the information output from an information manufacturing system has value that
is transferable to the consumer. By depending on TDQM, organizations can develop
a new information manufacturing system for the IP that allows for capturing many IQ
requirements.
Moreover, Ballou et al. [BWPT98] presented an information manufacturing system
that can be used to determine the data quality in terms of timeliness, quality, cost, and
value of information products. In their work the information quality is a customer driven,
i.e., the quality of the information products manufactured by the system is determined
by the customer of information products. Shankaranarayanan et al. [SWZ00] extend
the information manufacturing system model proposed by [BWPT98] to develop a formal
modeling method for creating an IP-MAP. This model permits checking every raw input
data item for data quality problems before it can be used in the production of an IP.
While Ballou et al. [BWPT98] model allows raw input data items to be used without
checking their quality first, and uses a quality block only when the raw input data items.
Scannapieco et al. [SPP02] propose IP-UML, which is a software engineering approach
developed to improve data quality in a single organization. The proposed approach relies
on the IP-MAP framework [SWZ00], and IP-UML uses the Data Quality profile as the
modeling language; which consists of three different models, namely: the Data Analysis
Model, the Quality Analysis Model, and the Quality Design Model.
Information Quality in Requirements Engineering Area
Information Quality (IQ) modeling is an extension of traditional information modeling,
where information modeling captures the structure and semantics of information, and IQ
modeling captures the structural and semantic issues underlying IQ [WKM93]. Require-
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ment Engineering community [BPG+04; SPP06; MG07] suggests concepts for modeling
and analyzing information, yet they did not appropriately support modeling or analyzing
IQ requirements, i.e., they either loosely define such requirements, or simply ignore them.
For instance, SecureUML [BDL06] is a UML-based modeling language with a security
modeling language for formalizing access control requirements. Yet it does not consider
IQ related concerns, since it has been developed with a main reason to model access
control policies.
Moreover, UMLsec [Ju¨r05] that is an extension to UML modeling language, which
allows for integrating security requirements modeling and analysis within the system de-
velopment process. UMLsec is able to model security related features such as secrecy,
integrity (IQ related aspect), access control, etc. It represents security feature on UML
diagrams by providing several extension mechanisms, namely: (1) stereotypes: a new
types of modeling elements that extends the semantics of existing types in the UML
meta-model; (2) tagged values: that is used to associate data with model elements and
(3) constraints: that are used to define criteria to determine whether requirements are
met or not by the system design. In UMLsec, integrity is modeled as a constraint, which
can restrict unwanted modification (e.g., insert), but information Quality can be affected
in several other ways that cannot be captured by this approach.
Lin et al. [LNI+03b; LNI+03a] propose abuse frames based on Jackson’s Problem
Frames [Jac01]. In their approach, they introduce the notion of anti-requirement as the
requirement of a malicious user, which can threaten an existing requirement of the system.
A problem frame defines an identifiable problem class in terms of its context and the char-
acteristics of its domains, interfaces, and requirements. Each frame describes a class of
security violation that can be classified under: interception: that is used to address infor-
mation confidentiality, modification: that is used to address information integrity related
issues (e.g., unwanted information change), and denial of access : that is used to address
situations where an attacker wants to make information unavailable to a user. Even abuse
frame addresses the integrity problem (modification) by preventing unauthorized actors
from modifying the data or prevent authorized actors from doing unauthorized modifica-
tions, yet information still can be modified in several other ways, i.e., abuse frames does
not fully address integrity related issues.
The KAOS methodology [VLDM95] adopts the concept of goal to model the desired
behaviors of the system, and the use obstacles to represent a set of undesirable behaviors.
Therefore, obstacles are used as preconditions a designer has to overcome in order to
achieve the goal. Furthermore, KAOS provides obstacle prevention and obstacle mitigation
for resolving obstacles. Obstacle analysis is a recursive process since it may produce new
goals for which new obstacles may be generated and resolved. However, obstacles seem
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to be sufficient for modeling non-intentional obstacles to goals, but they appear limited
for modeling and resolving intentional obstacles.
At the other hand, Van Lamsweerde et al. [VLBDLJ03] extends KAOS framework by
introducing anti-requirement concept to represent the requirements of malicious attackers,
and they introduce anti-goals that can be defined as the intentional obstacles to security
goals. Moreover, they introduce the active attacker concept that can be modeled along
with their own goals, capabilities, and the vulnerabilities that they can monitor or control.
The anti-goal analysis starts by obtaining root anti-goals by negation of confidentiality,
privacy, integrity or availability goals. Then for each of these anti-goals, we identify
potential attacker. Finally, anti-requirements are defined in terms of the capabilities of
the corresponding attacker. The preliminary elicitation of security-related goals is driven
by generic specification patterns associated with each specialization of this goal class,
namely, confidentiality, integrity, availability and privacy goals. Then these patterns are
expressed in terms of abstractions from the language meta-model and security-specific lan-
guage constructs. For each subclass, the instantiation of the corresponding specification
pattern to “sensitive” objects found in the object model yields corresponding candidates
for application-specific security goals (to be refined if necessary). For example, the specifi-
cation pattern for integrity goals refers to meta-model elements such as Agent and Object
to capture the definition of integrity.
Finally, Secure Tropos methodology [MG07] seems to be sufficient to capture the func-
tional, security, privacy and trust requirements of systems. It is also able to capture the
social and organizational context where the system will operate, but offers no concepts
to capture IQ requirements of the system. In summary, all the previously mentioned lan-
guages, approaches and frameworks either ignore IQ requirements, or they do not properly
capture them. Moreover, beside Secure Tropos, all of these approaches do not consider
the social or the organizational context of the system-to-be, which is very important in
our work.
Technical Solutions for Improving Information Quality
IQ can be improved at the technical level by ensuring information integrity. In what
follows, we presents several technical solutions that have been proposed to avoid, detect,
and correct information integrity violations in both storage and network transmission
systems. For example, some systems use avoidance techniques that provide a certain
level of integrity preservation for information they store, such as Read only Storage
that is one of the simplest techniques to preserve the integrity of information in storage
devices. However, these systems enforce read-only limitation that can prevent integrity
violations due to user errors (e.g., Venti [QD02]), but information is still vulnerable to
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hardware and software errors. Another example is the journaling file system [PADAD05]
that can recover from a system crash by examining its log, where any pending changes
are stored and then replaying any operations it finds there. This means that even after
an unexpected shutdown, it is not necessary to scan through the entire contents of the
disk looking for inconsistencies, i.e., the system just needs to figure out whatever has
been added to the journal but not marked as done. However, journaling systems cannot
protect information from malicious modifications or hardware bit errors, but it can ensure
file system consistency without performing any explicit integrity checks for each file.
Beside information integrity avoidance techniques, some systems implement informa-
tion integrity violation detection techniques. For examples, Checksumming [Coh87] is
a well-known method for performing integrity checks, which can be computed for disk
data and can be stored persistently. A checksum is a fixed-size datum computed from
an arbitrary block of digital data for the purpose of detecting errors that may have been
introduced during its transmission or storage. The integrity of information can be checked
at any later time by re-computing the checksum and comparing it with the stored one. If
the checksums match, information is likely to be unaltered. Moreover, mirroring [Bak85]
is one of the simplest and oldest ways to implement integrity verification, which can be
achieved by maintaining two or more copies of the same information in the storage device.
Any integrity violation in one of the copies can be easily detected by comparing the copies.
Usually mirroring can detect integrity violations, but it cannot always help in recovering
the error, since it is not easy to determine which of the copies is correct.
Redundant Array of Independent Disks (RAID) is a storage technology that combines
multiple disk drive components into a logical unit. Information is distributed across the
drives in one of several ways called“RAID levels”, starting from RAID-3 then RAID-4, and
RAID-5 [PGK88] parity bit (check bit) is used to detect errors in the stored information,
which can verify information integrity across the multiple disks to a certain level. At
the other hand, Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) [Bom08] is a powerful technique for
error detection in information communications that can be easily implemented to obtain
information integrity in network transmissions.
At the other hand, several integrity violation detection and correction techniques have
been proposed. For instance, Error Correction Codes (ECCs) [Ham50] is an advanced
form of parity detection that is used in servers and critical information applications. ECC
modules use multiple parity bits per byte to detect double-bit errors. Some systems
that support ECC can use a regular parity module by using the parity bits to make up
the ECC code. Several storage disks today employ error correcting codes to detect and
correct bit errors at the hardware level. Another example is Forward Error Correction
(FEC) [Bie92], in which, the correction is performed at the receiver end using the check
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bits sent by the transmitter. FEC uses the Reed-Solomon algorithm [MS81] to perform
correction. Usually, FEC is used in network file systems. While, RAID-2 [PGK88] is able
to detect and recover information integrity violation in storage devices. In RAID-2 the
lost information (integrity violation) is recovered by reading the other components in a
subset, including the parity component, and setting the missing bit to 0 or 1 to get the
proper parity value for that subset.
It is well known that information integrity is a main issue in the databases area, where
preserving information integrity in the database field means ensuring that information in
the database is accurate, valid, and consistent [GA93]. Usually, the integrity of informa-
tion in databases can be violated either by unwarranted changes to the database, or as a
result of changes in the real world (inconsistency) [Mot89]. Generally speaking, databases
are updated through transactions, when applying a transaction a database consistency
might be falsified. [SV84] define four disciplines in database technology that are used to
prevent such kinds of errors:
Security control that prevent users from accessing and modifying information in a
database by unauthorized ways;
Concurrency control that prevent inconsistencies resulted from concurrent access of
multiple users or applications to the database;
Reliability control that prevent errors due to the malfunctioning of system hardware
or software;
Integrity control that prevent semantic errors made by users due to their carelessness
or lack of knowledge; the integrity control use some integrity rules to verify the
database and operations on the database.
Furthermore, databases incorporate integrity constraints (integrity controls) to ensure
that the integrity of information is preserved. Grefen and Apers [GA93] classify integrity
constraints based on their types under:
Domain and non-null constraints are used to specify a certain range of values for the
attribute;
Referential integrity constraints are used to specify semantic links between the var-
ious relations in a database that should hold. Such constraints are a central issue in
the relational databases;
Transition constraints constraints that are used to correctly evaluate a pre-
transaction and post-transaction states of a database.
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Temporal constraints are used to specify the temporal qualifiers for information in the
database;
Fuzzy constraints that is used in fuzzy relational database systems to deal with fuzzy
or incomplete data.
Moreover, Motro [Mot89] define two other types of integrity constraints, a validity
constraint and completeness constraint, where both of them are used to ensure the va-
lidity of information in the database. However, integrity constraints are able to enhance
information integrity in a database, but they cannot ensure it.
2.4 Chapter summary
In this chapter, we have reviewed the state of the art of several research areas related to
this thesis. In 2.1, we have reviewed the main organizational and enterprise concepts that
have been proposed by different research communities In particular, we discussed several
concepts in Enterprise Engineering area 2.1.1, in organization and enterprise ontologies
2.1.2, and then we discussed organizational concepts that have been proposed by Agent
Oriented Software Engineering (AOSE) and Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) communities
2.1.3. Finally, we introduce the main organizational concepts that have been proposed by
the RE community 2.1.4. Moreover, we reviewed the related work in Trust Management
area in 2.2. While in section 2.3, we discussed information, IQ along with its dimensions,
metrics and measurements, and then we reviewed how different communities have dealt
with IQ needs.
Chapter 3
The Modeling Language
All models are wrong, but some are useful.
George Box
It is generally accepted in RE area that a system development requires models that
represent the system-to-be [NE00], i.e., a modeling language is needed to describe the
conceptual construct underlying the system [POB00], where a modeling language can be
defined as the language that is used to construct and specify a software system [RJB04].
In other words, a modeling language can be used to describe concepts and constructs
in the problem domain [Fow97], and it might be more useful for a modeling language
to be graphical [Fow97; RJB04]. To this end, we propose a modeling language that
adopts concepts from both Secure Tropos [MG07] and SI* [Zan06] modeling languages,
and extends them with concepts and constructs for modeling IQ requirements of the
system since the early phases of the system development.
In the remainder of this chapter, we introduce the objectives that underlie our model-
ing language in Section 3.1, and then we propose the principles that have been taken into
consideration while developing the language in Section 3.2. In Section 3.3, we present
our modeling language, we start by discussing the essential modeling constructs, and then
we introduce more refined concepts for modeling trust. Finally, we propose concepts and
constructs for modeling IQ requirements. Section 3.6 proposes workflow net with ac-
tors (WFA-net) that is a modeling extension, we propose, for modeling and analyzing
IQ requirements in business processes. In particular, we introduce the semantics of the
language, and we discuss how IQ requirements can be captured in their social and organi-
zational context, and then how these requirements can be mapped into WFA-net. Finally
in 3.7, we present a systematic process for dealing with IQ requirements.
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3.1 The modeling language objectives
Our modeling language has been built with the following objectives in mind:
O1: the language should provide the required concepts and constructs for modeling the
stockholders’ IQ requirements in their social and organizational context. As previ-
ously discussed, leaving the social and organizational aspects outside the system’s
boundary leaves the system open to different kinds of vulnerabilities that might
manifest themselves in the actor’ interactions and dependencies.
O2: the language should provide the required concepts and constructs to refine top-level
requirements into more detailed ones. In other word, if a requirement is too coarse
to be satisfied, the language should provide the required constructs to refine them.
O3: the language should provide the required concepts and constructs to capture the
relation between information, its stakeholders and its intended purpose of use at one
hand, and required IQ dimensions at the other hand. In other words, the modeling
language should provide clear semantics among information, its stakeholders, and
its IQ dimensions.
O4: the language should provide the required concepts and constructs to capture the
information structure taking into consideration its “fitness for use” for a particular
purpose. The structure of information should be defined in a way that guarantee its
completeness based on its purpose of usage, i.e., the extent to which information is
applicable and helpful for the task at hand.
O5: the language should provide the required concepts and constructs for capturing IQ
related aspects in actors’ interactions. Usually, information might not be used where
it is produced, i.e., it might be transferred, stored, etc., which might influence its
quality. Thus, to get better understanding of IQ, the language should provide the
required concepts to capture any information that can helps in determining the
history of information, starting from its original sources and the process by which it
has been delivered to its destination.
O6: the language should provide the required concepts and constructs to capture the
Means-end relations between the different modeling constructs in order to identify
whether a certain concept (e.g., goal, etc.) is achieved/satisfied or not.
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3.2 The modeling language principles
The modeling language has been built based on several principles proposed by Paige et
al [POB00]. In what follows, we list and define each of these principles:
Reliability: the language should be able to design a reliable system, i.e., it should be
able to capture all the aspects of the system that the language has been developed
to capture.
Uniqueness: the language should provide single construct to express every concept of
interest, and it should avoids providing more than one. In particular, there should
be no redundancy or overlapping among the concepts that the language proposes.
The main aim of uniqueness principle is having a simple language that have a small
but expressive number of clear concepts. Note that uniqueness does not mean min-
imizing the language concepts, but avoiding the use of unnecessary concepts. More
specifically, a construct can be included in the language, only if, it is necessary for
modeling a required concept, and if there is no other way of modeling such concept
using an already existing construct.
Seamlessness: can be defined as the ability of mapping abstractions in the problem
space to implementations in the solution space without changing notation [PO99a],
i.e., deriving specifications from requirements should be consistent. Seamlessness
provides several benefits, including: avoiding semantic gaps, mismatches between
analysis and design, design and implementation, etc. [PO99b].
Consistency: the language constructs should meet the language design goals. In partic-
ular, any construct that is included (added) in the language should be justified by
its contribution to the language purpose, and any construct that does not support
the language purpose must be removed.
Simplicity: means that no unnecessary complexity should be included in the language;
and it can be achieved by satisfying the previous three principles (e.g., uniqueness,
seamlessness, and consistency).
3.3 The essential modeling concepts
Our modeling language adopts concepts from both Secure Tropos [MG07] and SI* [Zan06]
modeling languages, and extends them with concepts and constructs for modeling IQ
requirements in their social and organizational context. In the rest of this section, we
present actors related constructs in 3.3.1, goals and information along with their different
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relations in 3.3.2. Subsection 3.3.3, presents actors objectives and entitlements related
constructs, and 3.3.4 introduces the different social relations among the actors, while in
3.4 we present their trust relations constructs. Finally, in 3.5, we propose IQ related
concepts and constructs.
3.3.1 Actors, roles, and agents
An actor1 represents an autonomous entity that has intentionality and strategic goals
within the system. Basically, an actor covers two concepts, namely: a role and an agent,
where the first can be defined as an abstract characterization of an actor in terms of a
set of behaviors and functionalities within some specialized context, and the last can be
defined as an autonomous entity that has a specific manifestation in the system. Agents
can be a social agent as well as a software agent. An agent can play a role or more within
the system [Yu95]. Moreover, our language adopts the modeling of role hierarchies based
on the concept of specialization, i.e., a role can be a specialization of another one, and this
relation can be represented by is a relation. Figure 3.1 shows the graphical representation
of actors, roles, and agents along with their interrelations.
Actor
Agent Role
play
is_a is_a is_a
Figure 3.1: Graphical representation of actors, agents, roles, and their interrelations
Example 1. in Figure 3.7, a stock trader (a role) is a person or company involved in
trading securities in the stock market, and it is able to employ different strategies for
making profit out of its trading activities. Moreover, we have different kinds of traders
(e.g., fundamental trader; small trader, etc.), where they can be considered as a specialized
(is a) form of the stock trader role. Also we can identify Pro Trading (agent) that plays
the role of stock trader.
1The notion of actor here is adopted from the Artificial Intelligence (AI) notion of software agent [GMP03]
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3.3.2 Goals, information, and their relations
A goal can be defined as a state of affairs that an actor intends to achieved, and it is used to
represent actors’ strategic interests [BPG+04]. When a goal is too coarse to be achieved, it
can be refined through and/or-decompositions of a root goal into finer sub-goals2. Refining
a root-goal into finer sub-goals through and-decomposition (shown in 3.2(a)) implies that
the achievement of the root-goal requires the achievement of all its sub-goals. While
or-decomposition (shown in 3.2(b)) is used to provide different alternatives to achieve
the root goal, since or-decomposition allows for different alternatives for achieving the
root-goal, i.e., achieving any of the sub-goals allows for achieving the root-goal.
Sub goal
and
Sub goal
Goal
Sub goal
or
Sub goal
Goal
(a) And-decomposition (b) Or-decomposition 
Figure 3.2: Graphical representation of goal, and its and/or-decompositions
Example 2. in Figure 3.7, we can identify the top-level goal “Make profit by facilitating
the trades among stock traders” that is and decomposed into “Manage orders matching
among traders” and “Ensure stable trading environment”. While the stock investor goal
“Analyze the trading environment” is or decomposed into “Trade by itself” and “Delegate
trading activities to a trader”.
Information represents any informational entity without intentionality. In Secure Tro-
pos, they use the term resource to cover both physical and informational entities. However,
in this thesis, we only consider informational entities (information), since our main concern
is capturing IQ requirements. Goals may produce, read, modify, and send information,
where each of these relations can be defined as follows:
Produce : indicates that an information item can be created by achieving the goal that
is responsible of its creation process;
Read : indicates that a goal consumes an information item, and it can be strictly classi-
fied under:
2And/or refinement have been first introduced in AI domain [Nil71]
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Information
R
 [R]
 
[B][P]
Goal
Information
S
[T][D]
Goal
Information
P[B]
Goal
Information
R
 [O]
 
[B][P]
Goal
Information
M
Goal
Produce Read Required SendModifyRead Optional  
Figure 3.3: Graphical representation of goal-information relations
Optional : indicates that information is not required for the goal achievement, i.e.,
the goal can be achieved even without reading such information;
Required : indicates that information is required for the goal achievement, i.e., the
goal cannot be achieved without consuming such information.
Modify : indicates that the goal achievement depends on modifying a particular infor-
mation item;
Send : indicates that the goal achievement depends on transferring a particular informa-
tion item to a specific destination under predefined criteria.
Example 3. in Figure 3.7, NYSE (a stock market) produces “Trade information” by
achieving the goal“Perform trades”, where such information describes the performed trades
in the market, and the same information is read (required) [R][R] by the goal “Analyze the
trading environment”. Moreover, the goal “Receive orders from traders” reads (optional)
[R][O] “Trading orders”. While the stock investor’s goal “Produce and send trading orders”
needs to send “Investor’s orders” to destination [D] within a defined time period [T]. The
different relations between goals and information are shown in Figure 3.3 as edges labeled
with P (produce), R (read) that can be R[R] (read required) and R[O] (read optional), M
(modify), and S (send) that has [D] destination and [T] time attributes3.
3.3.3 Actors’ objectives and entitlements
Actors may have different relations with the previously mentioned modeling constructs;
in what follows we discuss two main relations:
3We describe the other properties of these relations later in this section
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Goal
Information
(a) Objective (b) Ownership
O
RoleRole
Figure 3.4: Graphical representation of actor’s objective and information ownership
Objective : indicates that an actor aims to satisfy a goal, if the goal is represented
within the actor’s scope. Scope is represented as oval in Figure 3.4(a);
Ownership : indicates that an actor is the legitimate owner of an information item,
where information owner has full control over the use of information it owns, i.e., it
has the authority to control the delegated permissions over information it own. The
“ownership” relationship between an actor and information it owns is represented as
edges labeled with O in Figure 3.4(b).
Example 4. in Figure 3.7, a stock investor owns its own orders (“Investor orders”), and
any goal appears within its scope belongs to its objectives (e.g., “Produce and send trading
orders”).
3.3.4 Actors’ social interactions
Actors may not have the required capabilities to achieve their own objectives by themselves
(e.g., achieve a goal, provide an information item, etc.). Thus, they depend on one another.
In what follows, we discuss the different actors’ social interactions and dependencies.
Goal delegation
Our modeling language adopts the notion of goal delegation that has been proposed in SI*
to model the transfer of objectives from one actor to another. In particular, delegation
is a ternary relation among two actors concerning the delegatum (e.g., a goal), where the
source of delegation called the delegator and the destination is called delegatee. Figure
3.5(a) shows the graphical representation of a goal delegation between two roles.
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Information provision
Our modeling language adopts and extends the notion of information provision proposed
in SI*, which indicates that an actor has the capability to deliver an information item to
another one, where the source of the provision relation is the provider and the destination
is the requester. However, the quality of the provided information might be affected by
the provision process, which we discuss later in this section. Figure 3.5(b) shows the
graphical representation of information provision between two actors.
Role RoleD DGoal Role RoleInformation
[P/IP]   [T]
(a) Goal delegation (b) Information provision 
Figure 3.5: Graphical representation of goal delegation & information provision
Information permissions and permissions delegation
Generally speaking, a permission is a consent of a particular use of a particular object in a
system [SCFY96], i.e., the holder of the permission is allowed to perform some action(s) in
the system. In particular, permissions are used to restrict information usage to authorized
actors only. In our work, information permission are classified under (P)roduce, (R)ead,
(M)odify, and (S)end permissions, which covers the four relations between goals and
information that our framework support. Moreover, permissions can be delegated among
actors, where permissions delegation indicates that an actor delegates to another actor
the right to produce, read, modify, and/or send permissions over a specific information
item. Note that permission delegation should be under the control of the legitimate
owner of information, since it has full control over information it owns. Figure 3.6 shows
permissions delegation over information between two roles.
Role RoleInformation
[P][R][S][M]
Figure 3.6: Graphical representation of permissions delegation
Example 5. in Figure 3.7, a stock investor delegates its goal “Make profit from trading
securities” to a stock trader, and it provides “investor’s orders” to the trader as well, and
Social trust concepts 37
Make profit from 
trading securities 
Investor’s 
orders
Produce and 
send trading 
orders
Analyze the 
market 
Analysis 
depending 
on trader
Analysis 
depending on 
consulting firm
Tr trading  
suggestions 
Con trading 
suggestion
John
Stock 
investor Make profit from 
trading securities 
DMake profit by 
trading securities 
Internal analysis 
of targeted 
securities 
Tr trading  
suggestions Securities' 
assessments
Analyze the market 
for targeted 
securities 
Analyze the market  
depending on 
consulting firm
Con trading 
suggestion
Pro 
trading
Investor’s  
orders
[IP] [Time]
Tr trading  
suggestions 
[IP] [Time]
Consulting 
firm
Credit 
assessme
nt firm
P[B]
R 
[R
]
[B
][P
]R
 [R]
[B][P]
P[B]
R
 [R]
[B][P]
R
 [R]
[B][P]
R
 [R]
[B][P]
Trading 
orders
[IP] [Time]
S
 
[D]
 [T]
Investor’s 
orders
Trading 
ordersP
[B]
Produce trading 
orders for targeted 
securities 
Con trading 
suggestion
[IP] [Time]
Securities' 
assessments
[IP] [Time]
Con trading 
suggestion
[IP] [Time]
R 
[R
]
[B
][P
]
Market 
Makers
HFT
Small 
traders
play Secure 
trading
Fast 
trading 
play
play
is
_a
Make profit from 
trading securities TT
Stock 
trader is_a
is_a
and
or
and
and
Delegate 
trading  to a 
trader
Trade by 
itself
or
Investor’s
 
orders
[R][M][S]
Investor’s 
orders
[R][M][S]
TT
O
D
pla
y
NYSEplay Stock 
marketManage orders 
matching among 
traders 
Receive  orders 
from traders
Trading 
orders
Perform 
trades 
Trade 
information 
Make profit by 
facilitate trading 
among traders 
Accepted 
orders 
Ensure stable 
trading 
environment 
Analyze the 
trading 
environment 
Manage 
trading 
environment
NSQ
CB info 
NASDA
Q
Manage orders 
matching among 
traders 
Receive  orders 
from traders
Trading 
orders
Perform 
trades 
Trade 
information 
Make profit by 
facilitate trading 
among traders 
Accepted
 
orders 
Ensure stable 
trading 
environment 
Analyze the 
trading 
environment 
Manage 
trading 
environment
NYSE 
CB info 
pla
y
CME 
CB info 
part of
CME
P
[B]R 
[O
]
[B
][P
]
R
 
[R
]
[B
][P
]
R
 [R ]
[B][P]
P[B]
P[B]
R
 
[R
]
[B
][C
B
]
R
 [R]
[B][CB]
P
[B]
P [B
]
R
 
[R
]
[B
][P
]
R
 [R]
[B ][P]
R
 [O ]
[B][P ]
P [B
]
CME CB 
info 
[IP] [Time]
and
andand
and
andand
CME 
CB info 
part of
pl
ay
CME CB 
info 
[IP] [Time]
V







V
Figure 3.7: A partial goal model concerning the stock market structure
it also delegates read, modify and send permissions to the trader.
3.4 Social trust concepts
Trust is very important in human societies [SS05], so it is in Socio-Technical Systems (STS)
[ET60], where organizations and humans are an integral part of the system. Vulnerabilities
of a STS are not only originated by technical issues, but they can be directly related to
the social interactions of its components (both social and technical actors). Our language
adopts the notion of trust and distrust proposed in SI* to capture the actors’ expectations
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of one another concerning their delegated entitlements and authorities4, which can be
defined as follows:
Trust : indicates the expectation of trustor that the trustee will behave as expected
considering the trustum (e.g., trustee will achieve the delegated goal, or it will not
misuse the delegated permission);
Distrust : indicates the expectation of trustor that the trustee will not behave as ex-
pected considering the trustum (e.g., trustee will not achieve the delegated goal, or
it will misuse the delegated permission).
Role RoleT TGoal Role RoleT TInformation
[P][R][S][M]
(a) Trust/distrust of 
goal delegation 
(b) Trust/distrust of 
permission delegation 
Figure 3.8: Graphical representation of trust/distrust of goals & permissions delegation
Trust/distrust relations between two roles concerning a goal and permission delegation
are shown in Figure Figure 3.8(a) and 3.8(b) respectively.
Example 6. in Figure 3.7, a stock investor trusts a stock trader for its delegated goal
“Make profit from trading securities”, and it also trusts it for the delegation of read, modify
and send permissions.
3.4.1 Analyzing trust based on the actors’ internal structure
As previously discussed, several RE approaches (e.g., [GMMZ04; GMMZ05; Zan06;
MG07]) propose constructs to model trust requirements, but they mainly focus on trust
as social relations, without proposing any specific modeling technique to relate them with
the internal requirements of the system’s components. In particular, none of these ap-
proaches proposes to analyze trust directly from the actors’ internal structure (capabilities
and motivations). To this end, we enrich trust requirements analysis by acquiring infor-
mation about the actors’ internal structure, and using such information to analyze trust,
i.e., we propose analysis mechanisms to verify trust requirements consistency with the
actors’ internal structure. In order to do that, we rely on actors’ competencies (can do)
4In SI*, they differentiate between trust of execution and trust of permissions. In this thesis, we do not
differentiate between them
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and motivations (will do) toward the trustum to clearly identify “why” an actor trust/
distrusts another one.
However, relying only on the trustee’s competencies and motivations toward the
trustum might not be enough for analyzing trust, since other factors might influence
the trustee’s behavior. In particular, we need to define the different intentional threats
[VL04] (threat for short) that might threaten the achievement of the trustum, and identify
the trustee’s competencies and motivations toward such threat(s). In other words, actors
are intentional entities, and relying only on their competencies and motivation toward
the trustum might not be enough for analyzing trust, since some of the defined threats
might be within their objectives, i.e., the trustee aims to achieve them, which might
threaten the achievement of the trustum. The graphical representation of thread along
with threaten relation toward goal and information are shown in Figure 3.9(a) and Figure
3.9(b) respectively.
Threat Goalthn Threat thn Information
(a) Goal threat (b) Information threat 
Figure 3.9: Graphical representation of goal/ information corresponding threat
Example 7. in Figure 3.13, the Stock trader defines “Biasing the security assessment”
as a threat to the delegated goal “Assessing the worthiness of companies’ securities”. Sim-
ilarly, a stock market defines “Provide falsified/fraud orders” as a threat to the received
“trader’s orders” information.
To this end, an integrated analysis of trustee’s competencies and motivations toward
the trustum along with its corresponding threat(s), if any, is required to analyze trust.
In what follows, we show how role’s (trustee’s) competencies and motivations toward a
trustum/threat can be classified and captured.
Roles’ competencies: we classify a role’s competencies toward a trustum/ threat
under: (1) Competence: when the role has the capability of achieving the trustum/ threat;
and (2) Incompetence: when the role does not has the capability of achieving the trustum/
threat. A role capability/incapability toward achieving a threat5 is modeled as an edges
labeled with cap/incap respectively (Figure 3.10).
5We only model the actors’ capability/incapability toward achieving threats, since capabilities toward goals/
information can be captured by other concepts proposed in Secure Tropos and SI* languages.
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Role Threatcap Role Threatincap
(a) Threat capability (a) Threat incapability
Figure 3.10: Graphical representation of roles’ capability/incapability toward achieving a threat
Example 8. in Figure 3.13, based on the roles they play, both Secure trading and Fast
trading have the capability to achieve the threat “Provide falsified/fraud orders”. While
Pro trading does not has such capability (incapable). Similarly, Star Co has the capability
to achieve the threat “Biasing the security assessment”.
Roles’ motivations: we classify a role’s motivations toward achieving a
trustum/threat under: (1) Positively motivated : when there is evidence(s) that the role
has positive intentions toward achieving the trustum/threat; and (2) Negatively moti-
vated : when there is evidence(s) that the role has negative intentions toward achieving
the trustum/threat. Roles’ motivations toward achieving a trustum/threat can be derived
from the different interrelations among their own objectives and a trustum/threat, which
can be captured by relying on qualitative goal relationships [GMNS03], in which a goal can
contributes positively or negatively towards the achievement of another goal. In particu-
lar, an actor is positively motivated to achieve a trustum/threat, if such trustum/threat
contributes positively to at least one of its own goals. At the other hand, an actor
is negatively motivated to achieve a trustum/threat, if such trustum/threat contributes
negatively to at least one of its goals.
Goal Goal++ Goal Goal--
(a) Goal positive 
contribution 
(b) Goal negative 
contribution 
Figure 3.11: Graphical representation of goals positive and negative contributions
Positive and negative contribution among goals are modeled as edges labeled with
++ and -, and they are shown in Figure 3.11(a) and Figure 3.11(b) respectively. Sim-
ilarly, positive and negative contribution between a threat and a goal are modeled as
edges labeled with ++ and -, and they are shown in Figure 3.12(a) and Figure 3.12(b)
respectively.
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Goal++Threat Goal--threat
(a) Threat positive 
contribution 
(b) Threat negative 
contribution 
Figure 3.12: Graphical representation of threat-goal positive and negative contributions
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Figure 3.13: A partial goal model concerning trust analysis based on the actors’ internal structure
Example 9. in Figure 3.13, Sarah’s goal “Make profit from trading securities” contributes
negatively to the stock trader’s goal “Make profit by trading securities”. At the other hand,
the threat “Provide falsified/fraud orders” contributes positively to the stock trader’s goal
“Make profit by producing the right orders”. Similarly, the threat “Biasing the security
assessment” contributes positively to the consulting firm’s goal “Provide paid advices about
securities”.
3.4.2 Trust and Distrust Analysis
In the previous sections, we discussed how actors’ competencies and motivations toward
trustum/threats can be derived. In this section, we show how trust relations can be
analyzed based on actors’ competencies and motivations (shown in Table 3.1).
Trust: an actor trusts another one for a specific trustum, if the trustee have the
competency and positive motivations toward achieving the trustum, and there is no evi-
dence(s) about the trustee’s incompetency neither negative motivations toward achieving
the trustum. Moreover, the trustee should not have the competency toward achieving the
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Table 3.1: Analyzing trust based on the actors’ internal structure
Trustum Threat
Competence Motivation Competence Motivation
Comp Incomp Positive Negative Comp Incomp Positive Negative
Trust X X X X X X - -
Distrust
- X - - - - - -
- - X X - - - -
- - - - X X X X
trustum related threat (if any).
Example 10. in Figure 3.13, a stock market can trust small traders for “trader’s orders”,
since they have the competencies and positively motivated to provide them, and they are
incompetence for achieving the related threat.
Distrust: an actor distrusts another one for a specific trustum, if:
(1) The trustee does not have the competency toward achieving the trustum6.
(2) There is no evidence(s) about the trustee’s positive motivations toward achieving the
trustum, and there is evidence(s) about its negative motivations toward the trustum.
Example 11. in Figure 3.13, Sarah distrust the stock trader for its goal “Make profit
from trading securities”, since such goal contributes negatively to the stock trader’s goal
“Make profit by trading securities”.
(3) There is evidence(s) about the trustee’s competency and positive motivations toward
achieving the trustum related threat, and there is no evidence(s) about the trustee’s
incompetency and negative motivations toward achieving the threat.
Example 12. in Figure 3.13, a stock market distrusts both Secure trading and Fast trading
for “trader’s orders” information, since they have the capability to achieve the related
threat “Provide falsified/fraud orders”, and they are positively motivated to achieve such
threat (contributes positively to their goal “Make profit by producing the right orders”).
Similarly, stock trader distrusts Star Co for its delegated goal “Assessing the worthiness
of companies’ securities”, since Star Co have the capability to achieve the related threat
6This situation is handled by a logical constraint that prevents delegating a goal to actors, who do not have
the capability to achieve the trustum
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“Biasing the security assessment”, and it is positively motivated to achieve such threat
(contributes positively to its goal “Provide paid advices about security”). Enron scandal
[PS03] is a famous example about biasing the security assessment.
Monitoring can be defined as the process of observing and analyzing the perfor-
mance of an actor in order to detect any undesirable performance [GZF04]. According
to [GJKL01; Zan06], the lack of trust or distrust can be compensated by monitoring.
Monitoring is modeled as an edge labeled with M between two roles concerning the sub-
ject of monitoring. The graphical representation of monitoring concerning a goal and
information are shown in Figure 3.14(a) and Figure 3.14(b) respectively.
Example 13. in Figure 3.13, a stock market can compensate the lack of trust in both
Secure trading and Fast trading for “trader’s orders” information, by monitoring such
information. Similarly, stock trader can compensate the lack of trust in Star Co for its
delegated goal “Assessing the worthiness of companies’ securities” by monitoring the goal.
Role RoleM MGoal Role RoleM MInformation
(a) Goal monitoring (b) Information monitoring
Figure 3.14: Graphical representation of goal/information monitoring
3.5 Information Quality concepts
In this section, we introduce a new model for analyzing IQ based on seven IQ dimensions
3.5.1, and then we introduce our proposed modeling concepts and constructs for modeling
IQ requirements 3.5.2.
3.5.1 Multi-dimensional Model for Analyzing Information Quality
As previously mentioned, IQ is a hierarchical multi-dimensional concept [BP85; WW96;
BSM03], which can be characterized by different dimensions, including: accessibility, ac-
curacy, completeness, consistency, trustworthiness, etc. [Red95; PLW02; BSM03; Jia10].
Although there exist several models for analyzing IQ based on its different dimensions
[LC02; PLW02], yet there is no general consensus on which dimensions should be consid-
ered or not for analyzing IQ, i.e., most of these works do not theoretical justify why a
certain dimension should be considered or not for analyzing IQ [LC02].
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Moreover, several attempts to categories IQ dimensions into different groups have been
proposed. For example, Wang et al. [WS96] categories IQ dimensions into four groups:
(1) Intrinsic IQ: considers IQ dimensions that is related to the consumer needs (e.g., accu-
racy, believability); (2) Contextual IQ: considers IQ dimensions related to the contextual
aspects of the task at hand (e.g., relevancy, timeliness, completeness); (3) Representa-
tion IQ: considers IQ dimensions related to the IQ representation and understood by its
consumers (e.g., representational consistency, interpretability); and (4) Accessibility IQ:
considers IQ dimensions related to accessible to information consumer (e.g., security).
The same four categories were adopted by [SLW97; LC02], but they did not consider the
same IQ dimensions as in [WS96]. Similarly, there was no theoretical basis that justifies
why those researchers classify IQ dimensions under just only four categories [LC02], why
not three or five?
Not only the classification of IQ dimensions is not clear or appropriately justified,
but also there are inconsistencies in the interrelations among the IQ dimensions that
these works consider. For example, relevance has been considered as an IQ dimension
in [BSM03], while it has been considered as a sub-dimension of usefulness in [WRK95].
Further, completeness has been considered as a sub-dimension of believability in [WRK95],
while it has been considered as sub-dimension of integrity in [BSM03]. In addition, most
of these approaches intend to propose a holistic method for defining IQ along with its
sub-dimensions (one size fits all), i.e., they consider the same dimensions for analyzing
IQ (user-centric view) without taking into consideration the relation between information
and its purpose of use.
Furthermore, most of these approaches were not designed to capture the needs of
socio-technical systems. More specifically, they mainly focus on the technical aspects of
IQ dimensions, and ignore the intentional, social and organizational aspects that might
underlie some of these dimensions. Ignoring such aspects leaves the system open to
different kinds of social and organizational vulnerabilities that might manifest themselves
in the actors’ interactions and dependencies.
To tackle the previously mentioned problems, we need to propose a model for analyzing
IQ in terms of its different dimensions based on information purpose of use. Moreover,
the model should be able to capture the intentional, social and organizational aspects
that might underlie these dimensions. To this end, we propose a multi-dimensional model
(Figure 3.15) for analyzing IQ based on seven IQ dimensions: accessibility, accuracy,
believability, trustworthiness, completeness, timeliness and consistency. We chose these
dimensions based on the following criteria. Although there is no general agreement on the
identification of the most important IQ dimensions, it is possible to distinguish several
IQ dimensions that have been considered in most of the IQ models; including: accuracy,
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Figure 3.15: A multi-dimensional model for analyzing IQ from social perspective
completeness, timeliness and consistency [BS06; CCRC13]. In addition, we consider both
information believability and trustworthiness, since they can be used to analyze informa-
tion accuracy. Finally, before thinking about information accuracy, completeness, etc., we
need to have information and the required permissions over it to perform a task at hand.
Thus, we consider information accessibility in our model.
In the rest of this section, we define these dimensions along with their interrelations,
and we discuss how each of them can be analyzed from different social perspectives (e.g.,
producer, reader, modifier, and sender perspectives7).
1. Accessibility: the extent to which information is available, or easily and quickly
retrieved [PLW02]. In [BS06], they differentiate between accessibility as information
available, and accessibility as access security to information that can be restricted
by permissions. While accessibility in our work is defined as information availability
along with the required permissions over it to perform a task at hand.
Example 14. A trader might need to reads, modifies, and/or sends trading orders belong
to its investors, yet it is not able to perform such activities unless it has the required
permissions from investors (information owners). Note that accessibility is analyzed in
the same way from all the different perspectives of information users (e.g., producer,
reader, modifier, and sender).
7In our framework , produce, read, modify and send are the main relation between a stakeholders and infor-
mation they use
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2. Accuracy: means that information should be true or error free with respect to some
known, designated or measured value [BSM03]. Accuracy is the most important and
studied IQ dimension. Yet without a clear standard, analyzing accuracy is not an
easy task, i.e., determining whether information is accurate or not. However, Dai et
al. [DLBK08] stated that information accuracy is highly influenced by information
trustworthiness. While Wang and Strong [WS96] argued that accuracy can be ana-
lyzed based on several dimensions including believability. Thus, we analyze accuracy
based on two sub dimensions, namely: trustworthiness and believability.
3. Believability: to which extent information is accepted or regarded as true [WKM93;
PLW02; BSM03].
4. Trustworthiness : can be defined as to which extent information is credible [LC02].
We rely on the trustworthiness of the provenance to analyze trustworthiness, i.e.,
trustworthiness of information is analyzed depending on the (trustworthiness of the
source), and the (trustworthiness of the provision) [DLBK08]:
Trustworthiness of the source: the trustworthiness of the source can be ana-
lyzed from information reader perspective based on the source capability to
produce fraud, falsified, or harmful information that might compromise the sys-
tem performance. In other words, information source is untrusted if it has the
capability to produce such information, otherwise it is trusted;
Trustworthiness of the provision: the trustworthiness of information provision
can be analyzed based on the way information arrives to its destination, and
the operations that have been applied to it taking into consideration whether
such operations were authorized or not (e.g., permissions and trust) [GG15a],
and it can be used to guarantee that information has not been corrupted nor
modified during its transfer from its source to its destination.
Analyzing accuracy from information producer perspective: information pro-
ducer requires that the produced information is the same as the intended one,
and it analyzes information accuracy based on its believability and trustworthiness
dimensions.
Example 15. consider a stock investor that aims to produce a trading order by itself. In
order to analyze the order accuracy, it analyzes the believability and the trustworthiness of
such order. More specifically, considering believability for the produced orders enables to
avoid producing inaccurate information unintentionally (e.g., fat finger error that is a hu-
man error caused by pressing the wrong key when using a computer to input information).
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While considering trustworthiness enables to avoid producing inaccurate information in-
tentionally. For instance, investor analysis accuracy based on its believability only, if it
produces orders by itself, since it trusts itself for producing such orders. While if the in-
vestor delegate (common in socio-technical system) order producing to a trader, a trust
relation between them concerning the produced information should hold, since trader is an
intentional actor as well, and it might not have the same intentions as the producer, i.e.,
trader might produce orders different from the ones intended by the investor.
Analyzing accuracy from information sender perspective: information sender re-
quires that information it sends to be accurate at its destination, and it analyzes
information accuracy based on its trustworthiness (trustworthiness of the provision)
dimension only.
Example 16. to guarantee that the trading orders are accurate at their destination (e.g.,
a trading market), investor (information sender) should guarantee that such orders have
been provided by trusted means, which guarantee that its orders have not been intentional/
unintentionally compromised. For instance, if the investor provides such orders through
its trader, he should be sure that orders will not be modified in unauthorized way, and the
trader will not misuse its permissions for compromising the orders, i.e., a trust relation
for such permissions between the investor and the trader should hold.
Analyzing accuracy from information reader perspective: information reader
analyzes information accuracy based on its believability and trustworthiness of the
provenance (trustworthiness of the source and provision).
Example 17. in order to fulfill their obligation (facilitate trading), Market Makers (stock
traders) provide what is called “stub quotes”, which are orders with prices far away from
the current market prices, i.e., such orders can be considered as inaccurate/fraud/ falsified
orders. During the Flash Crash, over 98% of the trades were executed at prices within 10%
of their values because of such orders [KKST11]. However, such failure could be avoided,
if markets apply a mechanism to analyze the believability of the received orders. At the
other hand, some HFTs (stock traders) provide inaccurate/fraud/ falsified orders to affect
the prices of some securities before starting their real trades (e.g., flickering quotes that
are orders last very short time, which make them unavailable for most traders). If markets
analyze the trustworthiness of the provenance of the received orders, they will be able to
detect such orders and apply the required mechanisms to mitigate their harmful effect. In
particular, by considering the trustworthiness of the source, markets can guarantee that
the received orders are not provided by harmful traders. Moreover, by considering the
trustworthiness of the provision, markets can avoid situation in which traders may deny
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to commit to their performed orders by claiming that such orders either were not issued
by them, or they were modified by unauthorized entities or corrupted during their delivery
to the market.
5. Completeness: means that all parts of information should be available, and informa-
tion should be complete for performing a task at hand [BSM03]. Thus, completeness
can be analyzed depending on two sub dimensions:
Value Completeness: information is preserved against corruption or lost that
might endanger its integrity (e.g., during its storage/ transfer).
Purpose of use completeness: information is complete for performing a task at
hand, i.e., all the required information for performing a specific task should be
available. Usually, the purpose of use completeness is harder to be analyzed,
and it requires a domain knowledge.
Information completeness can be analyzed from two different perspectives (sender, and
reader8):
Analyzing completeness from information sender perspective: information
sender analyzes information completeness only based on its value completeness,
since send information is complete for the purpose of send.
Example 18. to guarantee that the trading orders are complete at their destination (e.g.,
a trading market), investors (information senders) should ensure that their orders will be
provided by a trusted means that guarantee their orders have not lose any of their parts
during the transfer and became incomplete.
Analyzing completeness from information reader perspective: information
reader analyzes information completeness depending on its two sub dimensions, i.e.,
value and purpose of use completeness.
Example 19. a main reason of the Flash Crash was the lack of coordination among
the Circuit Breakers (CBs)9 of the trading markets. In particular, markets depend only
on their own CBs information to stabilize their trading environment. However, such
information is complete for each market alone, but when it comes to coordinate the CBs
activities among all the markets, it can be considered as incomplete for the purpose of
8We do not analyze it from the producer perspective, since its related issues do not arise in produced infor-
mation
9CBs are techniques that are used by markets to slow down or halt trading for pre-defined period of time in
specific cases in order to prevent a potential market failure [GHLZ12]
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use. For instance, during the Flash Crash CME market employs its CB, but NYSE did
not [Sub13], since each of them depends only on its CB information.
6. Timeliness (validity): means to which extent information is valid in term of time
(e.g., sufficiently up-to-date) [PLW02]. According to [BWPT98], information time-
liness can be analyzed depending on information currency (age) that is the time
interval between its creation (or update) to its usage time [WS96; PLW02], and in-
formation volatility that is the change frequency of information value [WS96], i.e.,
information is not valid, if its currency is bigger than its volatility interval, otherwise
it is valid.
Information timeliness can be analyzed from two different perspectives (sender, and
reader10):
Analyzing timeliness from information reader perspective: information reader
analyzes information timeliness based on information currency, and information
volatility, i.e., information is not valid, if its currency is bigger than its volatility
interval when it is read, otherwise it is valid.
Example 20. a stock trader should guarantee the timeliness (validity) of his investors’
finical portfolio before accepting to perform any of its orders, i.e., the portfolio currency
is bigger than its volatility.
Analyzing timeliness from information sender perspective: information sender
requires that its information to be valid at its destination in terms of time. In
particular, it defines the allowed amount of time for information (send time) to
reach its final destination, and information is valid from the sender perspective if
its currency at destination is less than the defined send time.
Example 21. to guarantee the validity of its orders at the intended market, investor
should ensure that the trader it depends on provides a time to market that fits its needs
(less that its send time).
7. Consistency : means all multiple records of the same information should be the same
across time and space [BSM03]. In this thesis, consistency is a time related aspect,
i.e., the value of information among its different users might became inconsistent
due to time related aspects (e.g., currency). While in [WS96] consistency is used to
refer to “representational consistency”.
10Timeliness related issues do not arise in produced information
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Analyzing consistency from information reader perspective: information consis-
tency arises only when there are multiple records of the same information that are
being used (read) by several actors for interdependent purposes (goals), and we call
such actors as interdependent readers. While if actors use the same information for
independent purposes, inconsistency will not be an issue since the actors’ activities
are independent. In particular, to ensure consistency among the different interde-
pendent readers, we need to ensure that they depend on the same information value
in term of time.
Example 22. the lack of coordination among CB activities of the trading markets will
not be resolved unless markets (interdependent readers) depend on consistent information
for their CB activities.
3.5.2 Information Quality constructs
Secure Tropos and SI* modeling languages do not provide specialized concepts or con-
structs that enables to model IQ related aspects. From this perspective, we propose several
new concepts and constructs to model IQ related aspects. In the rest of this section, we
discuss each of the proposed concepts.
Information accessibility: can be influenced by the permissions that an actor has over
information, which might enables or prevents it from using information as intended.
As previously mentioned, we propose four types of permissions concerning the four
types of information usage that our framework supports (e.g., (P)roduce, (R)ead,
(M)odify and (S)end)11.
Information completeness: means that all parts of information should be available,
and information should be complete for performing a task at hand [BSM03]. Thus,
it can be subject to:
(1) Value completeness: information provision might affect the quality of the
transferred information. Thus, we extend information provision concept with a
property that define its type, which can be strictly classified under:
Normal provision (P) : does not guarantee the integrity of the provided
information against corruption or lost;
Integrity Preserving (IP) provision: guarantee the integrity of the pro-
vided information against corruption and lost, i.e., the completeness of
information is preserved [GG13a].
11Permissions and permissions delegation have been discussed earlier
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Example 23. in order to guarantee that its information (“CME CB info”) will be
preserved against corruption and lost, CME provides it to both NYSE and NASDAQ
through IP provision. Provision type (e.g., P/IP) is added as an attribute to the
information provision construct as shown in Figure 3.7.
(2) Purpose of use completeness: we rely on “part of” concept that has been
used in several areas (e.g., natural language [Bri95], conceptual modeling
[Ode98], etc.) to model the relation between a composite information item
and its sub-items. Such relation enables to decide whether information is com-
plete for the purpose of use or not. Note that the completeness of information
is subject to task it is intended to be used for, i.e., the structure of information
is not always easy to be defined.
Example 24. a main reason of the Flash Crash was the lack of coordination among
the Circuit Breaker (CBs) of the trading markets. More specifically, markets depend
only on their own CBs information to stabilize their trading environment. However,
such information is complete for each market alone, but when it comes to coordinate
the CBs activities among all the markets, such information can be considered as
incomplete. In particular, in stock market domain the same security can be traded
in several markets, but it will always have only one primary listing market that is the
main market for trading the security, such market has full control over the way its
listed security can be traded in other markets. Considering the Flash Crash, CME
is the primary listing market, and it requires that all CB activities related to its
securities to be coordinated with its own activities, i.e., if CME turn to slow trading
mode or stop trading, all markets trade the same security should do the same. This
can be solved, if we consider that the CB information of any market trading the
CME securities is composed of its own CB information along with the CME CB
information. Part of relation is shown in Figure 3.7 as edges labeled with part of
between “NYSE CB info” and “CME CB info”.
Information timeliness (validity): to model timeliness, we extend information con-
struct with a (V)olatility attribute to represent the change rate of information value
[WS96] (shown in Figure 3.7 for produced information). Information might not be
used where it is produced (it might be transferred). Thus, we extend information
provision construct with a time attribute (shown in Figure 3.7) that captures the
amount of time an information provision requires (referred to as the transmission
time in telecommunication networks [For06]). Since, we already defined two different
relations between goals and information that can be affected by time related aspects
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(e.g., reads and sends), we extend them to accommodate time related aspects, as
follows:
Read timeliness: in order to capture information validity for read, we propose
read time12 concept that capture the actual usage time of information, and it
enables to determine information currency (age), which can be used to analyze
the timeliness of read information, i.e., information is valid, if its currency is
smaller than its volatility, otherwise it is not invalid.
Send timeliness: in order to capture information validity at its intended desti-
nation, we extend send relation with two attributes: (1) (D)estination that
represents the intended send destination of information; and (2) (S)end time
that represents the allowed amount of time for information to reach its final
destination. Both of these attributes are shown in 3.7. The timeliness of send
information at its destination can be analyzed depending on the send time and
destination read time, i.e., information is valid, if read time is smaller than the
send time.
Information consistency: as previously mentioned, consistency arises only when there
are multiple records of the same information, which are being read by actors for
interdependent purposes (goals). In order to capture consistency, we extend the
read relation between a goal and information with Purpose Of Use (POU) attribute
that captures the intended purpose of information usage, which enables to identify
interdependent readers that are actors who read the same information for the same
POU. To this end, consistency can analyzed among interdependent readers based on
their read times, i.e., information is consistent among its interdependent readers, if
all of them have the same read time, otherwise it is inconsistent.
Example 25. in Figure 3.7, NYSE and NASDAQ are reading “CME CB info” for the
same purpose of use (CB), i.e., they are interdependent readers for such information.
Thus, in order to guarantee that “CME CB info” is consistent among them, both of them
should have the same read time.
Information believability: is considered in both read and produce, since only these two
relations can be influenced by information believability. Thus, we extend these two
concepts with attributes to accommodate a believability check for read/produced
12Read time can be derived by analyzing the model, i.e., there is no specialized construct or attribute to
represent it
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information respectively (shown as [B] in Figure 3.7), i.e., produced/read informa-
tion is believable from the perspective of its producer/ reader, if the produce/ read
relations apply a believability check.
Information trustworthiness: can be subject to:
Trustworthiness of the source: as discussed in the trust section, we capture the
trustworthiness of information source, by identify and model threat(s) that in-
fluence the trustworthiness of the produced information (e.g., producing fraud,
falsified, or harmful information), and we identify and model actors’ capabilities
and motivations towards such threat.
Trustworthiness of the provision: can be captured based on the way informa-
tion arrives to its final destination, taking into consideration its provision type
(e.g., P/IP provision), and the operations (e.g., modify) that have been applied
to it taking into consideration if such operations were authorized or not (e.g.,
permissions and trust)13.
Information accuracy14: can be analyzed based on:
Accuracy of produced information: can be analyzed based on its believability,
which enables to avoid producing unintended information, and its trustworthi-
ness of the production process if the producing goal has been delegated;
Accuracy of send information: can be analyzed based on the trustworthiness of
the provision;
Accuracy of read information: can be analyzed based on believability and its
trustworthiness of the provenance.
All modeling concepts that underlie our language are structured in terms of a meta-
model shown in Figure 3.16, where we can identify: an actor covers two concepts (role and
agent), an agent can play a role or more, and roles can be specialized from one another
(is a). Actors can be interdependent readers concerning an information item, they may
have a set of goals, they aim to achieve, and they may have the related capabilities for
their achievement.
Goals can be and/or-decomposed, and they contribute either positively or negatively to
the achievement of one another. Goals may produce, read, modify and send information,
where produce concept is enriched with a believability check, and read can be descried by
its type (e.g., optional or required), purpose of use, and believability check. While send can
13No special constructs are added to capture the trustworthiness of the provision
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Figure 3.16: A meta-model of the main concepts of the modeling language
be described by a time and destination attributes. Information has volatility attribute that
is used to analyze its validity, and it can be composed of several information items (part
of ). An actor can be a legal owner of information item, which gave it a full control over
its use. Threat might threaten an information item or goal, and actors might be capable/
incapable of achieving such threat. Moreover, threat may contribute either positively or
negatively to the achievement of a goal or more. Actors may delegate goals/ permissions
to one another, and they may have information, and provide them to one another. Finally,
actors may trust/ distrusts one another for both goal and permissions delegation, and they
can monitor one another for goal achievement and information production.
3.6 Workflow net with actors (WFA-net)
A Business Process (BP) can be defined as a set of activities that has a clear structure
describing its sequencing order and dependencies [AS04]. Although information related
problems can be a main reason of different kinds of errors in BPs [TvdAS09], the BP
literature has focused on control-flow (activity flow) perspective of the process with less
emphasis on information perspective. However, in recent years some efforts have been
devoted to information-aware process design (e.g., Sadiq et al. [SOSF04]; Sidorova et al.
[SST10]; Trcka et al. [TvdAS09]). Yet the focus of attention in these works is combining
information flow with activity flow, i.e., they are able to detect when an activity in BP
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Figure 3.17: Overview of the approach for modeling and analyzing IQ in BP
relay on information that does not exist, but they say nothing about Information Quality
(IQ) related concerns.
In the literature, we can find several techniques for dealing with IQ (e.g., preventing,
detecting and correcting IQ related issues [Ham50]). Yet most of these techniques propose
solutions that are able to address the technical aspects of IQ, and seem to be limited in
addressing the social and organizational IQ related aspects. Such aspects are particularly
important for BPs, since they are mainly executed by social actors and not only machines
[YM94]. More specifically, most BPs occur in social context (e.g., socio-technical systems
[ET60]), where humans and technical components are considered as an integral part of
the BP. Thus, understanding the social and organizational context where the BPs are
executed is essential to detect different kinds of vulnerabilities.
To this end, we propose a goal-oriented approach to capture IQ requirements of the
social and organizational context where the BP is executed, and then introduce mecha-
nisms for mapping these requirements into workflow net with actors (WFA-net) that is a
modeling language, we propose, for capturing IQ requirements in BPs.
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3.6.1 Approach for Modeling and Reasoning about IQ Requirements in Busi-
ness Process
In this section, we propose our approach for modeling and analyzing IQ requirements in
BP. An overview of the approach is shown in Figure 3.17, the process is composed of
three main phases: (i) modeling phase; (ii) mapping phase; and (iii) analysis phase, each
of them is discussed as follows:
Mapping phase
Aims to model the social, organizational and IQ requirements of the overall system where
the BP occurs. In order to do that, we rely on an extended version of Secure Tropos
[GG15d]that propose concepts for modeling IQ requirements. Figure 3.18 shows a por-
tion of a goal model concerning the stock market system represented in the extended
secure Tropos modeling language. For instance, John is an agent that plays stock in-
vestor role, which has a main goal of G1. Make profit from trading securities
that is or-decomposed into G1.1 Trade securities by itself and G1.2 Delegate
trading activities to a trader. Moreover, G1.1.1 Trade securities by itself
is and-decomposed into G1.1.1.1 Produce and send orders and G1.1.1.2 Finalize
the trade.
Moreover, the goal G1.1.1.1 (P)roduces and (S)ends investor’s orders, and the
goal G1.1.1.2 (R)eads trade settlement. Each of the previously mentioned relations
between goals and information are required for the achievement of the goals, i.e., if a
goal could not use (e.g., reads, sends, or produces) information as intend, it will not
be achieved (it will be prevented). Moreover, the stock investor provides (Integrity
Provision (IP)15) investor’s orders to a trader, and it delegates the goal G1.2 Del-
egate trading to a trader to stock trader, and trusts it for its achievement. Stock
investor is the owner of investor’s orders, and it delegates (R)eads, (M)odifies and
(S)ends permissions concerning it to the trader.
Mapping phase
In this section, we propose the workflow net with actors (WFA-net), and then we discuss
several mechanisms that can be used for mapping IQ requirements model into WFA-net.
15IP provision preserves the integrity of the provided (transferred) information
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Figure 3.18: A partial goal model concerning the stock market structure
Work flow net with actors (WFA-net)
a workflow net with actors (WFA-net) adopts workflow net (WF-net) and extends it with
the notion of social actor, and IQ related concerns. In WFA-net, activities (tasks) are
assigned to social actors, and they may produce, read, modify, and send information
items. In what follows, we define the semantics of WFA-nets. Let us consider a finite set
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of social actors A = {a1, a2, . . ., an}, a finite set of information elements I= {i1, i2, . . .,
im}, and a finite set of time intervals T= {t1, t2, . . ., tm}, and we define Iv ⊆ {I X T} to
describe information items along with their volatility values.
Moreover, to capture information send relations, we define S ⊆ {A X I X T} that
describe the target (actor) of send information, information to be send, and the required
send time. Further, we define a set of responsibility predicates ΠA = {pia1 , pia2 , . . . , piak}
to capture the relation between actors and activities they are responsible of (e.g., respon-
sible(actor); a set of produce predicates ΠP = {pip1 , pip2 , . . . , pipj} to capture the relation
between activities and information they produce (e.g., produce(info)); a set of read pred-
icates ΠR = {pir1 , pir2 , . . . , pirk} to capture the relation between activities and information
they read (e.g., read(info)); a set of modify predicates ΠM = {pim1 , pim2 , . . . , piml} to cap-
ture the relation between activities and information they modify (e.g., modify(info)); a
set of send predicates ΠS = {pis1 , pis2 , . . . , pisl} to capture the relation between activities
and information they send (e.g., send(actor, info, send time)).
Furthermore, we define the following functions: fpia = ΠA −→ {A}, responsibility func-
tion that assign responsibility predicates with actors responsible of achieving the related
activities; function fpip = ΠP −→ 2
Iv , production function that assigns produce predicates
with information items that activities produce; function fpir = ΠR −→ 2
Iv , reading func-
tion that assigns read predicates with information items that activities read; function fpim
= ΠM −→ 2
Iv , modify function that assigns modify predicates with information items
that activities modify; and function fpis = ΠS −→ 2
S, send function that assigns send
predicates with information items that activities send.
Now, we define a WFA-net as a WF-net where every transition t is described with:
an actor being assigned to perform the activity (res); a set of information items being
produced (pd) by the activity when t fires; a set of information items being modified
(md) by the activity when t fires; a set of information items being read (rd) by the
activity when t fires; and a set of information items being send (sd) by the activity when
t fires.
Definition 3.6.1 (WFA-net). A workflow net with actors (WFA-net) N = 〈 P, T, F,
res, pd, rd, md, sd 〉 consist of WF-net N= 〈 P, T, F 〉, an actor assigning function res:
T −→ A, information producing function pd : T −→ 2Iv , information reading function
rd : T −→ 2Iv , information modifying function md : T −→ 2Iv , and information sending
function sd: T −→ 2S.
Example 26. A WFA-net of a stock investor for trading securities is shown in Figure
3.19. Its actor set is A = {credit_firm, audit_firm, trader, investor, consult-
ing_firm, stock market}, and its information set is I= {securities_ assessment,
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Figure 3.19: A WFA-net of a stock investor for trading securities
financial_statement, trader_suggestion, trading_orders, consultant _sug-
gestion , investors_orders, trading_settlement}. Considering the transition T12:
Produce and send orders, the responsibility function res(Produce and send orders) =
{investor}, the production function pd( Produce and send orders) = {investor’s order},
the sending function sd(Produce and send orders) = {(stock market, investor’s order,
time)}, modify and read functions md(Produce and send orders) = rd(Produce and send
orders) = {∅}.
To capture the work flow in WFA-net, we should be able to evaluate the activities
related predicates either to true (⊤) or to false (⊥) based on an already defined criteria.
Thus, we define the following functions, σpia : ΠA −→ {⊤,⊥} assigns to each responsibility
predicate either ⊤, when the responsible actor can achieve the activity, or it assigns ⊥,
when the responsible actor cannot achieve the activity. Similarly, we define σpip : ΠP
−→ {⊤,⊥}, σpir : ΠR −→ {⊤,⊥}, σpim : ΠM −→ {⊤,⊥}, and σpis : ΠS −→ {⊤,⊥} that
assign to each produce/ read/ modify/ send predicate either ⊤, when information item i
can be produce/ read/ modify/ send by the activity, or it assigns ⊥ otherwise.
Finally, we define σΠ function that sums the values of the previously mentioned func-
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tions over their related predicates. σΠ: T → (⊤, ⊥), where σΠ = σpia∧σpip∧σpir∧σpim∧σpis .
Following WFD-net, we refer to a state16 of WFA-net as a configuration, where a WFA-
net configuration is a state that includes responsible actors along with the produce, read,
modify, and send information that the activity perform. Moreover, a state can be repre-
sented as σΠ, and the set of all states is denoted by Σ.
Definition 3.6.2 (Configuration). Let N = 〈 P, T, F, res, pd, rd, md, sd 〉 be a WFA-
net, let m be a marking of N, and let σΠ be as defined above. Then, c = 〈m,σΠ〉
is a configuration of N. With Ξ we denote the set of all configurations, and the start
configuration of N is defined by 〈[start] , σΠ〉, ( Iv = ∅) 〉. While Ce = {〈 [end] , σΠ〉 |
σΠ ∈ Σ } defines the set of final configurations.
In the initial configuration, only one place is marked [start], and Iv set is initialized to
empty set. While a configuration is a final configuration, if it contains a marking [end].
A transition t of a WFA-net N can be enabled at a configuration c = 〈m,σΠ〉, IFF: (1)
the transition t is enabled at marking m (activity flow), and (2) the predicates related to
configuration c enabling (σΠ) must be true, which guarantees that IQ requirements are
met. When a transition t is enabled, it may fires, where firing of transition t changes the
marking as well as the related predicates and information set Iv, i.e., the firing of t enable
a set of successor configurations 〈m
′
, σ
′
Π 〉, and changes predicates and information.
Example 27. consider transition T13: Receive orders in Figure 3.19, and suppose
there is a token in place p8. The transition is enabled if stock market (responsible actor)
has the capability to achieve such activity, information investors_orders fits for read
from the perspective of the stock market, i.e., information has been already produced, stock
market has it, and it does not suffer from any IQ related issue (e.g., information is valid
(timeliness), accurate, stock market has the read permissions over it, etc.). Firing this
transition means that the token in p8 is removed, and a token is produced in p9. Moreover,
information trading_orders is produced by the stock market. Note that we only consider
information producing when a transition fires, since it affects all the other information
related operations (e.g., sends, modifies). While other IQ aspects can be captured with the
help of the automated reasoning support (discussed in section 4.3).
Mapping IQ Requirements from the Goal model into WFA-nets
in this section, we describe how IQ requirements model can be mapped into WFA-net.
In particular, we define rules for identifying complete building blocks that are used to
represent the extended secure Tropos constructs, which can be mapped into WFA-net
16A state (also called marking) of a Petri net is a distribution of tokens over its places
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activities. Moreover, we define several sets of constraints that should be followed during
the mapping process to ensure the correctness of both the mapping and the resulting
WFA-net:
Building blocks: we define 3 rules for identifying complete building blocks: (a) a
goal that is not and/ or-decomposed of any other goal, and it is not composed into sub-
goals as well, can be considered as a complete building block, and it can be mapped into
a WFA-net activity (task) taking into consideration the actor, who is responsible of its
achievement, and information it relies on (if any); (b) goals that are and-decomposed from
a parent goal are considered as a complete building block, and they can be mapped into
a sequence of WFA-net activities, where each of these activities represents a sub-goal; (c)
goals that are or-decomposed from a parent goal are considered as a complete building
block, and they can be mapped into parallel (alternatives) WFA-net activities, where each
of these activities represents a sub-goal.
Consistency constraints: we define 3 consistency constrains that can be used to
ensure a correct mapping between the identified building blocks and WFA-net activities:
(i) mapping is allowed for complete building blocks only, i.e., no goal is allowed to be
mapped unless it can be considered as a complete building block; (ii) if the WFA-net is
used to model a plan to achieve a top-level goal, the full plan to achieve the top-level goal
should be considered in the WFA-net; and (iii) no information is allowed in the WFA-net
unless its source (the goal that produces it) exists in the WFA-net.
Sequencing constraints: we define 3 sequencing constraints that can be used to
ensure the proper ordering of the WFA-net activities: (i) activities in WFA-net should
be consistent with their sequencing order in their own building blocks; (ii) if an activity
depend on another activity, it should appear after the activity it depends on in the WFA-
net; (iii) if an activity depend on the outcome of another activity (e.g., information), it is
desirable to appear after the activity it depends on its outcome.
Refinement constraints are constrains derived from the WFA-net semantics, and
used to refine the WFA-net that results from the sequencing phase. We define two sim-
ple refinement constraints : (i) no two places (p1, p2) can appear in sequence without a
transition (t) separating them; and (ii) no two transitions (t1, t2) can appear in sequence
without a place (p) separating them.
Example 28. in this example, we show how investor process for trading securities shown
in Figure 3.18 can be mapped into WFA-net shown in Figure 3.19. The investor aims
to achieve the top-level goal G1, but G1 cannot be considered as a building block, since it
is or-decomposed into G1.1 and G1.2. Thus, instead of G1 we have G1.1 and G1.2 that
can be mapped as parallel activities into WFA-net. G1.2 can be mapped into T3 activ-
ity, while G1.1 is and-decomposed into G1.1.1 and G1.1.2, which can be mapped into
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two sequential transactions. Moreover, G1.1.1 is also and-decomposed into G1.1.1.1 and
G1.1.1.2, which can be mapped into two sequential transactions T12 and T15 respectively.
While G1.1.2 is or-decomposed into G1.1.2.1 and G1.1.2.2, and they can be mapped
into two parallel transactions T11 and T10 respectively. Furthermore, transaction T10
needs to read trader suggestion information, and transaction T11 needs to read consul-
tant suggestion information. Since no information is allowed to exist without its source,
we add T8 and T9 transactions that produce trader suggestion and consultant suggestion
respectively. However, T8 requires to read securities analysis that is produced by trader,
which can be produced either by T4 or T5. Similarly, T9 requires to read securities analysis
that is produced by consultant, which can be produced either by T6 or T7. Moreover, T4
and T6 need to read securities assessment. Thus, T1 is added since it is responsible of
producing such information. Similarly, T5 and T7 need to read financial statement infor-
mation. Thus, T2 is added since it is responsible of producing such information. At the
other hand, T15 needs to read trade settlement information, thus, T13-14 are also added.
Finally, following the refinement constraints, we add some position between transactions
when required.
In this section, we describe the automated reasoning support that our approach pro-
poses to guarantee the correctness and consistency of information-flow, IQ requirements,
and control-flow of BPs. In order to verify the correctness and consistency of BP model,
we provide a Datalog [AHV95] formalization of all the concepts that have been introduced
in the paper, along with the reasoning axioms17. Moreover, we define a set of properties of
the design (shown in Table 4.8) that can be used to verify the correctness and consistency
of the BP model; in what follows we discuss each of these properties:
3.6.2 Analysis Phase18
aims to verify the correctness and consistency of the BP model. In particular, we define
a set of properties to check the correctness and consistency of the BP control-flow; infor-
mation flow along with IQ requirements, i.e., BP is correct and consistent, if all of these
properties hold.
3.7 Dealing with IQ requirements
A system usefulness is determined by both its functional and its non-functional (quality)
requirements [CdPL09], where functional requirements are used to represent services that
17The formalization of the concepts and axioms is omitted due to space limitation, yet they can be found at
https://mohamadgharib.wordpress.com/iqbp/
18For more information about the analysis phase refer to [GG15e]
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the system is expected to deliver, and nonfunctional requirements refer to quality require-
ments that the system needs to satisfy while delivering the services [JFS06]. Thus, an
integrated analysis of both functional and quality requirements is essential to determine
the system usefulness, since as highlighted in some functional requirements might not be
useful without their necessarily related non-functional requirements (e.g., IQ) [CdPL09].
However, non-functional requirements are more difficult to be expressed in a measur-
able way [NE00], i.e., they do not always have a clear-cut criteria for their satisfaction
[MCN92; CdPL09]. Thus, we advocate that an appropriate integration of such require-
ments is not possible without removing any ambiguity related to the verification of quality
requirements.
Like all non-functional (quality) requirements, IQ requirements use to be represented
as generic qualitative properties of the system, without specific methods for their analysis
[CdPL09]. To tackle this problem, we propose a systematic process for dealing with
IQ requirements. In particular, we introduce a set of modeling constructs that enable
for capturing the stakeholders’ top-level IQ requirements as softgoals (usually informal),
and then we discuss how such softgoals can be gradually refined until reaching their leaf
softgoals (cannot be refined more than a leaf softgoal). Finally, we show how leaf softgoals
can be approximated into Quality Constraint (QC) that can provide a means end (formal
specifications) for achieving the leaf softgoal. The process along with an example about
its modeling constructs is depicted in 3.20. Each of the previously mentioned concepts is
defined as follows:
Top-level IQ softgoals: are softgoal concerning IQ requirements, and they are used
as a starting point for identifying the stakeholders’ needs concerning IQ. However, at this
point IQ softgoals are likely to be informal and imprecise, but they became more precise
during the latter refinement activities.
And-decomposition for IQ softgoals refinement: a softgoal can be refined into
more specific sub softgoals, if the joint satisfaction of these softgoals is considered equiv-
alent to the satisfaction of the refined softgoal [JMF08]. Usually, softgoals refinement
into more specific sub softgoals can be performed based on some related taxonomy. For
instance, Mylopoulos et al. [MCN92] propose taxonomy for refining accuracy and perfor-
mance softgoals. While Anto´n et al. [AER02] introduce taxonomy for refining privacy
softgoals. The same can be applied to IQ softgoals, i.e., they can be refined based on
different IQ dimensions, we rely on the IQ taxonomy (IQ model) shown in 3.15.
In particular, we introduce and-decomposition relation between an IQ softgoal and its
sub IQ softgoals instead of contribution links proposed in [MCN92], since such require-
ments will reach a point that enables for clearly deciding whether they can be achieved or
not (operational specifications). Note that IQ softgoals cannot be refined more that the
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Figure 3.20: Process: from informal to formal IQ requirements
leaf IQ softgoals, which are used to represent leaf IQ dimensions (shown in Figure 3.15),
where a leaf IQ dimension is an IQ dimension that does not has sub dimensions (e.g., leaf
IQ believability softgal is used to represent believability (leaf IQ dimension)).
Approximating leaf IQ Softgoals: as previously mentioned, softgoals are difficult
to be expressed in a measurable way. Yet Jureta et al. [JMF08] introduce the approxi-
mation relation through which a softgoal can be satisfied by a Quality Constraint (QC),
i.e., a QC can provide clear-cut criteria for the satisfaction of a softgoal. However, leaf
IQ softgoals are used to capture different IQ dimensions (e.g., accuracy, completeness,
etc.), i.e., each of them is used to describe different aspects of IQ. Thus, leaf IQ softgoals
might not have the same nature/type, and in turn, they may need to be approximated
in different ways. To tackle this problem, we rely on Glinz [Gli05] work19, to get better
understanding of the nature/type of the leaf IQ softgoals, and to define the appropriate
Information Quality Constraints (IQC)20 for their approximation. Moreover, for the ap-
proximation to be consistent with the different types of leaf IQ softgoals, we define three
different types of IQCs:
1- Operational IQC: are constraints that define the required actions to be performed
in already determined situations.
Example 29. IQ softgoal concerning information believability can be approximated
19Glinz classify requirements based on their kind, satisfaction and representation
20We use IQC to refer to QC, since no other type of constraints is used in this paper
Dealing with IQ requirements 65
Table 3.2: IQ softgoal classification & approximation into IQC
Leaf IQ softgoals Kind Satisfaction Representation Approximated into IQC
Believability Functional Hard Operational Operational IQC
Trustworthiness Constraint Hard Declarative Declarative IQC
Completeness Constraint Hard Declarative Declarative IQC
Timeliness Performance Hard Quantitative Quantitative IQC
Consistency Performance Hard Quantitative Quantitative IQC
into operational IQC that define a mine and max values to determine the believability
of produced/ read information.
2- Declarative IQC: are constraints used to define properties of the system that should
hold.
Example 30. IQ softgoal concerning the trustworthiness of provision can be ap-
proximated into declarative IQC stated that information should be transferred only
through IP provision.
3- Quantitative IQC: are constraints used to specify properties of the system that
should hold, and can be measured on an ordinal scale.
Example 31. IQ softgoal concerning consistency can be approximated into quan-
titative IQC stated that interdependent readers should rely on information that has
the same currency (age).
Table 3.2 shows how leaf IQ softgoals can be classified, and how they can be approxi-
mated into the adequate IQCs. Finally, in order for the approximation relation between
IQ softgoal and its related IQC to hold, a well-defined quality space should exist [JMF08],
where a quality space can be defined as a certain conceptual space that can be used to
describe the quality value [MBG+03]. The main purpose of the quality space is providing
a general consensus among the stakeholders of the system on how quality aspects (e.g.,
IQ dimensions) can be measured, which removes any ambiguity related to the verification
of IQCs, i.e., determining whether a certain IQC is satisfied or not. For instance, both
information timeliness and consistency are time related aspects. Thus, how time can be
represented and measured should be clear to all stakeholders of the system, i.e., the al-
lowed number of digits along with the value they represent (e.g., seconds, milliseconds,
etc.).
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3.8 Chapter summary
In this chapter, we proposed our modeling language, we started by discussing the objec-
tives of the language 3.1, and then we introduced the principles that have been taken
into account while developing the language 3.2. In Section 3.3, we present our modeling
language 3.3, that can be used for modeling the actors of the system along with their
objectives, entitlements, and authorities. In addition, it propose more refined concepts
for modeling trust among actors, and propose constructs for modeling IQ requirements.
In 3.6, we discussed workflow net with actors (WFA-net) that is a modeling extension,
we proposed, for modeling and analyzing IQ requirements in business processes. Finally
in 3.7, we presented a systematic process for dealing with IQ requirements.
Chapter 4
Automated Reasoning Support
If you torture the data long enough, it will confess.
Ronald Coase
A modeling language allows for drawing graphical requirements models that can be
used to represent requirements of the system-to-be. However, we cannot rely on such
graphical models to perform any kind of automated analysis without a formal representa-
tion of their semantics. In this chapter, we present the formal framework that underlies
our modeling language. The rest of this chapter is organized as follows, Section 4.1
describes how our modeling constructs are mapped into the formal framework, i.e., we
define several predicates to represent the different modeling constructs along with their
relations. While in Section 4.2, we discuss the reasoning rules (axioms), which can be
used to derive new knowledge from the predicates that have been derived from the graph-
ical model. Finally, in Section 4.3, we verify the requirements model by proposing the
properties of the design, which can be used to verify the correctness and consistency of
the requirements model.
4.1 Concepts and Relations
As previously mentioned, graphical models cannot support any kind of automated analysis
without a formal representation of their semantics. Thus, we need to translate graphical
models into formal specifications that enables for performing the required analysis to
verify the correctness and consistency of the requirements model. To this end, we rely
on Disjunctive Datalog [BFI+09] to define the formal semantics underlying our modeling
language, since Disjunctive Datalog is more expressive than most other logic languages
with negation [EGM97].
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In addition, we need an inference engine that allows for performing the required anal-
ysis, i.e., deducing new knowledge from facts derived from the graphical requirements
model. Among existing inference engines (e.g., Cmodels [Lie05], Smodel [NSS00], DLV
system [LPF+06], etc.), we chose DLV system1, which is a powerful deductive database
system that allows for deducing new knowledge based on rules and facts stored in deduc-
tive database, and it has been reported in [Zan06] that DLV system is more efficient than
the other available engines.
In order to be consistent with deductive database terminology [BFI+09], we distin-
guish between two types of predicates: (1) extensional predicates (extensional database
(EDB)), which can be defined as a collection of facts that are used to represent the graph-
ical model constructs along with their semantic relations; and (2) intensional predicates
(intensional database (IDB)), which are used to deduce new facts depending on the ex-
tensional predicates and the reasoning rules (axioms). In what follows, we propose the
extensional predicates in 4.1.1, and the intensional predicates in 4.1.2.
4.1.1 Extensional predicates
Extensional predicates (shown in Table 4.1) are used to represent the graphical model
constructs along with their different relations. We describe each one of them as follows:
Type predicates: unary and binary predicates that are used for identifying actors, roles,
agents, goals, information, and threat entities respectively. Type predicates are
necessary for some rules, since they differentiate between modeling constructs based
on their types.
Role and agent relations: binary predicates that are used for identifying specialization
and instantiation relations among actors respectively.
• instantiation (plays) has two arguments, where the first is an agent (a) and
the last is a role (r), and it is true if (a) plays (r).
• specialization (is a) has two arguments that represent two roles, and it is
true, if r1 is specialization of r2.
Actors’ properties: binary predicates that are used to represent the different relations
between an actors, goals and information.
• aims: the first argument of aims is an actor (a), and the second is a goal (g),
where aims(a, g) is true if g is a top level goal of a.
1http://www.dlvsystem.com/
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Table 4.1: Extensional Predicates
Type predicates
actor(Actor: a)
role(Role: r)
agent(Agent: ag)
goal(Goal: g)
info(Info: i, Volatility: v)
threat(Threat:t)
Role and agent relations
isa(Role: r1, Role: r2)
plays(Agent: x, Role: r)
Actors’ properties
own(Actor: a, Info: i)
aims(Actor: a, Goal: g)
Goal analysis
andDecomposition(Goal: g, Goal: g1)
orDecomposition(Goal: g, Goal: g1)
contribute(Type:t, Goal :g, Goal:g1)
Goal-information relations
produce(BType: t, Goal :g, Info: i)
read(Type: t, POU: pou, BType: t, Goal :g, Info: i)
modify(Goal: g, Info: i)
send(Time: t, Goal: g, Actor: a, Info: i)
partOf(I, I1)
Threat analysis
threaten(Threat: t, Goal/info: g/i)
capable_threat(Actor: a, Threat: t)
incapable_threat(Actor: a, Threat: t)
threat_contribute(Type: t, Threat: t, Goal/info: g/i)
Social relations
provide(Type: tp, Time: tm, Actor: a, Actor: a, Info: i)
delegate(Actor: a, Actor: b, Goal :g)
delegate_perm(Actor:a, Actor:b, Perm:r, Perm:p, Perm:m, Perm:s, Info:i)
monitor(Actor: a, Actor: b, Goal/info: g/i)
trustReq(Type:t, Actor: a, Actor: a, Goal :g)
trust_perm(Actor:a, Actor:b, trust:t, trust:t, trust:t, trust:t, Info:i)
• own: the first argument of own is an actor (a), and the second is information
(i), where own(a, i) is true, if a is the legal owner of i.
Goal analysis: binary and ternary predicates that are used to capture the different re-
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lations between goals.
• andDecomposition: the two arguments of andDecomposition are goals (g, g1),
and andDecomposition(g, g1) is true, if g1 is and refinement of g.
• orDecomposition: the two arguments of orDecomposition are goals (g, g1),
and orDecomposition(g, g1) is true, if g1 is or refinement of g.
• contribute: the first argument of contribute is a type (positive/negative), the
second and the third arguments are goals (g, g1). contribute(positive/negative,
g, g1) is true, if g contributes positive/negative to g1.
Goal-information relations: predicates that are used to describe the different relations
between goals and information.
• produces: the first argument of produces is believability check type, the second
is a goal (g), and the third is information (i), where produces(b, g, i) is true, if
g produces i, with believability check type b.
• read: the first argument of read is read type t (optional/ required), the second
is purpose of use pou, the third is believability check type b, the fourth is goal
(g), while the last is information (i). read(t, pou, b, g, i) is true, if g optional/
required reads i for purpose of use pou and believability check type b.
• modify: the first argument of modify is a goal (g), and the second is information
(i), where modify(g, i) is true, if g modifies i.
• send: the first argument of send is period of time (t), the second is a goal (g),
and the third is an actor a, while the last is information (i), where send(t, g, a,
i) is true, if g sends i to actor a within periodof time t.
• partOf the two arguments of partOf are information items i and i1, where
partOf(i, i1) is true, if i1 is part of i.
Threat analysis: predicates that are used to describe threats along with their different
relations.
• threaten: the first argument of threaten is a threat t, and the second is nfor-
mation or goal i/g, where threaten(t, i/g) is true, if t threaten i/g.
• capable_threat: the first argument of capable threat is an actor a, and the
second is a threat t, where capable threat(a, t) is true, if a is capable of achieving
threat t.
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• incapable_threat: the first argument of incapable threat is an actor a, and
the second is a threat t, where incapable threat(a, t) is true, if a is incapable of
achieving threat t.
• threat_contribute: the first argument is a type (positive/negative),
the second argument is a threat t, and the third is a goal g.
threat contribute(positive/negative, t, g) is true, if goal g contributes posi-
tive/negative to threat t.
Social relations: predicates that are used for capturing actor’ social interactions.
• provide: the first argument of provide is provision type tp, the second is provi-
sion time tm, while the third and fourth arguments are actors a and b, and the
last is information i, where provide(tp, tm, a, b, i) is true if a provides b with
information i through provision type tp, and within provision time tm.
• delegate: the first two arguments of delegate are actors a and b, and the third
is a goal g, where delegate(a, b, g) is true if a delegates a goal g to b.
• delegate_perm: the first two arguments of delegate perm are actors a and
b, and arguments from number three until six are permissions for produce,
read, modify, and send respectively, while the last is information i. We say
delegate perm(a, b, p,r,m,s,i) is true if a delegates permission p/r/m/s over
information i to b.
• monitor : the first two arguments of monitor are actors a and b, and the last
is information i or goal g . We say that monitor(a, b, i/g) is true, if actor a
monitors actor b during the achievement of goal g/ producing information i.
• trustReq: the first argument of trust is a trust type (trust/ distrust), the second
and third arguments are actors a and b, while the last is a goal (g). We say that
trustReq(t, a, b, g) is true if the trust level between a b for the achievement of
goal g is t.
• trust_perm: the first two arguments are actors a and b, and arguments from
number three until six are trust/distrust over produce, read, modify, and send
permissions respectively, while the last argument is information i. trust perm(a,
b, p, r, m, s, i) is true if a trust/distrusts b concerning each of p, r, m, s
permissions over information i.
4.1.2 Intensional predicates
Intensional predicates are used to deduce new facts (knowledge) depending on the exten-
sional predicates and the reasoning rules (axioms). Some of the intensional predicates are
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Table 4.2: Intensional Predicates
Actors analysis
objective(A, G) is_responsible(C, G)
can_achieve(B, G) capable_achieve(R, G)
producer(A, I, T) reader(T, POU, BT, A, I)
sender(T, A, B, I) modifier(A, I)
has(A, I, T) fits_reader(A, I)
need_perm(P, A, I) has_perm(P, A, I)
achieved(A, G) achieve(A, G)
motivation(T, A, G)
Goals analysis
fits_send(T, G, B, I) not_leaf(G)
dependent(G) prevented(G)
Information Quality analysis
accessible_read(A, I) accurate_read(A, I)
complete_read(A, I) valid_read(A, I)
consistent_read(A, I) only_reader(A, I)
interdependent_readers(A, B, I) inconsistent_reader(A, I)
Social analysis
prvChain(T, Z, A, B, I) deleChain(A, B, G)
dele_permChain(A,B,P,R,M,S,I) monitorChain(A, B, M)
Trust analysis
trust_produce(T,A,B,I) trust_permChain(A,B,TP,TR,TM,TS,I)
trust_threat(A, B, G) threat_source(A, I/G)
threat_motivation(T, A, Th)
shown in Table 4.2, we discuss them as follows:
Actors analysis: predicates that are used for capturing actors’ objectives, entitlements
and authorities.
• objective: the first argument of objective is an actor a, and the second is a
goal g, where objective(a, g) is true, if g is an objective of a.
• is_responsible: the first argument of is responsible is an actor a, and the
second is a goal g, where is responsible(a, g) is true, if a took the responsibility
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of g achievement.
• can_achieve: the first argument of can achieve is an actor a, and the second
is a goal g, where can achieve(a, g) is true, if a has the capability (directly or
indirectly) to achieve g.
• capable_achieve: the first argument of capable achieve is an actor a, and the
second is a goal g, where capable achieve(a, g) is true, if a has the self-capability
to achieve g.
• producer: the first argument of producer is an actor a, and the second is
an information item i, while the last is time (currency (age) of information).
Producer(a, i, t) is true, if a is the producer of i.
• reader: the first argument is read type t, and the second is purpose of use pou,
the third is the believability check type bt, while the fourth is an actor a, and
the last is information i. reader(t, pou, bt, a, i) is true, if a reads i with read
type t, believability check type bt, and for purpose of use pou.
• sender: the first argument of sender is the required time of send t, the second
and third are actors a and b (sender and the receiver respectively), while the
last is information i to be send. sender(t,a, b, i) is true, if a needs to send i to
a within time period t.
• modifier: the first argument of modifier is an actor a, and the second is infor-
mation i, where modifier (a, i) is true if a needs to modify i.
• has: the first argument of has is an actor a, and the second is an information
item i, while the last is read time the currency (age) of information that an
actor has. has(a, i, t) is true, if a has i with currency t.
• fits_reader: the first argument of fits read is an actor a, while the last is an
information item i. fits read(a, i) is true if i fit for read from the perspective of
a (reader).
• need_perm the first argument of need perm is the permission type p/r/m/s,
the second is an actor a, while the last is an information item i. need perm(p,
a, i) is true, if actor a needs permission p/r/m/s over information i.
• has_perm the first argument of has perm is the permission type p/r/m/s, the
second is an actor a, while the last is an information item i. has perm(p, a, i)
is true, if actor a has permission p/r/m/s over information i.
• achieved: the first argument of achieved is an actor a, and the second is a goal
(g), where achieved(a, g) is true, if g is achieved (directly or indirectly) from
the perspective of actor a.
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• achieve: the first argument of achieve is an actor a, and the second is a goal
g, where achieve(a, g) is true, if g is achieved directly by actor a.
• motivation: the first argument of motivation is a type t (positive/ negative),
the second argument is an actor a, while the third is a goal g. motivation (t, a,
g) is true if a is t motivated to achieve g.
Goals analysis: predicates that are used for representing goals’ relations.
• fits_send: the first argument of fits send is period of time t, the second is a
goal g, and the third is an actor a, while the last is an information item i, where
fits send(t, g, a, i) is true, if g sends i to actor a within period of time t.
not_leaf: the only argument of not leaf is a goal g, where not leaf(g) is true,
if g is not a leaf goal (g is and/or decomposed into finer goals).
• dependent: the only argument of dependent is a goal g, where dependent(g) is
true, if g is information dependent (e.g., produce dependent, read dependent,
modify dependent, send dependent).
• prevented: the only argument of prevented is a goal g, where prevented(g)
is true, if g was prevented for being achieved (e.g., produce prevented,
read prevented, modify prevented, send prevented).
Information Quality analysis: predicates that are used for analyzing IQ.
• accessible_read the first argument of accessible read is an actor a, while the
last is an information item i. accessible read(a, i) is true if a has the permission
to read i.
• accurate_read the first argument of accurate read is an actor a, while the last
is an information item i. accurate read(a, i) is true if i is accurate from the
perspective of a (reader).
• complete_read the first argument of complete read is an actor a, while the last
is an information item i. complete read(a, i) is true if i is complete from the
perspective of a (reader).
• valid_read the first argument of valid read is an actor a, while the last is an
information item i. valid read(a, i) is true if i is valid from the perspective of
a (reader).
• consistent_read the first argument of consistent read is an actor a, while the
last is an information item i. consistent read(a, i) is true if i is consistent from
the perspective of a (reader).
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• only_reader the first argument of only reader is an actor a, while the last is
an information item i. only reader(a, i) is true if there is no other reader of i
but a.
• interdependent_readers the first and second arguments of interdepen-
dent readers are actors a and b, while the last an information item i.
interdependent_readers(a, b, i) is true if a and b reads i for the same
purpose of use.
• inconsistent_reader the first argument is an actor a, and the last is an in-
formation item i. inconsistent_reader(a, i) is true if there is at least one
other actor (e.g., b) that reads i for the same purpose of use, and i value in
inconsistent between a and b.
Social analysis: predicates that are used for analyzing social interactions among actors.
• prvChain: the first argument of prvChain is provision type tp, the second is
provision time tm, while the third and fourth arguments are actors a and b,
and the last is information i, where prvChain(tp, tm, a, b, i) is true if there is
a provision chain between a and b concerning information i through provision
type tp, and within provision time tm.
• deleChain: the first two arguments of deleChain are actors a and b, and the
third is a goal g, where deleChain(a, b, g) is true if there is a delegation chain
between a and b concerning goal g.
• dele_permChain: the first two arguments of dele permChain are actors a and
b), and arguments from number three until six are permissions for produce,
reads, modify, and send respectively, while the last is an information item i.
We say that dele perm Chain(a, b, p,r,m,s,i) is true if there is a permission
delegate chain from a to b concerning p/r/m/s permission over information i.
• monitorChain: the first two arguments of monitorChain are actors a and b, and
the last is information i or goal g . We say that monitorChain(a, b, i/g) is true,
if there is a monitoring chain between a and b concerning the achievement of
goal g/ producing information i.
Trust analysis: predicates that are used for analyzing trust requirements.
• trust produce the first argument of trust produce is a type (trust/distrust), the
second and third arguments are actors a and b, while the forth is an information
item i. We say that trust produce(t, a, b, i) is true, if the trust type between a
and b for producing i is t.
76 Automated Reasoning Support
• trust_permChain the first two arguments are actors a and b, and arguments
from number three until six are trust/distrust over produce, read, modify,
and send permissions respectively, while the last argument is information i.
trust permChain(a, b, p, r, m, s, i) is true, if there is a trust chain (trust/dis-
trusts) between a and b concerning each of p, r, m, s permissions over informa-
tion i.
• trust_threat the first two arguments of trust threat are actors a and b, the
third argument is a goal g. We say that trust threat(a, b, g) is true, if a
belief that b represent a threat to trust relation between them concerning the
achievement of goal g.
• threat_source the first argument of threat source is an actor a, the second
argument is a a goal g or an information item i, where threat source (a, i/g)
is true, if a is a threat source to i/g, i.e., a has the capability and positively
motivated to achieve the trust related threat of i/g.
• threat_motivation the first argument of motivation is a type (positive/ neg-
ative), the second argument is an actor a, while the third is threat Th. We say
that threat motivation(t, a, th) is true, if a is t motivated to achieve threat th.
4.2 Reasoning rules (axioms)
In this section, we describe the reasoning rules (axioms) that are used to in derive new
knowledge depending on extensional and intensional predicates, and helps in performing
the required analysis to verify the requirements model.
4.2.1 Actors’ objectives, entitlements and capabilities axioms
Table 4.3, lists the actors’ objectives, entitlements and capabilities axioms.
Actors’ objectives axioms: O1-4 axioms are used to identify actors’ objectives. O1
states that if an actor aims for a goal, the goal became an objective for the actor,
i.e., the actor aims to achieve such goal. O2 states that if a goal is delegated to
an actor, and the actor can take the responsibility of its achievement, it became an
objective of such actor. O3-4 state that if a goal belongs to actor objectives and
such goal is and/ or decomposed, all of its sub-goals became objectives to the actor.
Actors’ entitlements axioms: E1 states that an actor became responsible of a goal
achievement, if the goal is an objective of the actor, and the actor has the capabilities
to achieve it.
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Table 4.3: Actors’ objectives, entitlements and capabilities axioms
Actor’s objectives
O1 objective(A, G) :- aims(A, G).
O2 objective(A, G) :- deleChain(B, A, G), is_responsible(A, G), objective(B, G).
O3 objective(A, G1) :- andDecomposition(G, G1), objective(A, G).
O4 objective(A, G1) :- orDecomposition(G, G1), objective(A, G).
Actor’s entitlements
E1 is_responsible(A, G) :- objective(A, G), can_achieve(A, G), not not_leaf(G).
Actor’s capabilities
C1 capable_achieve(A, G):-play(A, R), capable_achieve(R, G).
C2 capable_achieve(R1, G):-is_a(R1, R2), capable_achieve(R2, G).
C3 can_achieve(A, G) :- capable_achieve(R, G).
C4 can_achieve(A, G) :- deleChain(A, B, G), capable_achieve(B, G).
C5 can_achieve(A, G) :- orDecomposition(G, G1), can_achieve(A, G1).
C6 can_achieve(A, G) :- andDecomposition(G, G1), andDecomposition(G, G2),
can_achieve(A, G1), can_achieve(A, G2), G1 != G2.
C7 producer(A, I, 0) :- is_responsible(A, G), produce(G, I, 0).
C8 reader(Type, POU, A, I):- is_responsible(A, G), read(Type, POU, BType, G, I) .
C9 sender(T, A, B, I):- is_responsible(A, G), send(T, G, B, I) .
C10 modifier(A, I):- is_responsible(A, G), modify(G, I) .
C11 has(A, I, 0) :- producer(A, I, T).
C12 has(A, I, T3) :- prvChain(Type, T1, B, A, I), has(B, I, T2),
#int(T1), #int(T2), #int(T3), T3=T1+T2.
C13 has_perm(_, A, I) :- own(A, I).
C14 has_perm(r, A, I) :- dele_perm_chain(A, B, _, r,_ , _, I), has_perm(r, A, I) .
Actors’ capabilities axioms: axioms C1-12 are used to identify actors’ capabilities. C1
states that an actor is capable of achieving a goal, if the actor plays a role that has
such capability. While C2 states that a role is capable of achieving a goal, if the
role is specialized of a role that has such capability. C3 states that an actor can
achieve a goal, if the actor has the required capabilities to achieve such goal by
itself. Moreover, C4 states that an actor can achieve a goal, if it delegates the goal
to an actor who has the capability to achieve it. C5 states that an actor can achieve
a goal, if the goal is or-decomposed, and the actor has the capability of achieving at
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least one of the sub-goals. C6 states that an actor can achieve a goal, if the goal is
and-decomposed, and the actor has the capability of achieving all its sub-goals. C7-9
state that an actor is a producer/ reader / sender / modifier of an information item,
if the actor is responsible of achieving the goal that produces/ reads/sends/ modifies
such information. C11 states that an actor has information, if it is its producer, and
C12 states that an actor has information, if such information was provided to it.
4.2.2 Information Quality analysis axioms
In this section, we present IQ axioms in Table 4.4, and discuss each of them as follows:
Goal-information axioms: axioms GI1-12 are used to capture the relations between a
goal and information it uses. For instance, GI1-GI8 state that a goal is dependent,
if it produces, reads, modifies, and/or sends information. GI9-GI12 state that a goal
might not be achieved (prevented), if it did not use information item as required
(e.g., produces, reads, modifies, and/or sends).
Goal-information axioms:
Table 4.4: Information Quality analysis axioms
Goal-information axioms
GI1 dependent(G):- produce_dependent(G, I).
GI2 dependent(G):- read_dependent(G, I).
GI3 dependent(G):- modify_dependent(G, I).
GI4 dependent(G):- send_dependent(G, I).
GI5 produce_dependent(G, I):- produces(G, I, T).
GI6 read_dependent(G, I):- read(POU, G, I).
GI7 modify_dependent(G, I):- modify(G, I).
GI8 send_dependent(G, I):- send(T, G, B, I).
GI9 prevented(G):- modify_prevented(G, I).
GI10 prevented(G):- produce_prevented(G, I).
GI11 prevented(G):- send_prevented(G, I).
GI12 prevented(G):- read_prevented(G, I).
Modifier axioms
M1 modify_prevented(G, I):- modify(G, I), is_responsible(A, G), not has_perm(m, A, I).
Producer axioms
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P1 produce_prevented(G, I):- produces(TY, G, I, T), is_responsible(A, G), not
fits_produce(A, I).
P2 fits_produce(A, I):- producer(A, I, T), is_responsible(A, G), has_perm(p, A, I),
accurate_produce(A,I).
P3 accurate_produce(A,G):- is_responsible(A, G), produce(chk_blv, G, I, T).
Sender axioms
S1 send_prevented(G, I):- send(T, G, B, I), not fits_send(T, G, B, I).
S2 fits_send(T, G, B, I):- is_responsible(A, G), send(T, G, B, I), fits_sender(T, A,
B, I).
S3 fits_sender(T, A, B, I):- accurate_send(T, A, B, I), complete_send(T, A, B, I),
valid_send(T, A, B, I).
S4 accurate_send(T, A, B, I):- sender(T, A, B, I), not unauthorized_modify(I).
S5 complete_send(T, A, B, I):- sender(T, A, B, I), prvChain(ip, Tr, A, B, I).
S6 valid_send(T, A, B, I):- sender(T, A, B, I), prvChain(_, Tr, A, B, I), #int(T),
#int(Tr), Tr <= T.
S7 unauthorized_modify(I):- modifier(A, I), own(B, I), not trustPerm(trust, A, B,
modify, I).
Reader axioms
R1 read_prevented(G, I):- read(POU, G, I), not fits_read(POU, G, I).
R2 fits_read(POU, G, I):- is_responsible(A, G), read(POU, G, I), fits_reader(A, I).
R3 fits_reader(A, I):- accessible_read(A, I), accurate_read(A, I), complete_read(A,
I), valid_read(A, I), consistent_read(A, I).
R4 accessible_read(A, I):- reader(POU,A, I), has_perm(r, A, I).
R5 accurate_read(A, I) :- reader(Type, POU, BType, A, I), has(A, I, T), not inaccu-
rate(A, I).
R6 inaccurate(A, I):- read(Type, POU, no_chk_blv, G, I), reader(Type, POU, BType, A,
I).
R7 inaccurate(A, I):- reader(Type, POU, BType, A, I), has(A, I, T), unautho-
rized_modify(I).
R8 inaccurate(A, I):- reader(Type, PoU, BType, A, I), producer(B, I, T), not
trust_produce(A,B,I).
R9 trust_produce(A, B, I):- reader(Type, PoU, BType, A, I), producer(B, I, T), not
threat_source(B, I).
R10 trust_produce(A, B, I):- reader(Type, PoU, BType, A, I), producer(B, I, T),
threat_source(B, I), monitorChain(A, B, I).
R11 threat_source(A, I):- threaten(Th, I), capable_threat(A, Th), motivation(positive,
A, Th).
R12 motivation(positive, A, Th):- threat_contribute(positive, Th, O), objective(A, O).
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R13 motivation(negative, A, Th):- threat_contribute(negative, Th, O),objective(A, O).
R14 complete_read(A,I):- reader(Type, PoU, BType, A, I), complete_value(A, I), com-
plete_pou(A, I).
R15 complete_value(A, I):- producer(A, I,_).
R16 complete_value(A, I):- reader(_, _, _, A, I), has(A, I, _), producer(B, I, 0), not
prvChain(ip, T, B, A, I), #int(T).
R17 complete_pou(A, I):- reader(Type, PoU, BType, A, I), has(A, I, _), composedO-
fOne(I), partOf(I, I1), has(A, I1,_).
R18 complete_pou(A, I):- reader(Type, PoU, BType, A, I), has(A, I, _), composed-
OfTwo(I), partOf(I, I1), partOf(I, I2), has(A, I1,_), has(A, I2,_), I1 != I2.
R19 composed(I):- composedOfOne(I).
R20 composed(I):- composedOfTwo(I).
R21 composedOfOne(I):- numOfParts(I,1).
R22 composedOfTwo(I):- numOfParts(I,2).
R23 numOfParts(I, X):- partOf(I,I1),#count{Z:partOf(I,Z)}=X.
R24 valid_read(A, I):- producer(A,I, _).
R25 valid_read(A, I):- reader(POU, A, I), read_time(T, A, I), info(I, V), #int(T),
#int(V), V >= T.
R26 consistent_read(A, I):- only_reader(A, I).
R27 only_reader(A, I):- reader(_, _, _, A, I), numOfReaders(X, I), X = 1.
R28 numOfReaders(X, I):- reader(_, _, _, A, I), #count{Z: reader(_, _, _, Z ,I)} = X.
R29 consistent_read(A, I) :- reader(_, _, _, A, I), not only_reader(A, I), not incon-
sistent_reader(A, I).
R30 inconsistent_reader(A, I):- interdependent_readers(A, B, I), read_time(X, A, I),
read_time(Y, B, I), #int(X), #int(Y), X != Y, A!=B.
R31 interdependent_readers(A, B, I):- reader(Type, POU, _, A, I), reader(Type, POU, _,
B, I), A!=B.
R32 interdependent_readers(B, A, I):- interdependent_readers(A, B, I).
R33 read_time(T, A, I):- reader(_, _, _, A, I), has(A, I, T).
Modifier axioms: axiom M1 states that a goal will be prevented from being achieved,
if it need to modifies an information item, and the actor who is responsible of the
goal achievement does not has the required permissions.
Producer axioms: P1-3 axioms state that a goal will be prevented from being achieved,
if it need to produce an information item, and the actor who is responsible of the goal
achievement does not has the required permissions (P2), and/or produce process do
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not apply any believability check to verify the accuracy of the produced information
(P3).
Sender axioms: S1-7 axioms state that a goal will be prevented from being achieved,
if it need to send an information item to a particular destination within a defined
period of time, if the send process does not satisfy the senders needs (S 1-2). S3
axiom specifies such needs as information should be accurate, complete, and valid
at its final destinations from the perspective of the sender, where information is
accurate at its end destination, if it was not modified in an unauthorized way (S4,
S7). In addition, S5 states that information is complete (value complete) at its
destination, if it has been transferred through Integrity Preserving (IP) provision
only that guarantee its completeness against corruption and lost. Finally, S6 states
that information is valid in term of time at its destination, if it has been transmitted
through a provision time that is smaller than its required send time.
Reader axioms: R1-33 axioms are used to analyze whether information fits for purpose
of read from the reader perspectives or not.
• R1-2 axioms state that a goal will be prevented from being achieved, if it reads
an information item, and such information does not fit for use from the per-
spectives of its reader, where such information should be accessible, accurate,
complete, valid, and consistent to fit for the purpose of use (R3).
• R4 axiom states that an information item is accessible from the reader perspec-
tives, if it has the required read permissions.
• R5-13 axioms are used to analyze information accuracy from its reader perspec-
tive. For instance, R5 axiom states that information is considered accurate from
the perspective of its reader, if there is no reason to consider it as inaccurate,
where information can be considered inaccurate, if it is read without checking
its believability (R6). In addition, information is inaccurate, if it was modified
in an unauthorized way (R7).
• R8 axiom states that information reader consider information it reads as inac-
curate, if no trust produce holds between the reader and information producer.
• R9-13 axioms are used to analyze trust produce in producer from the reader
perspective. Axiom R9 states that a trust produce holds, if information reader
consider that information producer is not a threat source for such information,
or it is a threat source but the reader apply the required monitoring mechanisms
to guarantee that the producer will not produce inaccurate information (R10).
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• R11 states that an actor can be a threat source for the accuracy of an infor-
mation item, if there is a threat that threatens such information, and the actor
has the required capabilities, and positively motivated to achieve such threat.
• R12 state that an actor is positively motivated to achieve a threat, if such
threat contributes positively to an least one of its objectives (goals). While R13
state that an actor is negatively motivated to achieve a threat, if such threat
contributes negatively to an least one of its objectives (goals).
• R14-23 axioms are used to analyze information completeness from its reader
perspective. For instance, R14 axiom states that information is considered
complete from the perspective of its reader, if it is complete concerning its
value and Purpose Of Use (POU).
• R15-16 state that information value is complete from the perspective of its
reader, either if it is the producer of such information (P15), or it has been
delivered o it by IP provision (P16).
• R17-18 state that information is complete for POU from the perspective of its
reader, if it is composed of one item, and the actor has such sub item (R17), or
if information is composed of two sub items, and the reader has both of them
(P18).
• R19-20 state that information is composed, if it is composed of one sub item
(R19), or two sub items (R20), where information is composed of one informa-
tion item, if it has one sub item (R21), and it is composed of two information
items, if it has two sub items (R22).
• R23 states that the number of information sub items, is equal to the number of
part of relations that can be found in the model concerning such information.
• R24-25 axioms are used to analyze information validity from its reader perspec-
tive, where it is valid if it is produced by its reader, i.e., it is not possible to
produce invalid information (R24), and it is valid if its currency is smaller than
its volatility (R25).
• R26-33 axioms are used to analyze information consistency from its reader per-
spective. For instance, R26 axiom states that information is consistent from
the perspective of its reader, if it is an only reader for such information, i.e.,
there is no other information item to be consistent with. R27 state that an
information reader is an only reader for a specific information item, if it reads
such information, and the number of reader in the model for such information
is equal to one (R28).
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Table 4.5: Social Relations Axioms
S1 prvChain(Type, T, A, B, I):- provide(Type, T, A, B, I).
S2 prvChain(Type, Z, A, C, I):- prvChain(Type, X, A, B, I), prvChain(Type, Y, B, C, I),
#int(X), #int(Y), #int(Z), Z = X + Y.
S3 deleChain(A,B,G) :- delegate(A,B,G).
S4 deleChain(A,C,G) :- delegate(A,B,G), deleChain(B,C,G).
S5 dele_perm_chain(A, B, P, R, M, S, I) :- delegate_perm(A, B, P, R, M, S, I).
S6 dele_perm_chain(A, B, P, R, M, S, I) :- dele_perm_chain(A, C, P, R, M, S, I),
dele_perm_chain(C, B, P, R, M, S, I).
S7 trustChain(A, B, G):- trust(A, B, G)
S8 trustChain(A, C, G):- trustChain(A, B, G), trustChain(B, C, G)
S9 trust_perm_chain(A, B, TP, TR, TM, TS, I):- trust_perm(A, B, TP, TR, TM, TS, I).
S10 trust_perm_chain(A, B, TP, TR, TM, TS, I) :- trust_perm_chain(A, C, TP, TR, TM, TS, I),
trust_perm_chain(C, B, TP, TR, TM, TS, I).
S11 monitorChain(A, B, M):- monitor(A, B, M).
S12 monitorChain(A, C, M):- monitorChain(A, B, M), monitorChain(B, C, M)
• R29-33 axiom state that an information item is consistent from the perspective
of its reader, if it is not an only reader for such information, but it is also not an
inconsistent reader (R29). A reader can be considered as an inconsistent reader
for an information item, if there is another interdependent reader and they do
not have the same read time (R30).
R31-32 axioms are used to capture interdependent reader that can be defined
as actors who read the same information for the same purpose of use, and R33
axiom is used to capture the actual information read time from the perspective
of its reader.
4.2.3 Actors’ social interactions
Table 4.5 lists the actors’ goals/ information/ permissions/ monitoring axioms. For in-
stance, axioms S1-2 are used to capture information provision among actors, S3-4 are
used to capture goal delegation, and permissions delegation is captured by S5-6. More-
over, it lists trust axioms concerning goal delegation (S7-8) and permission delegation
(S9-10). Finally, axioms S11-12 capture monitoring chains among actors concerning goals
and information.
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Table 4.6: Trust analysis axioms
T1 trust(trust, A, B, G):- trustReq(trust, A, B, G), motivation(positive, B, G), not trust_threat(A, B, G).
T2 trust(trust, A, B, G):- trustReq(trust, A, B, G), motivation(negative, B, G), monitorChain(A, B, G).
T3 trust(trust, A, B, G):- trustReq(trust, A, B, G), trust_threat(A, B, G), monitorChain(A, B, G).
T4 trust(distrust, A, B, G):- trustReq(distrust, A, B, G), motivation(negative, A, G).
T5 trust(distrust, A, B, G):- trustReq(distrust, A, B, G), trust_threat(A, B, G).
T6 trust_threat(A, B, G):- trustReq(trust, A, B, G), threat_source(B, G).
T7 threat_source(A, G):- threaten(Th, G), capable_threat(A, Th), motivation(positive, A, Th).
T8 motivation(positive, A, G):- contribute(positive, G, G1), objective(A, G1).
T9 motivation(negative, A, G):- contribute(negative, G, G1), objective(A, G1).
T10 motivation(positive, A, Th):- threat_contribute(positive, Th, G), objective(A, G).
T11 motivation(negative, A, Th):- threat_contribute(negative, Th, G), objective(A, G).
4.2.4 Trust analysis axioms
Table 4.6 lists trust analysis axioms. For instance, T1 states that a trust relation (exten-
sional predicate) holds between a trustor and a trustee concerning the achievement of a
goal, if trustee is positively motivated to achieve such goal, and the trustee is not a threat
source for the trust relation. T2 states that a trust relation holds between a trustor and
a trustee concerning the achievement of a goal, even if the trustee is negatively motivated
to achieve the trustum, if the trustor monitors the trustee. T3 states that a trust relation
holds between a trustor and a trustee, if the trustor beliefs that the trustee is a threat
source to the trust relation, but there is a monitoring relation between the trustor and
the trustee concerning the trustum (goal).
T4 states that a distrust relation holds between a trustor and a trustee concerning the
achievement of a goal, if the trustee is negatively motivated to achieve the goal, or the
trustor consider the trustee as a threat to the trust relation (T5). T6 states that a trustor
consider a trustee as a threat to a trust relation concerning the achievement of a goal, if
the trustee represent a threat source to the trustum (goal), where it can be a threat source
to the trustum, only if, there is a threat that threaten the achievement of the trustum, and
the trustee has the capability to achieve it, and it is positively motivated to achieve such
threat (T7). T8-9 state that an actor is positively/ negatively motivated to achieve a goal,
if such goal contributes positively/ negatively to at least one of its objectives. Similarly,
T10-11 state that an actor is positively/ negatively motivated to achieve a threat, if such
threat contributes positively/ negatively to at least one of its objectives.
4.2.5 Goals achievement axioms
Table 4.7 lists axioms that are used to identify whether a goal is achieved or not from
the perspective of the actor, who aims for it. A1 states that a goal is achieved from the
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perspective of the actor who aims for it, if the goal is not information dependent and the
actor took the responsibility of achieving it by itself. A2 states that a goal is achieved
for an actor, if the goal is information dependent, but not prevented, and the actor took
the responsibility of achieving it by itself. A3 states that a goal is achieved, if the goal
is achieved from the perspective of the actor who aims for it. A4 states that a goal is
achieved for an actor, if the goal is delegated to another actor, who has the capability to
achieve it, and a trust relation holds between the delegator and delegatee concerning the
delegated goal. A5-6 state that a goal is achieved for an actor, if one (or decomposition)
or all (and decomposition) of its sub goals is/are achieved from the perspective of the
actor.
Table 4.7: Goals Achievement Axioms
A1 achieve(A,G) :- is_responsible(A,G), not dependent(G).
A2 achieve(A,G) :- is_responsible(A,G), dependent(G), not prevented(G).
A3 achieved(A,G) :- achieve(A,G).
A4 achieved(A,G) :- deleChain(A,B,G), trustChain(A,B,G), achieve(B,G).
A5 achieved(A,G) :- andDecomposition(G,G1), andDecomposition(G,G2),achieved(A,G1),
achieved(A,G2), G1 != G2 .
A6 achieved(A,G) :- orDecomposition(G,G1), achieved(A,G1).
4.3 Verifying the requirements model (properties of the design)
In this section, we define a set of properties (shown in Table 4.8) that can be used to verify
the correctness and consistency of the requirements model, i.e., these properties define
constraints that the designers should consider during the system design to guarantee the
correctness and consistency of the requirements model. In what follows, we discuss each
of these properties:
• Pro1 states that the model should not include any top-level goal that is not achieved
from the perspective of the actor, who aims for it. However, top-level goal might
not be achieved due to several reasons (e.g., not achieving their sub-goals, delegat-
ing them with no trust, etc.). Yet we rely on this property to quickly verify the
correctness and consistency of the requirements model, i.e., if this property holds for
all top-level goals, we can conclude that all the stakeholders’ requirements will be
achieved.
• Pro2 states that the model should not include any goal delegation/ delegation chain,
if there is no trust/ trust chain between the delegator and the delegatee, or there is
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at least a compensation of the lack of trust among them, since delegation with no
trust leaves the delegator with no guarantee that its goal will be achieved.
• Pro3 states that the model should not include any false goal delegation / delegation
chain, i.e., goals should be delegated only to actors, who have the capability to
achieve them either directly or indirectly by delegating them to an actor who has
such capability.
• textbfPro4 states that actors should have all information that is required for the
achievement of the goals they are responsible of
• Pro5 states that information should be only provided to actors, who require them
either for achieving their objectives, or they have a valid provision chain to actors
who require them.
• Pro6 states that actors should have all permissions they need to achieve their ob-
jectives.
• Pro7 states that permissions should be only delegated to actors, who require them
for the achievement of their objectives. Only information owners may have permis-
sions they do not require.
• Pro8 states that the model should not include actors who delegate permissions that
they do not have.
• Pro9 states that the model should not include actors who have permissions, and
there is no trust/ trust chain between such actors and information owner concerning
the delegated permissions.
• Pro10 states that the model should not include produced information that is not
accurate from the perspective of its producer.
• Pro11-13 state that the model should not include send information that is not
accurate, complete and valid at its destination from the perspective of ts sender.
• Pro14-17 state that the model should not include information to be read that is
not accessible, accurate, complete, valid and consistenet at from the perspective of
ts reader.
• Pro18 states that the model should not include trust/ distrust conflicts concerning
both goal achievement and information provision. In other words, the model is able
to detect whether trust/ distrust relations in the model will actually hold or not.
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Table 4.8: Properties of the design
Goal properties
Pro1 :- aims(A,G), not achieved(A,G)
Pro2 :- deleChain(A, B, G), not trustChain(A, B, G)
Pro3 :- deleChain(_,A,G), not can_achieve(A,G), is_responsible(C, G), not deleChain(B, C, G)
Information availability properties
Pro4 :- reader(_, _, A, I), information(I, T), not has(A,I,T), #int(T)
Pro5 :- prvChain(_,A,I), reader(_, _, B, I), not reader(TP, POU, TB, A, I), not prvChain(A,B,I)
Permissions properties
Pro6 :- need_perm(P, A, I), not has_perm(P, A, I)
Pro7 :- has_perm(P, A, I), not need_perm(P, A, I), not own(A, I)
Pro8 :- dele_perm(P, A, B, I), not has_perm(P, A, I)
Pro9 :- has_perm(P, B, I), own(A,I), not trust_perm_chain(P, A, B, I)
IQ properties
Pro10 :- producer(A, I, T), not accurate_produce(A,I)
Pro11 :- sender(T, A, B, I), not accurate_send(T, A, B, I)
Pro12 :- sender(T, A, B, I), not complete_send(Tr, A, B, I), #int(Tr).
Pro13 :- sender(T, A, B, I), not valid_send(T, A, B, I)
Pro14 :- reader(T, P, A, I), has(A, I, T), not accurate_read(A, I)
Pro15 :- reader(T, P, A, I), not complete_read(A, I)
Pro16 :- reader(T, P, A, I), not valid_read(A, I)
Pro17 :- reader(T, P, A, I), not consistent_read(A, I)
Trust properties
Pro18 :- trustReq(Type, A, B, S), not trust(Type, A, B, S)
Pro19 :- motivation(positive, A, G), motivation(negative, A, G)
Pro20 :- monitorChain(A, B, M), not trust_threat(A, B, M)
Conflict of interest properties
Pro21 :- play(A, R1), play(A, R2), conflict_roles(R1, R2, produce, I), producer(A, I, T)
Pro22 :- play(A, R1), play(A, R2), conflict_roles(R1, R2, read, I), reader(A, I)
• Pro19 states that the model should not include actors with conflicting motivational
beliefs toward a trstum i.e., an actor who is positively and negatively motivated
toward achieving the same trustum.
• Pro20 states that the model should not include a monitoring relation between a
delegator and a delegetee, if the last cannot be considered as a possible threat source
for the subject of delegation.
• Pro21-22 state that the model should not include any agent that plays conflicting
roles in terms of producing and/or reading information. In particular, it is used to
ensure that the model manage separation of duties among its actors to avoid any
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conflict of interest that may leads to different kinds of vulnerability.
4.4 Chapter summary
In this chapter, we showed how our modeling constructs can be mapped into their corre-
sponding formal specifications that enables for performing the required analysis to verify
the correctness and consistency of the requirements model. In particular, we proposed
a formalization of all our modeling language constructs in Disjunctive Datalog [BFI+09],
i.e., such formalization enables for translating the graphical requirements model into for-
mal specifications that can be used as an input for the inference engine (DLV system),
and enables for deducing new knowledge and perform the required analysis with the help
of the reasoning rules (axioms) that have been proposed and discussed throughout this
chapter.
Chapter 5
Automated Information Quality
Policy Specification
One of the great mistakes is to judge policies and programs by
their intentions rather than their results.
Milton Friedman
Policies are very important to define the expected actors’ behavior in any community,
i.e., with the absence of policies, actors will be free to determine their own behavior
[SD99]. The Oxford English Dictionary [Dic89] defines a policy as “a course of actions or
principles adopted by a government, party, individual, etc.”. While security policies can be
defined as the rules that governs the behavior of a system [SL02; HPL98], or as in [PP03]
as the specification of requirements related to the security properties that a system must
provide. More specifically, a policy statement concentrate on the permitted, forbidden
and obligated actions to be carried out [SD00]. Relying on the previous definitions, we
define IQ policy as a set of rules that control the behavior of actors toward information
by defining their permitted, forbidden and obligated activities. However, defining such
policies for complex systems is not a trivial task, since they might be used to represent
different stakeholder’ needs, which might be conflicting with one another, i.e., conflicting
needs will lead to conflicting policies.
Several organizational and security policy languages have been proposed in the liter-
ature. For instance, Hoagland et al. [HPL98] purpose a visual security policy language
called LaSCO that is able to describe constraints on a system, which must hold in cer-
tain situations. Steen and Derrick [SD00] introduce a method for expressing enterprise
policies in terms of the permitted, forbidden or obligated action to be carried out. While
the Policy Description Language (PDL) [LBN99] is an event-based language that uses
the event-condition-action paradigm to define a policy as a function that maps a series
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of events into a set of actions. Moreover, Security Policy Language (SPL) [RZFG01] is a
constraint-based language consisting of four fundamental building blocks: entities, sets,
rules and policies, which can be used to express the concepts of permission and prohibi-
tion, and some restricted forms of obligation. While Ponder language [DDLS01] is able to
support a number of basic policies, including: obligation, information filtering, delegation,
and refrain policies. However, the main focus of these approaches is the functionality of
the system, and they seem to be limited in addressing IQ related issues properly.
In addition, we can find several policy-based approaches that can be used for improving
IQ by defining the permitted/ forbidden actors’ activities toward information (e.g., access
control policies [SS94], security and reliability policies [SV84], integrity policies [Mot89],
etc.). However, most of them put more emphasis on the technical aspects of the system,
and leave the social and organizational aspects outside the system’s boundary, where
different kinds of vulnerabilities might arise. In other words, these approaches do not
propose a holistic method that is able to capture the social, organizational along with the
technical aspects of IQ. More specifically, they might not be able to satisfy the needs of
current complex systems (e.g., socio-technical systems [ET60]). Moreover, these policies
might be subject to several different social and/ or organizational aspects. Thus, we
need to guarantee that the defined IQ policies are also consistent with the social and
organizational context where the system will be employed.
To tackle these problems, we need to guarantee that the defined IQ policies are con-
sistent with the social, organizational, and IQ requirements of the system. This can be
done by deriving such policies from the IQ requirements model of the system, after ver-
ifying that the model is correct and consistent. The rest of this chapter is organized as
follows; first we define our IQ policy specification language that can be used to represent
the derived IQ policies 5.1, and then we define several rules that enable for the automatic
derivation of such policies from the requirements model 5.2.
5.1 Information Quality Policy Specification Language
Our IQ policy specification language provides a clear way for specifying IQ policies in
terms of the permitted, forbidden and obligated activities toward information. The
language supports three types of polices, namely: permit, forbid, and obligate policies
that are used to control four different types of activities over information, namely,
produce, read, modify, and send. The IQ policy specification language can be represented
in BNF notation [MR03] as:
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IQ Policy = (Permit | Forbid | Obligate)
IQ Policy = IQ Policy name(Actor: a, [Actor: b,], information: i {[, (for |
to | in), (Actor: c | Goal: g | Time: t)]})
The syntax of the language can be described as follows, bold is a language keyword,
definitions are represented as =, alternations are enclosed in round brackets () separated
by |, optional elements are enclosed within square brackets [], and repetition is enclosed
with braces {}. In what follows, we discuss the three types of IQ policies:
Permit policy is used to define the activities that an actor is allowed to perform over
information, and it can be represented in BNF notation as follows:
Permit = permitted policy name(Actor: a, information: i [, (for | to), (Actor:
c | Goal: g)])
For example, stock investor (information owner) is permitted to produce its own orders,
and a trader 1 is permitted to read and modify investor’s order for its goal make profit by
producing the right orders, and it is permitted to send investor’s order to a stock market,
each of the previous permit policies can be represented as follows:
permitted produce(investor, investors_order)
permitted read(trader, investors_order, for, make_profit_by_producing_orders)
permitted modify(trader, investors_order, for, make_profit_by_producing_orders)
permitted send(trader, investors_order, to, stock_market)
Forbid policy is used to define the activities that an actor is prohibited to perform
over information, and it can be represented in BNF notation as follows:
Forbid = forbidden policy name(Actor: a, information: i [, (for | to), (Actor:
b | Goal: g)])
Consider for example, a trader that is forbidden to produce some investor’s order (e.g.,
does not has the required permissions), and it is forbidden to read/ modify investor’s order
for some goals, and it is forbidden to send investor’s order to some actors, we can represent
the previous statements in the form of forbid policies as follows:
forbidden produce(trader, investors_order)
forbidden read(trader, investors_order, for, analyzing_the_market)
1We assume it has the required permissions
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forbidden modify(trader, investors_order, for, analyzing_the_market)
forbidden send(trader, investors_order, to, consulting_firm)
Obligate policy is used to specify the activities that an actor must perform over
information, and it can be represented in BNF notation as follows:
obligate = obligated policy name(Actor: a, [Actor: b,] information: i {[,
(for | to | in), (Actor: c | Goal: g | Time: t)]})
Obligation policies cover three different types of activities, namely: (1) provide, in
which an actor is obligated to provide information to another one within a predefined
period of time; (2) read, in which an actor is obligated to read information within a
predefined period of time delay; and (3) send, in which an actor is obligated to transfer
information to its defined destination (another actor) within a predefined period of time.
For example, an obligation policy concerning information provision, in which a stock
market (e.g., NYSE, CME, etc.) is obligated to provide CTA with information concerning
trades/ quotes (e.g., CQS/CTS info) in the predefined period of time (e.g., 10 seconds),
can be represented as:
obligated provide(stock_market, CTA, CQS-info, in, 10)
While an obligation policy concerning information read, in which an actor (e.g., NYSE )
is obligated to read information (e.g., CME CB-info) within a predefined period of time
delay (e.g., 0 seconds) , can be represented as:
obligated read(NYSE, CME_CB info, for, manage_trading_environment, in, 0)
Finally, an obligation policy concerning information send, in which an actor (e.g.,
trader) is obligated to send information (e.g., investor’s order) to a predefined destina-
tion (e.g., stock market) within a predefined period of delay (e.g., 10 seconds) , can be
represented as:
obligated send(trader, investors_order, to, Stock_market, in, 10)
5.2 Rules for Automated Derivation of Information Quality Pol-
icy Specifications
In the previous section, we described our IQ policy specification language. Here, we
discuss how the final IQ specifications can be derived from the requirements model.
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Table 5.1: Rules for Automated Derivation of IQ Specifications
Permit policies
P1 permitted_produce(A,I):- has_perm(p,A,I), not forbidden_produce(A,I).
P2 permitted_read(A,I,for,G):- own(A,I), is_responsible(A,G), not forbidden_read(A,I,for,G).
P3 permitted_read(A,I,for,G):- has_perm(r,A,I), is_responsible(A,G), read(POU,G,I),
not forbidden_read(A,I,for,G).
P4 permitted_send(A,I,to,B):- has_perm(s,A,I), is_responsible(A,G), send(T,G,B,I).
P5 permitted_modify(A,I,for,G):- has_perm(m,A,I), is_responsible(A,G), modify(G,I).
Forbid policies
F1 forbidden_produce(A,I):- play(A,R1), play(A,R2), conflict_roles_produce(R1,R2,produce,I).
F2 forbidden_read(A,I,for,G):- play(A,R1), play(A,R2), is_responsible(A,G), read(POU,G,I),
conflict_roles_read(R1, R2, read, I).
F3 forbidden_read(A,I,for,G1):- has_perm(r,A,I), is_responsible(A,G), read(POU1,G,I),
is_responsible(A,G1), not read(POU2,G1,I), G != G1.
F4 forbidden_modify(A,I,for,G1):- has_perm(m,A,I), is_responsible(A,G), modify(G,I),
is_responsible(A,G1), not modify(G1, I), G != G1.
F5 forbidden_send(A,I,to,C) :- has_perm(s,A,I), sender(T1, A, B, I), actor(C),
not sender(T2, A, C, I), #int(T1), #int(T2), B!=C.
Obligate policies
O1 obligated_read(A,I,in,0):- interdependent_readers(A,B,I).
O2 obligated_provide(A,B,I,in,T):- provideChain(_,T,A,B,I).
O3 obligated_send(A,I,to,B,in,T):- sender(T,A,B,I).
In particular, we define three sets of rules2 (shown in Table 5.1), namely: permit,
forbid and obligate policy derivation rules that are used for the automated derivation of
IQ specifications from the requirements model in terms of IQ policy specification language;
in what follows we discuss each of these sets:
Permit policy derivation rules : are used to derive allowed actors’ activities con-
cerning information, and represent them in IQ specification language (permit policies). In
particular, rules P1-5 are used to identify the permitted actors’ activities over informa-
tion based on the permissions they have taking into consideration that actors that might
be prevented from performing some activities (e.g., conflict of interests).
P1: states that an actor is permitted to produce an information item, if it has the produce
permission, and it is not forbidden, by any reason, from producing such information.
P2: states that an actor is permitted to read an information item for any goal that is
2Derivation rules (axioms) that are also represented in DLV language [BFI+09] (Datalog with Disjunction)
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Figure 5.1: A partial goal model concerning the stock market structure
responsible of its achievement, if it is the owner of such information, and there is no
reason forbidding it from reading such information.
P3: states that an actor is permitted to read an information item for a specific goal that
is responsible of its achievement, if it has the related read permissions, and it is not
forbidden, by any reason, from reading such information.
P4: states that an actor is permitted to send an information item to a specific actor, if
it is responsible of a goal that sends such information to the actor, and it has the
related send permissions.
P5: states that an actor is permitted to modify an information item by a specific goal,
if it is responsible of the goal that modifies such information, and it has the related
modify permissions.
Example 32. in Figure 5.1, stock investor (information owner) is permitted to produce,
read, and modify its own orders by any goal that is responsible of its achievement, and it
is also permitted to send them to any actor. While the trader is permitted to read and
modify the investor’s orders only by its goal “Make profit by producing the right orders”,
and it is permitted to send the investor’s orders only by its goal “Make profit by producing
the right orders”, and only to the stock market.
Forbid policy derivation rules : are used to derive prohibited actors’ activities
concerning information, and represent them in IQ specification language (forbid policies).
In particular, rules F1-5 are used to identify the activities that an actor is forbidden to
perform over information.
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F1: states that an actor is forbidden to produce an information item, if it plays conflicting
roles concerning the produce of such information.
F2: states that an actor is forbidden to read an information item, if it plays conflicting
roles concerning the read of such information.
F3: states that an actor is forbidden to read an information item for any goal that is
responsible of its achievement except the goal(s) that reads such information, and
the actor has been granted the read permissions to achieve it/them. This rule is
used to prevent actors from using (reading) information for any goal beside the one
they have been granted the read permissions for.
F4: states that an actor is forbidden to modify an information item by any goal that is
responsible of its achievement except the goal(s) that modifies such information, and
the actor has been granted the modify permissions to achieve it/them.
F5: states that an actor is forbidden to send an information item to any actor, except the
actor(s) that has been granted the send permissions to send information to it/them.
Example 33. in Figure 5.1, the stock trader is forbidden to read or modify the investor’s
orders by its goal “analyze the market for targeted securities”, and it is forbidden to send
the investor’s orders by any goal except “analyze the market for targeted securities” to any
actor but the stock market.
Obligate policy derivation rules: are used to derive obligated actors’ activities
toward information, and represent them in IQ specification language (obligate policies).
Obligate policies are essential for addressing several IQ related vulnerabilities by defining
the activities that actors must perform toward information. For example, if a stock in-
vestor depends on a stock trader for sending some trading orders to a stock market. The
automated analysis is able to detect situations, where the trader is not able to provide
the time to market that is required by the investor, which is important to determine
information validity at its destination. However, even if the trader is able to provide the
required time to market, it does not guarantee that the trader will not postponed sending
the orders for some reason, which cannot be addressed by the automated reasoning, since
it is hardly recognize the notion of obligation.
Similarly, there is no guarantee that a stock market will provide information concerning
its trades and quotes to CTA with no delay, where any delay in such information might
negatively influence the overall performance of the trading system. For instance, Nanex
report [Nan10] listed both NYSE-CQS delay along with the DOW Jones delay (was a
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result of the first delay) as a reason of the Flash Crash. Finally, the framework proposed
purpose of use, interdependent readers, and read time concepts to address information
consistency. Yet, such concepts do not guarantee that all interdependent readers will use
(read) such information without delay, i.e., none of them is obligated to use information
when it is received. Without such obligations, it is not guaranteed that the inconsistency
problem among the interdependent readers will be solved. To this end, we define O1-3
rules that can be used to derive obligation policies.
O1: states that all interdependent readers for information are obligated to read such
information with no delay (‘0’).
Example 34. considering the flash crash scenario, and in order to guarantee that NYSE
and NASDAQ (interdependent readers) will perfectly coordinate their CBs activities to
avoid any potential market crash, both of them should be obligated to read CME CB info
(information used for CBs coordination) with no delay (‘0’).
O2: states that an actor is obligated to another one to provide information within the
provision time it claims.
Example 35. to guarantee that a stock market will provide information concerning its
trades and quotes (e.g., CTS-info, CQS-info) to CTA with no delay, we can use an obli-
gation policy concerning information provision, in which a market is obligated to provide
CTA with such information within a predefined period of time.
O3: states that an actor is obligated to send information to its intended destination within
the send time it claims.
Example 36. to guarantee that a trader will not postponed sending investor’s orders for
some reason, we can use an obligation policy concerning information send, in which a
trader is obligated to send investor’s orders to trading market within a predefined period
of time.
5.3 Chapter summary
In this chapter, we argued that specifying IQ requirements is not an easy task, and we
discussed the limitations of existing approaches for specifying IQ requirements in terms
of permitted, forbidden, and obligated activities. In addition, we defined IQ specification
language, and we provide mechanisms for the automatic derivation of the final IQ speci-
fications from the requirements model and represent them in our language in terms of IQ
policies that define the permitted, forbidden and obligated activities toward information.
Chapter 6
The Methodological Process
& Computer-Aided Support: ST-IQ
Tool
You know my methods. Apply them.
Arthur Conan Doyle
In this chapter, we describe our proposed RE methodology in 6.1, which should be
followed by system designers during the different phases of the system design. In par-
ticular, it describes how the different modeling activities should be performed by system
designers, how the requirements model can be analyzed against the properties of the de-
sign to verify its correctness and consistency, and finally, how the final IQ specifications
can be derived from the IQ requirements model. While in 6.2, we presented our CASE
tool (ST-IQ Tool) for modeling and analyzing IQ requirements.
6.1 The Methodological Process
The need for a methodological process for guiding of software engineers (designers) while
designing the system-to-be is well justified in RE community [Yu95]. In particular, the
process should specify who should do what, when and how. Further, the process should
indicate how to verify the model, i.e., whether the model satisfies all the stakeholders’
requirements or not. In the next section, we provide a detailed description of our proposed
methodology.
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6.1.1 A detailed description of the methodological process
Our methodological process provides the required support for system designers during the
system design, the overall methodological process is depicted in Figure 6.1. In particular,
it aims to support designers during the requirements modeling, requirements analysis, and
lastly, during the derivation of the final operational specification from the requirements
model1. The process is iterative, i.e., it can be repeated, if required, to refine the model
until reaching the target design of the system-to-be. In the rest of this section, we give
a detailed description of the methodological process activities along with the activities
interdependencies. The process has three main phases; each of them is composed of
several activities, in what follows we discuss these phases along with their sub activities:
(1) Modeling phase: aims to assist designers in modeling the system-to-be through
several sequential modeling activities, where the outcome of each of these activities
is used as an input to the following one(s). The modeling phase is composed of eight
main modeling activities; each of them is discussed in details as follows:
1.1 Actor modeling: is the first modeling activity that aims to identify the actors
(agents and roles) of the system along with their objectives, entitlements and ca-
pabilities. The outcome of the actor modeling activity is the actor diagram that
represents the main stakeholders of the system represented in terms of agents
and the role(s) they are playing, where each role/ agent has a clear definition,
based on which, we can identify their objectives entitlements and capabilities.
The actor diagram is used as an input for the goal modeling activity.
1.2 Goal modeling : aims to refine actors’ root goals that have been defined in
the previous activity through and/or decomposition until reaching their leaf
sub goals that are fine enough to be achieved by actors. The outcome of this
activity is the goal diagram that represents a refined model of actors’ objectives
in terms of leaf goals that can be achieved or delegated to other actors, who
have the required capabilities to achieve them. The goal diagram is used as an
input for 1.3 information modeling activity and 1.4 social interactions modeling
(1.4.1 goal delegation modeling activity).
1.3 Information modeling: information modeling is the first activity toward cap-
turing IQ requirements; it aims to identify the different relation between in-
formation and other modeling constructs in the system, including information
ownership, goal- information relations, and information structure. In particular,
this activity is composed of three sub activities:
1Requirements elicitation is out of the scope of the methodological process
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1.3.1 Information ownership modeling: aims to identify the legal owner(s)
of information items, which is essential to capture their requirements con-
cerning information they own. Further, such relation is required for identify-
ing who has full control over information use (e.g., information permissions/
permissions delegation);
1.3.2 Goal-information relations modeling: aims to identify the different
relations between goals and information, where these goals may produce,
read, modify, and/or send information. Yet defining such relation is essen-
tial for capturing the relation between information and its purpose of use,
which is essential for capturing requirements about IQ;
1.3.3 Information structure modeling: aims to capture the internal struc-
ture of composite information, which enables to decide whether information
is complete or not.
The outcome of this activity is the information diagram that is used as an input
for five different activities: 1.4 social interactions modeling (1.4.2 information
provision modeling and 1.4.3 permission delegation modeling), 1.5 threat mod-
eling (1.5.1 identify actors’ capabilities and motivations toward threats), 1.6
Trust modeling (1.6.1 trust of information producing), and EX- dealing with
IQ requirements (EX1- modeling and refining IQ as softgoals).
1.4 Social interactions modeling: aims to identify the different social dependen-
cies among the actors of the system concerning the transfer of entitlements and
authorities. As shown in Figure 6.1, social interactions modeling is composed
of three main sub activities:
1.4.1 Goal delegation modeling: aims to identify goal delegation among ac-
tors of the system, i.e., when an actor does not has the required capabilities
to achieve a goal it aims for, it delegates the goal to another actor who
have such capability. The outcome of this activity is the goal delegation di-
agram that identifies the transfer of responsibilities among the actors of the
system, and it is used as an input to 1.6.3 trust of goal delegation modeling.
1.4.2 Information provision modeling: aims to identify information trans-
mission among actors of the system, i.e., identify the source and destination
of each information transmission relation. In addition, it helps in identi-
fying how the quality of the transferred information might be affected by
the provision process, and enables to identify information availability from
information readers’ perspective.
1.4.3 Permission delegation modeling: aims to identify actors, who have
the capability to delegate permissions to other actors of the system, identify
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actors who need permissions to achieve their objectives, and identify how
actors can delegate permissions among one another. The outcome of this
activity is the actors’ authorities (permissions) diagram. The outcome of
this activity is used as an input for 1.6.2 trust of permissions delegations
social trust modeling.
1.5 Threat modeling: aims to identify goals and information related threats along
with actors’ capabilities and motivations toward such threats. In particular, this
activity is composed of two main sub activities:
1.5.1 Identify threats to goals and information related: identify and
model intentional threats that might threaten goals and information within
the system.
1.5.2 Identify actors’ capabilities and motivations toward threats:
identify actors’ capabilities and motivations toward threats based on the
actors’ internal structure.
1.6 Trust modeling: aims to identify the trust/ distrust relations among actors
of the system concerning information producing, permissions and goals delega-
tions. This activity is composed of three main sub activities:
1.6.1 Trust of information producing: aims to identify trust / distrust re-
lation among actors concerning produced information;
1.6.2 Trust of permissions granting modeling: aims to identify trust /
distrust relation among actors concerning their delegated permissions;
1.6.3 Trust of goal delegation modeling: aims to identify trust / distrust
relation among actors concerning their delegated goal.
EX. Dealing with IQ requirements modeling: the main aim of this activity is
removing any ambiguity while dealing with IQ requirements. In particular, it
helps in dealing with IQ requirements by identify how root IQ requirement (IQ
softgoals), and refine them until reaching their operational specifications. This
activity is composed of two main sub activities:
Ex1. Modeling and refining IQ as softgoals: aims to identify root IQ
softgoals, we can identify two sources of root softgoals: (1) root softgoals
that are identified by information owners, owners might define different soft-
goals concerning information they own; (2) root softgoals that resulted from
goal-information relations (e.g., produce, read, etc.), and they are used to
identify the IQ needs of goals concerning information they use. After iden-
tifying root IQ softgals, we refine them until reaching their leaf IQ softgoals
based on the actual purpose of use.
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Ex2- Approximating leaf IQ softgoals: aims to identify the appropriate
approximation of leaf softgoals into the adequate Information Quality Con-
straints (IQCs) based on their types.
After all the modeling activities are completed, the requirements model is checked to
determine whether it needs to be refined or not. If there is a need for refinement, the
process repeats the modeling activities again starting from the first activity to refine the
model; while if no refinement is needed the process proceed to the analysis phase.
(2) Analysis Phase: aims to verify the correctness and consistency of the requirements
model against some properties of the design. In particular, we define a set of prop-
erties to check the correctness and consistency of the requirements model, i.e., the
model is correct and consistent, if all of these properties hold. When the model cor-
rectness and consistency are verified (no inconsistency and/or conflict is detected),
we proceed to the final phase. Model analysis is an automated activity, and it is
support by the ST-IQ Tool. In particular, this activity is composed of two main sub
activities:
2.1 Analyzing the requirements: the main purpose of the analysis phase is de-
tecting any incorrectness or inconsistency in the model (e.g., unachieved goal,
information is not available, etc. ), and identify their reasons (e.g., delegation
without trust, etc.), which enable the system analyst to find proper solutions
for them.
2.2 Refining the requirements model: in this activity, analyst tries to resolve
any errors (incorrectness and/or inconsistency) in the model that have been
detected while analyzing the model. For example, the analyst can compensate
the lack of trust in a trustee concerning a delegated goal or permission by
monitoring the trustee.
After all the analysis activities are completed, if there are non-solved inconsistencies
and/ or conflicts among the overall requirements of the system, the process goes back to
the modeling phase to reconstruct the model accordingly, otherwise the process continues
to the final phase, since the requirements model is correct and consistent.
(3) Specification phase: is the final phase, and it aims to automatically derive the
final IQ specifications from the requirements model. More specifically, we define
IQ specification language and some rules that allow for the automatic derivation
of the final IQ specifications from a requirements model that have been verified
correct and consistent, which guarantee, in turn, to derive a correct and consistent
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IQ specifications in terms of IQ policies, which are represented in the IQ policy
specification language that clearly define the permitted, forbidden and obligated
actions to be carried out by actors of the system toward information.
6.2 Computer-Aided Support: ST-IQ Tool
Usually, Computer-Aided Software Engineering (CASE) tools are developed to assist soft-
ware engineers during the different phases of the system design, and they are considered as
a key component of any proposed RE framework [BCM+94]. In this section, we describe
our CASE tool (ST-IQ Tool) that have been developed to help designers in modeling and
reasoning about IQ requirements. The rest of this chapter is organized as follows; ST-IQ
Tool architecture is described in 6.2.1, ST-IQ modeling component is discussed in 6.2.2,
the Model-To-Text (M2T) component is described in 6.2.3. Finally, in 6.2.4, we discuss
its reasoning component.
6.2.1 ST-IQ Tool Architecture
Our CASE tool called Secure Tropos IQ Tool (ST-IQ Tool)2 consists of four main com-
ponents (ST-IQ Tool architecture is shown in Figure 6.2):
• Control component (JAVA based-program) that controls and coordinates the activ-
ities of the three other components;
• Graphical user interface (GUI) that enable designers for drawing the requirements
model by drag-and-drop modeling elements from palettes, and allows for specifying
the properties of the modeling elements along with their interrelations;
• Model-To-Text (M2T) transformation mechanism that supports the translating of
the graphical models into Disjunctive Datalog formal specifications;
• Automated reasoning support (DLV system3) takes the Disjunctive Datalog specifi-
cation that resulted from translating the graphical model along with the reasoning
axioms, and then perform the required analysis to verify the correctness and consis-
tency of the requirements model against the properties of the design.
2https://github.com/disi-unitn-RE-IQ/RE-IQ
3http://www.dlvsystem.com/dlv/
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Figure 6.2: ST-IQ Tool architecture
6.2.2 Modeling component
The modeling component (A snapshot is shown in Figure 6.3) has been developed using
Sirius4, which is an Eclipse project that allows for developing graphical-based modeling
framework relying on several Eclipse Modeling technologies (e.g., EMF and GMF). It aims
to support designer while drawing the requirements model. In particular, it provides four
palettes:
• General pallet that provides the general constructs for creating the requirements
model, including: roles, agents, goals, information, etc.
• Social interaction pallet that provides social interaction and dependency constructs,
including: goal delegation, information provision, permissions delegation, etc.
• Threat pallet that provides threat related constructs, including: threat, threaten,
positive/ negative threat to goal contributions, etc.
• Social Trust pallet that provides trust related constructs, including: trust for goal
delegation, threat, threat contribution, etc.
Designers can rely on these pallets for drawing the different requirements diagrams
(Actors diagram, goals diagram, social interactions diagram, trust diagram, etc.) by
drag-and-drop modeling constructs from the adequate pallet, and define the different
4https://projects.eclipse.org/projects/modeling.sirius
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Figure 6.3: ST-IQ Tool: Modeling Interface
relations among these constructs. In addition, the designer is able to specify or modify
the properties of modeling elements from the property panel.
6.2.3 Model-To-Text (M2T) component
A modeling language can be used for representing the system requirements in a simple
way, which enables the system designer along with the different stakeholders of the system
to communicate and understand each other perfectly [NE00]. However, to perform the
required reasoning about the IQ requirements model, we need to transform the visual
requirements model into formal specifications, which enables for performing the required
analysis to verify the correctness and consistency of the requirements model.
To this end, we depend on Acceleo Model-To-Text Transformation Language (MTL)5
to translate the graphical (visual) requirements model into Disjunctive Datalog formal
specifications. In particular, Acceleo takes the graphical requirements as an input, and
applies it to some transformation templates (shown in Figure 6.4) that are able to read the
concepts that underlay the visual constructs along with their different relations and prop-
erties, and then produce the corresponding formal specifications in terms of Disjunctive
Datalog language. A sample of the Acceleo output is shown in Figure 6.5.
5https://projects.eclipse.org/projects/modeling.m2t.acceleo
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Figure 6.4: ST-IQ Tool: Model-2-text Component
6.2.4 Reasoning component
The main aim of the reasoning components is verifying the requirements model. In par-
ticular, the control component, provide the Disjunctive Datalog specification (extensional
predicates) that resulted from translating the graphical model along with the reasoning
rules (axioms) and the properties of the design to the DLV engine. The DLV engine de-
rive new knowledge (intensional predicates) depending on extensional predicates and the
reasoning rules (axioms), and then it uses the extensional and intensional predicates to
perform the required reasoning to verify the correctness and consistency of the require-
Figure 6.5: Disjunctive Datalog formal specifications
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ments model against the properties of the design.
6.3 Chapter summary
In this chapter, we provide a detailed description of our proposed RE methodology should
be followed by system designers during the different phases of the system design. In other
words, we discussed the different modeling activities that should be performed by system
designer, and how the model can be analyzed against the properties of the design to verify
its correctness and consistency. Moreover, we discuss how the final operational specifica-
tion can be derived from the verified requirements model. In addition, we presented the
ST-IQ Tool, which can be used for modeling and analyzing IQ requirements.
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Chapter 7
Case study: the Flash crash
I have been impressed with the urgency of doing. Knowing is not
enough; we must apply. Being willing is not enough; we must do.
Leonardo da Vinci
In this chapter, we present the application of our proposed RE framework to a case
study concerning a stock market system crash (the Flash Crash). In particular, we apply
our framework to a real case study concerning the United States stock market crash
on Thursday May 6, 2010 (the Flash Crash), in which the Dow Jones Industrial Average
dropped about 1000 points (about 9%), and then it recover those losses within minutes. In
particular, we demonstrate the utility and effectiveness of the framework in identifying and
resolving the different vulnerabilities that manifested themselves in the system structure
and how they were exploited by some actors of the system, which led or contributed to
the crash.
In the rest of this chapter, we start by briefly describing the stock market system
structure in 7.1, the Flash Crash chronology of events in 7.1.1, and then we list and discuss
the main reasons of the crash 7.1.2. In 7.1.3, we apply our framework to the Flash Crash
case study. First, we use our modeling language for modeling the case study in 7.1.4. In
7.1.5, we discuss its analysis technique, i.e., we demonstrate its adequacy for reasoning
about IQ requirements. While 7.1.6 describes the automated derivation of the final
operational specifications of IQ requirements. Finally, we perform scalability experiments
to demonstrate the efficiency of the automated reasoning techniques for dealing with big
size models in 7.2.
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7.1 The stock market system structure
A stock market system can be defined as an aggregation of buyers and sellers of secu-
rities (also called shares), which can be listed on different stock exchanges. Based on
[KKST11; Mis03], several stakeholders of the system can be identified, including: stock
investors are individuals or companies, who have a main goal of “making profit from
trading securities”. While stock traders are persons or companies involved in trading se-
curities in stock markets either for their own sake or on behalf of their investors with a
main goal of “making profit by trading securities”. Stock markets are places where traders
gather and trade securities, and they have a main goal of “making profit by facilitating
security trading”. Furthermore, we can identify several financial companies that provide
supporting services (e.g., accounting firms, auditing firms, consulting firms, etc.). Finally,
the Consolidate Tape Association (CTA) and Consolidated Quotation System (CQS) that
provides information concerning trades and quotes1 respectively.
The stock market is an example of a complex socio-technical system, where IQ is
very important for the system efficient performance. In such system, actors interact and
depend on one another for information. For instance, investors need trading suggestions
to assist their trading decision, where the quality of the suggestion information plays a
main role in the trading decision that the investor may take. Trading suggestions can be
directly provided by consulting firms, or through traders.
Stock markets receive trading orders from traders, and they apply mechanisms to match
and perform trades. Moreover, they are responsible of ensuring stable trading environment
for the traders by slowing down or halting the trading activities when needed, for such
task they rely on what is called CB information that can be produced by analyzing the
trading activities in the markets. In addition, markets produce information about their
quotes (Quotation info-CQS) and traders (trades info-CTS) they perform, where such
information are used by Consolidate Tape Association (CTA) and Consolidated Quotation
System (CQS) to produce CTS-info and CQS-info respectively. Both of CTS-info and
CQS-info are very important to analyze the trading market and make the right trading
decisions.
Each of the system stakeholders has its own objectives it aims to achieve, where achiev-
ing some of these objectives is highly influenced with the quality of information it relies
on. Thus, the analysis should capture stakeholders’ IQ requirements and provide a clear
mechanism to verify whether such requirements are achieved or not.
1A quote is an order that has not been performed
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7.1.1 The Flash Crash: chronology of events
The following sequence of events is based on the joint report of CFTC and SEC regarding
the market events of May 6, 2010 [Tra10; SC+10] and Nanex2 Flash Crash summary report
[Nan10].
• On May 6, U.S. stock markets opened and trended down for most of the day on
worries about the European debt crisis (Greece).
• By 2:30 p.m., the selling pressure had pushed the DJIA down about 2.5% of its
value.
• At 2:32 p.m., a large fundamental trader initiated an order to sell a total of 75,000 E-
Mini contracts (valued at approximately $4.1 billion). The sell was initially absorbed
by HFTs and fundamental buyers. Usually, such big sell order may take more than
5 hours to execute. However, on May 6, it was executed extremely fast in only 20
minutes.
• Between 2:41 p.m. and 2:44 p.m., HFTs and other traders drove the price of the
E-Mini down by more than 5%.
• At 2:45:28 p.m., trading on the E-Mini was paused for five seconds when the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange (CME), CME Circuit Breakers (CB) was triggered in order to
prevent a cascade of further price declines. Yet NYSE did not halt trading [Sub13].
• At 2:45:33 p.m., prices stabilized when trading resumed, and the E-Mini began to
recover.
In summary, between 2:40 p.m. and 3:00 p.m., approximately 2 billion shares were
traded with a total volume exceeding $56 billion. Over 98% of all shares were executed
at prices within 10% of their 2:40 p.m. value.
7.1.2 Main reasons of the Flash Crash
The Flash Crash has raised many questions concerning the efficiency of the stock market
system. A deep analysis of the Flash Crash shows that several reasons that contributed
or led to the failure can be avoided if the IQ requirements of the system were captured
properly during the early phases of the system design. Several researchers investigate
IQ and their influence on the overall performance of the stock market (e.g., [FJK+11;
2Nanex is a firm that offers streaming data on all market transactions and distributes the data in real time
to clients and allows them to do analysis and visualization in real time
112 Case study: the Flash crash
FJK+11]), and other researchers propose different theories to explain what happened,
including:
• Fat-finger trade that is a human error caused by pressing a wrong key when using
a computer to input data. However, this theory was quickly disproved after it was
determined that the E-mini S&P 500 order, which was under suspicion of triggering
the Flash Crash, was not a result of a fat-finger trade [EDPO11; EDPO11];
• The highly fragmented nature of the market along with the inefficient coordination
mechanisms among the CBs of the trading markets also played a role in the Flash
Crash [GHLZ12; Sub13]. More specifically, if the trading markets do not coordinate
their CBs, HFTs will simply search for a market other than the closed ones and
continue trading [Mad11].
• The suspicious behavior of HFTs that effects the market prices and contributed to
the Flash Crash[SC+10; Bow10; KKST11].
• Fraud information (e.g., falsified, inaccurate, etc.) that have been used by some
actors and compromised the overall system performance. For instance, HFTs’ flick-
ering quotes that last very short time, which make them unavailable for most of
traders [MU12], and Market Makers’ stub quotes that are orders with prices far
away from the current market prices, such orders can also be considered as falsified
information; since they are orders were not intended to be performed [KKST11].
• Undetected vulnerabilities in the socio-technical system structure that have been
exploit by some actors and led to a failure in the overall system [Cli11; SCC+12].
7.1.3 Applying the framework to the Flash Crash case study
In this section, we apply our framework to the Flash Crash case study. In particular, we
use the modeling language to produce the different requirements diagrams (e.g., actors,
goals, information, etc.), and then we rely of the automated analysis support to verify
the correctness and consistency of the requirements model. Finally, we derive the final IQ
specifications (in terms of IQ policies) from the requirements model.
7.1.4 Requirements Modeling
This section presents the modeling activities that our framework proposes, i.e., we use
the modeling concepts and constructs proposed in Section 3 to model the Flash Crash
scenario. The modeling language proposed in this thesis has been improved through three
main stages. In each of these stages, we tested the adequacy of the proposed concepts for
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modeling the case study, identify their limitations in capturing some important aspects
of the system, and then overcome the identified limitations by introducing more refined
and expressive concepts.
For example, in [GG15d], we proposed concepts for capturing four IQ dimensions,
namely: accuracy, completeness, timeliness and consistency. Although the proposed con-
cepts were able to capture the IQ aspects we considered, but they seem to be inadequate
to capture several aspects of the system. Moreover, some of them were at high abstrac-
tion level, and we cannot rely on them to derive a clearly defined IQ specification. To
tackle this problem, first we extended the IQ dimensions we consider to seven dimensions
[GG15a], including: accessibility, accuracy, believability, trustworthiness, completeness,
timeliness and consistency.
Second, we proposed new concepts, and we extended the previously introduced ones
with attributes that enable for accommodating the new extensions. For instance, we ex-
changed the trusted provision concept that helps in analyzing the accuracy of the trans-
ferred information with several finer concepts that enable for analyzing the quality of the
transferred information. More specifically, we extended the relations between goal and
information by adding a new one (modify), and we enriched the modeling language by
supporting the notion of permissions, which is very important for identifying the permit-
ted/ forbidden actors’ activities toward information, and in turn, for addressing several
IQ related issues. Thus, we refine the modeling language by proposing four different types
of permissions concerning the four types of information usage (e.g., (P)roduce, (R)ead,
(M)odify and (S)end).
Moreover, we extend the language to model permission delegation among actors, and
to model trust/ distrust concerning the delegated permissions. Furthermore, we refine
information provision (transfer) concept by proposing two different types of provisions,
namely: normal provision (P), and Integrity Preserving provision (IP provision) which
can preserve the integrity of the provided (transferred) information [GG13a]. Still, the
framework hardly recognizes the obligation concept, which is essential for addressing sev-
eral IQ related vulnerabilities. Thus, in [GG15c] we proposed several techniques to deal
with this issue.
Following our methodology, we start by actor modeling, i.e., actors of the system are
identified and modeled along with their objectives, entitlements and capabilities. Second,
we proceed to goal modeling activity, in which actors’ goals are refined through and/or-
decompositions if needed. Third, information modeling activity, in which we identify
and model information, their owner(s) (if any), their relations with goals, and finally
their internal structure if they are composed. Fourth, we model the social interaction
among actors concerning information provision, permissions and goals delegations. Fifth,
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we identify and model threat concerning goals and information, and we model actors’
competencies and motivations toward such threats. Finally, we identify and model actors’
social interactions and dependencies, and then we model trust among them. Each of
the previously mentioned activities is supported with the ST-IQ Tool, at the end of each
activity we discuss how it was performed with the help of the Tool.
Actor modeling
The modeling activities start by modeling the actors of the system along with their ob-
jectives, entitlements and capabilities. In what follows, we list and define the main actors
(agents and roles) of the system along with their specialization and instantiation relations.
A stock investor: is an individual or company, who trades securities in stock market
with a main aim of making a potential profit.
A stock trader: is a person or company involved in trading securities in the stock mar-
ket, and able to employ different strategies for making profit out of the trading
activities. In particular, he/she is able to analyze the targeted securities in the stock
market, and make proper trading offers accordingly.
Based on [KKST11; SC+10], we can classify stock traders under five main categories
based on their: (1) trading speed3; (2) position limit4; and (3) the percentage of the
market volume. These categories are listed and defined as follows:
Fundamental Traders: are those who either buying or selling significant number of
securities in one direction with a low frequency rate. Fundamental Traders can
be further classified under Fundamental Buyers and Fundamental Sellers
depending on the direction of their trades.
Market Makers: are firms that hold a certain number of shares of a particular security
in order to facilitate trading in that security. They take the position at both sides
of the market by taking long and short positions on a particular security.
High-frequency Traders: are traders take long and short positions at both sides of the
market, and trade with very high frequency [Ald13]. Usually, they use some sort of
algorithmic trading to rapidly trade securities, i.e., they rely on advanced computer
systems to record high earnings in the market.
3Average amount of time taken between order placements
4Number of orders allowed to be held
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Small /Noise Traders: are traders who take either a long or short positions on the
market, and trade with a very low frequency.
Opportunistic Traders: traders who do not fall in the other categories.
According to [PHT+12], the numbers of market participation for the E-mini S&P 500
securities5 during the Flash Crash day were: 1268 fundamental buyers; 1276 fundamental
sellers; 176 market makers; 16 HFTs; 6880 small traders; 5808 opportunistic traders, and
the number of investor is much greater than that.
Stock markets (trading venues): are places where traders gather and trade securi-
ties [Har02]. Markets may be a physical trading floor (e.g., The New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE), the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME)), or it may be an elec-
tronic system (e.g., NASDAQ) [Har02; OY11].
Markets have a main goal of “making profit by facilitating security trading”. Usually,
they “manage traders’ order matching”, and they should “ensure stable trading environ-
ment”, which can be done by depending on their Circuit Breakers (CBs), where a CB
is a technique that is used to slow down or halt trading activities to prevent a potential
market crash. Moreover, they share all information concerning the quotes and trades they
receive/ perform accordingly.
Accounting firms: are specialized for performing accounting activities, i.e., they provide
companies with clear and reliable information about their economic activities and
the status of their assets.
Auditing firms: are specialized for providing efficient monitoring of the quality of infor-
mation produced by companies concerning their financial statements.
Consulting firms: are specialized for providing professional advices for a fee about se-
curities to traders and investors.
Credit assessment ratings firms: are specialized for assessing of the credit worthiness
of companies’ securities, i.e., such firms help traders in deciding how risky it is to
invest money in a certain security.
Consolidate Tape Association (CTA): produces information that describes the last
orders (trades) information, such information is very important for analyzing the
market and make trading decisions [HJ11].
5The security that was under suspicion of triggering the crash
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Figure 7.1: Actor Diagram
Consolidated Quotation System (CQS): produces information concerning quota-
tion6 information, and provides it to different actors who require such information.
Figure 7.1 shows the actor diagram that resulted from the actor modeling activity. In
which, we can identify Stock market that has a main goal of “make profit by facilitate
trading among stock traders”. A Fundamental seller that is specialized from Fundamental
trader role, which is also specialized from Stock trader role that has a main goal of “make
6A quote is an order that has not been performed
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profit by trading securities”.
ST-IQ Tool support: actor modeling activity starts by modeling the
main roles in the system (e.g., stock trader, stock investor, CQS), and
then we model specialization relation among the roles (e.g., fundamen-
tal seller role is specialized from fundamental trader role that is also
specialized from stock trader role). After identifying the roles along
with their specialization relations (if any), we model the agents of the
system, and we define the role(s) that such agents are instantiated of
(e.g., CME is an agent that is instantiated from the stock market role).
Note that some agents are not instantiated from any role (e.g., CQS,
CTS). After all the roles and agents of the system are modeled along
with their interrelations, their top-level goals are identified and modeled
as well.
Goal modeling
Goal modeling activity aims to produce the goal diagram that is a refined model of actors’
top-level goals in terms of leaf goals, which can be achieved or delegated to other actors.
In particular, goals are refined through and/or-decomposition until reaching their leaf
goals, which cannot be refined anymore, and they can be achieved by actors. Figure 7.2)
shows a partial goal diagram concerning the refinement of the Stock trader’s goal “make
profit by trading securities”, which is and-decomposed into two goals “Producing the right
orders” and “Decide the right trading order”. The first goal is also and-decomposed into
two goals“Trade investors’ securities”and“Trading its own securities”. While the last goal
is or-decomposed into two goals “Depend on consulting firm suggestions” and “Depend on
trader suggestions”.
ST-IQ Tool support: the tool provides the main concepts for mod-
eling and refining the actors’ goals, i.e., in the pallet we can find goal
along with and/or-decompositions constructs.
Information modeling
Information modeling and it is the first activity toward capturing IQ requirements, and
it aims to produce the information diagram that identifies the different relation between
information and other modeling constructs in the system. In particular, information
modeling can be composed of three sub modeling activities:
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Figure 7.2: Partial Goal Diagram
(1) Information ownership modeling: in which we model the legal owner(s) of infor-
mation items, which is essential to capture their requirements concerning information
they own. In addition, it identifies who has full control over information use (e.g.,
information permissions/ permissions delegation);
Example 37. a stock investor is the [O]wner of investor ’s order, and CME is the
[O]wner of CME CB info
(2) Goal-information relations modeling: in which we model the different relations
between goals and information, where these goals may produce, read, modify, and/or
send information. Moreover, we define the different attributes of the previously
mentioned relations base on the stockholders’ needs.
Example 38. a stock investor is [P]roduces and [S]ends investor ’s order through
its goal “Receive orders from traders”, and it can define several attributes related to
produce and send relations.
(3) Information structure modeling: in which we identify the internal structure of
composite information, which enables to decide whether such information is complete
or not.
Example 39. CME CB info is considered as a sub item of both (part of) NYSE CB
info and NYSE CB info.
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Figure 7.3: Partial Information Diagram
ST-IQ Tool support: the tool provides concepts for modeling the owner-
ship relation between an actor with information it owns, and it provide
the different relation between goals and information they produce, read,
modify and send, and allows to define the different attributes related to
these relations. Finally, it allows for modeling the relation between an
information item and its sub items by part of relation.
Figure 7.3, shows a partial information diagram concerning stock markets. In which,
we can identify, the goal“Receive orders from traders”([o]ptional) reads Trading orders for
the purpose of use [Tr]adding, and it produces Accepted orders. While the goal “Manage
trading environment” ([R]equired) reads NYSE CB info for the purpose of use [CB]reaker.
In addition, CME is the [O]wner of CME CB info, where CME CB info is considered as
a part of NYSE CB info. Thus, CME CB info should be provided to NYSE.
Social interaction modeling
Social interaction modeling aims to produce the social dependency diagram that cap-
tures the actor interactions and dependencies, including information provision, objectives
and authorities’ delegation. In particular, goals are delegated from actors who do not
have the capability to achieve to the actors, who have such capabilities. In addition,
information /authorities are provided /delegated from actors who have the capabilities to
provide/delegate them to the actors who require them to achieve their objectives.
Figure 7.4, shows a partial social dependency diagram. In which, we can identify that
CQS receives Quotations info-CQS from Stock market, and it provides CQS-info to stock
trader. Stock investor provides investor’s orders to the stock trader, and it delegates read,
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modify and send permissions to it. In addition, it delegates the “ delegate trading to a
trader”. CME provides CME CB info to both part of NYSE and NASDAQ, with two
different provision times (14.65 ms, 13 ms).
ST-IQ Tool support: the tool provides the required concepts for model-
ing all the social interactions we consider, and it enables for specifying
their related attributes. For example, the provision construct allows for
defining the provided information, the provision source and destination.
Moreover, it allows choosing the type and time of the provision.
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Threat modeling
Threat modeling aims to produce the threat diagram that identify and models threats
to goals and information, and identify actors’ competencies and motivations toward such
threats. Usually, threats to information/goals are defined by stockholders or domain
expert, and based on the threats characteristics we can determine which actors have the
capabilities to achieve them.
Figure 7.5 shows a partial threat diagram. In which, we can identify a threat “Biasing
the security assessment” to the goal “Assessing the worthiness of companies’ securities”,
and a threat “Provide falsified/fraud orders” to the information “trader orders”. In ad-
dition, actors’ capabilities toward such threats are identified and modeled, and threats
motivations related constructs (e.g., goals contribution, goal-threat threats) are identified
and modeled.
ST-IQ Tool support: propose constructs for modeling threats, and their
relations to both goals and information (threaten). Moreover, it en-
ables for modeling the capability/incapability relations between actors
and such threats. In addition, it introduces positive and negative con-
tribution relations between goals, and between threat and goals.
Trust modeling
Trust modeling aims to produce the trust diagram that identify and models trust/ dis-
trust relations among actors of the system concerning information producing, goal and
permissions delegations. Figure 7.6, shows a partial trust diagram concerning our case
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study. In which, we can identify a trust relations concerning “trader’s orders” between
the stock market at one hand, and Secure trading, Fast trading, and Pro trading at the
other hand. Moreover, we can identify a trust relation between a stock trader and Star
Co concerning the delegated goal “Assessing the worthiness of companies’ securities”.
ST-IQ Tool support: introduce three types of constructs for modeling
trust concerning produced information, delegated permissions and goals,
in which we identify the trustor, trustee, and the trustum (informa-
tion, permissions, goal). In addition, we can define the level of trust
(trust/distruct) that the trustor put in the trustee.
7.1.5 Analyzing the requirements model
Aims to verify the correctness and consistency of the requirements model diagrams that
resulted from the previously mentioned modeling activities. As previously mentioned,
graphical models cannot support any kind of automated analysis without a formal repre-
sentation of their semantics. Thus, we translate graphical models into Disjunctive Datalog
[BFI+09] formal specifications that enables for performing the required analysis to ver-
ify the correctness and consistency of the requirements model. The translation of these
models produces the extensional predicates, which represent all the modeling constructs
along with their semantic relations. In addition, the extensional predicates are applied
to a set of reasoning rules (axioms) to infer knew knowledge from the model that is the
intensional predicates. Finally, we use all the knowledge we have about to model to check
its correctness and consistency. In order to do that, we have defined a set of properties of
the design; these properties define constraints that the designers should consider during
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the system design to guarantee the correctness and consistency of the requirements model.
For example, in the trust diagram (shown in Figure 7.6) a trust relation should hold
concerning “trader’s orders” between the stock market at one hand, and Secure trading,
and Fast trading at the other hand. However, according to the threat diagram (shown in
Figure 7.5), such relation cannot hold, since both Secure trading, and Fast trading have
the capabilities and motivations to achieve the related threat (“Provide falsified/fraud
orders”).
ST-IQ Tool support: the tool enables for translating the different re-
quirements model diagrams into Disjunctive Datalog formal specifica-
tions, and then it reads the properties of the design from a file, and
perform the required analysis. In case there is a violation to the design
properties, it notifies the designer about it, which allows him to resolve
such violation by modifying the requirements model.
We run the automated analyses supported by our framework over the created models,
and the analysis captured several violations of the properties of the design, including:
Inaccurate information: markets (e.g., CME ) consider information received from any
trader that plays the role of HFT trader as inaccurate information, since no trust in
information production holds between them at one hand, and markets at the other.
Inaccurate information due to playing conflicting roles: Best services is playing
two conflicting roles “Accounting firm” and “Auditing firm” concern producing “Fi-
nancial statement”, it provides accounting and auditing services for the same com-
pany. However, we cannot trust a company for providing accurate auditing infor-
mation (“Financial statement”) for a company that it gets paid from to perform
their accounting services. Thus, Best services should not has produce permissions
concerning “Financial statement” information, and in turn, if it produce such infor-
mation it is considered as inaccurate (no produce permissions).
Unauthorized read due to playing conflicting roles: Fetch Co is playing two con-
flicting roles “Auditing firm”and “Consulting firm” concern reading “Security assess-
ment”, since it might use such information for providing paid consulting services.
Thus, Fetch Co should not has read permissions concerning “Security assessment”
information.
Incomplete information: “ NYSE CB info” and “Nasdaq CB info” are identified as
incomplete information from the perspectives of their readers, since they miss some
sub parts related to the purpose of use. However, this can be solved by providing
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these markets with the missed information sub items, i.e., providing both NYSE and
NASDAQ with “CME CB info”.
Inconsistent information: both of NYSE and NASDAQ are interdependent readers
concerning “CME CB info”. However, CME CB info is provided to them with
two different provision times. According to [Lew14], provision time from CME to
NASDAQ was 13 (ms), while provision time from CME to NYSE was 14.65 (ms),
which leads to different read times between them, which results in inconsistency
between them.
The proposed properties of the design enable to capture all the violations that we
consider in this thesis.
7.1.6 Deriving the final IQ Specifications
As discussed in Chapter 5, after verifying that the requirements model is correct and
consistent, we can derive correct and consistent IQ specifications from the requirements
model. In particular, we rely on the IQ policy specifications derivation rules to automati-
cally derive the final IQ policies. These rules enable for deriving three types of IQ polices
(permit, forbid, and obligate) that are used to control four different types of activities over
information, namely, produce, read, modify, and send. More specifically, permit policies
are used to define the activities that an actor is allowed to perform over information,
forbid policies are used to define the activities that an actor is prohibited to perform over
information, and obligate policies that are used to specify the activities that an actor must
perform over information. In addition, the derivation rules represent the derived policies
in the IQ policy specifications language. In what follows, we list some of the derived IQ
policies:
permitted produce(investor, investors_order)
permitted read(trader, investors_order, for, make_profit_by_producing_orders)
permitted modify(trader, investors_order, for, make_profit_by_producing_orders)
permitted send(trader, investors_order, to, stock_market)
forbidden read(trader, investors_order, for, analyzing_the_market)
forbidden send(trader, investors_order, to, consulting_firm)
obligated read(NYSE, CME_CB info, for, manage_trading_environment, in, 0)
obligated read(NASDAQ, CME_CB info, for, manage_trading_environment, in, 0)
obligated provide(stock_market, CTA, CQS-info, in, 10)
obligated provide(stock_market, CTA, CTS-info, in, 10)
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ST-IQ Tool support: the tool enables for deriving the final IQ specifi-
cations and represent them in the IQ policy specification language that
provide a clear way for specifying IQ policies in terms of the permitted,
forbidden and obligated activities toward information.
7.2 Scalability experiments
In this section, we report the result of our scalability experiments to demonstrate how well
the automated reasoning techniques perform while applied to large requirements models,
i.e., we investigate the relation between the size of the model and the reasoning execution
time.
7.2.1 Design of the study
We start by selecting a base model, and then we clone the model to obtain larger models.
We apply the reasoning techniques to each of these models, and we calculate the reasoning
execution time for each of them. In particular, we select the model shown in Figure 3.7,
as a base model, and we increasing the number of its modeling elements from 142 to
9340 through six steps, i.e., and investigate the reasoning execution time at each step by
repeating the reasoning execution seven times, discarding the fastest and slowest exaction
times, and then computed the average execution times of the rest.
7.2.2 Experiment results
We have performed the experiment on laptop computer, Intel(R) core(TM) i3- 3227U
CPU@ 190 GHz, 4GB RAM, OS Window 8, 64-bit. The result is shown in Figure 7.7,
and it is easy to note that the relation between the size of the model (the number of its
nodes) and the execution time is not exponential, i.e., the reasoning techniques should
work fine with real world scenarios, where there sizes probably will not exceed the sizes
we considered.
7.3 Chapter summary
In this chapter, we briefly described the stock market system structure, where the Crash
occurs in 7.1, the Flash Crash chronology of events 7.1.1, and then we discussed the
main reasons of the Flash Crash 7.1.2. In 7.1.3, we described the applicability of our
framework by applying it to the Flash Crash case study. The evaluation considers both the
modeling language 7.1.4 along with the analysis techniques for verifying the correctness
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Figure 7.7: Scalability results with increasing the number of modeling elements
and consistency of the IQ requirements model 7.1.5, and we describe the automated
derivation of the final operational specifications of IQ requirements in 7.1.6. Finally,
we performed the scalability experiments to demonstrate the efficiency of the automated
reasoning techniques proposed by the framework in 7.2. In particular, in the modeling
concepts and constructs that our language propose seem to be adequate for capturing all
IQ related aspects that we consider in this thesis. In addition, the proposed properties
of the design along with the supporting reasoning techniques were able to identify all the
violations that we consider in this thesis, and the scalability experiments we performed
demonstrate the ability of the reasoning techniques to deal with large models.
Chapter 8
Conclusions and future work
I think and think for months and years. Ninety-nine times, the
conclusion.
Albert Einstein
8.1 Summary of the Thesis
Usually, IQ is a problem handled at technical level, however, IQ concerns also how in-
formation are managed by people in the organization and how business processes make
the correct use of information during their execution. In this thesis, we argued that IQ is
not only a technical problem, but it is also a social and organizational issue. Thus, any
solution to IQ should consider the social and organizational context where the system
will eventually operates. Furthermore, we advocate that such needs should be consid-
ered from the early phases of the system development, which may prevent revising the
entire system to accommodate such needs after the system deployment, which might be
very costly. This thesis addresses this issue by proposing a RE framework that supports
system designers in modeling and analyzing IQ requirements in their social and organi-
zational context since the early phases of the system development. We summarize the
contributions of this thesis, as follows:
A modeling language: we proposed a modeling language that has been developed
based on a set of objectives, and several principles proposed by Paige et al [POB00].
The language adopts concepts from both Secure Tropos [MG07] and SI* [Zan06]
modeling languages, and extends them with concepts and constructs for modeling
IQ requirements of the system-to-be. In particular, our language offers concepts
and constructs for modeling actors of the system along with their objectives, entitle-
ments, authorities, and it proposes more refined concepts for trust analysis based on
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the internal structure of the actors. In addition, it proposes concepts and constructs
to model IQ requirements in terms of seven IQ dimensions, namely: accessibility,
believability, trustworthiness, accuracy, completeness, timeliness (validity), and con-
sistency.
A formal framework: that underlies our modeling language, and supports system de-
signers while performing the required analysis to verify the correctness and consis-
tency of the IQ requirements model. In particular, we formalized all constructs that
our modeling language offer in disjunctive Datalog, and we proposed several reason-
ing rules (axioms) that enable for deriving new knowledge about the requirements
model. Moreover, we proposed a set of properties of the design that can be used to
verify the IQ requirements model. In other words, these properties are able to detect
violations to the system design, and notify the designer to resolve them, either by
modifying the requirements model, or by relaxing some requirements.
A mechanism for the automated derivation of IQ specifications: that allows for
the derivation of IQ specifications from the IQ requirements model, and represents
them clearly defined IQ specification language that is able to define the permitted,
forbidden, and obligated activities toward information. One main advantage of this
mechanism is its ability to specify correct and consistent IQ policies, since it derives
these policies from a verified requirements model of the system, which guarantee
that the derived policies are correct and consistent with one another, and with the
system requirements. Moreover, it offers a great flexibility in determining the right
implementation of the defined policies, if there are several alternatives, since it only
specify the required IQ policies.
An engineering methodology: that proposes a detailed process to be followed by sys-
tem designers during the different phases of modeling and analyzing IQ requirements
of the system-to-be, and then deriving the final operational specifications from a
verified IQ requirements model. In particular, the process has three main phases,
namely: modeling, analyzing, and specification phases. The process is iterative, i.e.,
it can be repeated, if required, to refine the model until reaching the target design
of the system-to-be.
A CASE tool (ST-IQ Tool): consists of four main components (i) a control compo-
nent (JAVA based-program) that controls and coordinates the activities of the three
other components; (ii) modeling component that allows designers for drawing the
requirements models by drag-and-drop modeling elements from palettes; (iii) Model-
to-text transformation component that supports the translating of the graphical re-
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quirements models into Disjunctive Datalog formal specifications depending; (iv) an
automated reasoning component that allows for performing the required analysis
to verify the correctness and consistency of the requirements model against some
properties of the design. ST-IQ tool aims to support system designers during all the
system design activities (e.g., modeling, analysis, specifications activities).
8.2 Limitations of the framework
The following list provides a summary of limitations that we have identified in our frame-
work:
End users’ evaluation: although we empirically evaluated the utility, applicability, and
the reasoning techniques scalability of our framework. Yet we did not evaluate it with
end users (designers), i.e., we did not perform experiments to assess the adequacy
of our proposed framework with end users.
Evaluation with other case studies: we evaluated our framework by applying it to
only one case study concerning a stock market domain. However, this can be con-
sidered as a limitation to the applicability of the framework, i.e., several concerns
can be raised whether the framework can be applied to systems that belong to dif-
ferent domains. Thus, we are planning to apply the framework to several complex
case studies that belong to other domains.
ST-IQ Tool installation: the installation of the Tool is not user friendly, and it re-
quires several applications at the host environment (e.g., Java, Sirius, Acceleo) to be
installed, and run appropriately, since it has been developed by integrating several
existing technologies.
8.3 Ongoing and Future Work
In what follows, we discuss several ongoing and future works to improve our framework.
Enhancing IQ analysis: we are planning to extend the IQ dimensions that we consid-
ered in this thesis, and to better investigate how each IQ dimensions can be analyzed.
In addition, we believe that the interrelations among these dimensions need to be
studied more deeply. Moreover, information production needs more investigation,
since information might be produced depending on other information item(s), and
the quality of the produced information might be influenced by the quality of the
information item(s) that has/have been used in the production process.
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Better evaluating the framework: user-oriented evaluation is surely one mandatory
step in the evaluation of any RE framework. We are currently working on that, and
we are confident that we will have interesting results to show very soon. In addition,
we aim to apply the framework to several complex case studies that belong to other
domains.
Improving ST-IQ Tool: although ST-IQ Tool is able to provide the basic requirements
for modeling and analyzing IQ requirements of the system, yet it can be improved by
several means, including: (i) we are planning to implement mechanisms that auto-
matically support the Model-2-text mapping; (ii) improve its usability by proposing
an integrated installation of the tool, i.e., users do not need to install several applica-
tions that are essential for installing and using the Tool; (iii) enhance the modeling
component by adopting the multi-view modeling.
Improving the automated specification of IQ of policies: we plan to refine our
proposed IQ policy specification language, and extend it with events that can be
used to trigger these policies, and we are planning to make the language more ex-
pressive by adding different kinds of constraints to it. Moreover, we aim to propose
more expressive derivations rules, and investigating if other kind of policies needs to
be considered.
Refining the social trust analysis: the concept of trust has been studied within sev-
eral research areas (e.g., philosophy, sociology, organization theory, etc.), and there
is general consensus that trust is complex and multidimensional concept [CW03]. In
addition, several researchers tried to answer the challenging question “how trust can
be built?”. For instance, many researchers focused propose approaches for building
trust based on some related beliefs, including: competence, disposition, fulfillment,
dependence, willingness, and motivation beliefs [ARH00; CF01]. While other re-
searchers introduce computational models for trust [Ste94; SFR00; EC01; ARH00],
where trust can be built based on an already defined constructs (e.g., repetition,
motivations, competences, etc.). To this end, we are currently extending our frame-
work by proposing more refined concepts for modeling and analyzing trust among
actors based on sets of beliefs related to the actors’ competencies and motivations.
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